University of North Dakota

UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects

8-1-1982

Consensus Information in the Newspaper Advice
Columns
Danel E. Rubanowitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
Recommended Citation
Rubanowitz, Danel E., "Consensus Information in the Newspaper Advice Columns" (1982). Theses and Dissertations. 1179.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/1179

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

CONSENSUS INFORMATION IN THE NEWSPAPER ADVICE COLUMNS

by
Daniel E. Rubanowitz
Bachelor of Science
University of California at Los Angeles, 1978

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
University of North Dakota
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota
August
1982

This Thesis submitted by Daniel E. Rubanowitz in partial ful
fillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts from the
University of North Dakota is hereby approved by the Faculty Advisory
Committee under whom the work has been done.

This Thesis meets the standards for appearance and conforms to
the style and format requirements of the Graduate School of the Univer
sity of North Dakota, and is hereby approved.

Dean of the Gradutfpe School
ii

Permission
Title

Consensus Information in the Newspaper Advice Columns

Department_____ Psychology_____________________________________
Degree_________ Master of Arts_________________________________
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the re
quirements for a graduate degree from the University of North Dakota,
I agree that the Library of this University shall make it freely
available for inspection. I further agree that permission for ex
tensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the profes
sor who supervised my thesis work or, in his absence, by the Chair
man of the Department or the Dean of the Graduate School. It is
understood that any copying or publication or other use of this the
sis or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without
my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition
shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any
scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.

Si gnature
Date

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.......................................

vi

LIST OF TABLES...............................................

vi i

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..............................................

vi ii

ABSTRACT.....................................................

ix

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION....................................

1

Heider's (1958) Theory of Naive Psychology..........
Kelley's (1967) Covariation Model of Attribution....
The Consensus Controversy............................

1
4
7

CHAPTER II.

LITERATURE REVIEW.............. ...............

9

Types of Consensus Information.......................
Underutilization of Consensus Information...........
Effective Manipulations of Implicit Consensus.......
Effective Manipulations of Explicit Consensus.......
The Present Study....................................

9
13
23
32
44

CHAPTER III.

METHODOLOGY...................................

Overview..............................................
Materials.............................................
Raters................................................
Procedure.............................................
Data Analysis....................................

52
52
64
65
66
73

CHAPTER IV.

RESULTS........................................

76

CHAPTER V.

DISCUSSION......................................

87

The Ecological Validity of Kelley's (1967) Variables.
The Underutilization of Consensus Information.......
An Integrated Consensus Variable.....................

87
95
99

APPENDICES
Appendix A.
Appendix B.

Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements
in the Advice Columns...................
Scoring Manual: Consistency, Distinc
tiveness and Consensus Information in
the Newspaper Advice Columns...........
iv

106
141

REFERENCE NOTES..............................................

176

REFERENCES...................................................

178

v

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
1.

63

Example Stimulus Sheet

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table
1.

Overall Rater Agreement...............................

77

2.

Overall Use of Covariation Information...............

78

3.

Alone Versus Combination Use of Information..........

80

4.

Use of Information Combinations.......................

81

5.

Overall Use of Kelley's (1967) Variables.............

82

6.

Individual Use of Kelley's (1967) Variables..........

83

7.

Forms of Consensus Information........................

85

8.

Relationship Between Consensus and Attribution.......

86

vi i

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge the help of the three professors
who served on the thesis committee.

Dr. Beulah Hedahl acted as chair

man of the committee and managed all administrative details.

Dr. Paul

Wright guided the data analysis and served as a statistical consultant.
Dr. Thomas Schoeneman supervised all theoretical, methodological and
interpretive aspects of the project.

All three committee members were

particularly supportive regarding the time constraints surrounding
the preparation of the thesis.
Special thanks must also go to the three undergraduate volun
teers who served as advice column raters:
Shafer and Laurie Stephens.

vi ii

Paula Bergloff, Nickie

ABSTRACT
The present study investigated the naturalistic use of consis
tency, distinctiveness and consensus information, which are the three
information variables in Kelley's (1967) covariation model of attribu
tion.

Newspaper advice columns were used as a naturalistic source of

social data.
The first question addressed in this study was whether or not
Kelley's (1967) three information variables are ecologically valid.
If perceivers in the "real world" actually use covariation information
to support or defend their attributions, then it should be possible
to reliably locate these pieces of information.

If the information is

used, it would be possible to examine whether perceivers prefer indi
vidual items of information or combinations, as well as which combina
tions are most commonly used.

Student raters were trained in the use

of coding manuals which helped standardize their advice column searches
for attributions and the three information types.
The second question addressed in this study concerned perceiver's relative preferences for the three information types.

A con

troversy in the literature regarding the use of consensus information
began with several findings that consensus information is underutilized
(Kassin 1979a).

Researchers have demonstrated that under certain

laboratory conditions consensus will be utilized.

Up to now, the

question of the underutilization of consensus has not been approached
naturalistically.

For the present study, consensus information was
IX

defined as both implicit (e.g., norms, stereotypes) and explicit (e.g.,
base rates, observed covariation across actors).

It was hypothesized

that consensus may not be underutilized when such a broad definition is
used.
The third area of concern to the present study was an attempt
to demonstrate that consensus information, defined as both implicit and
explicit, is associated with internal-external attribution in the way
that previous theory and research would predict.

High consensus should

be associated with external attribution and low consensus should be
associated with internal attribution.
The results of this study indicate that Kelley's (1967) three
information variables may be ecologically valid because at least one of
them was used with over half of all attributions examined.

The informa

tion types were used significantly more often alone than in combination
form (p = 0.0004).

No one combination was used more than any other.

Consensus information was found to be significantly underutilized in
terms of perceiver preference, for overall use (p = 0.0005) as well
as for individual use (p = 0.0074).

A marginally significant result

(p = 0.0578) was obtained for the predicted relationship between level
of consensus and the direction of attribution.

Implicit and explicit

forms of consensus contributed equally to the overall use of consensus
information, but it was found that consensus was overwhelmingly used
in high (e.g., much covariation across actors) as opposed to low (e.g.,
little covariation across actors) form (p = 0.000002).
were discussed and various interpretations were offered.

x

These results

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
If someone acts aggressively in a particular setting, is this
because he/she is an aggressive individual or because he/she is respond
ing to situational pressures?

The way people formulate an answer to

a question like this is the concern of the area of cognitive social
psychology called attribution theory (Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth
1979).

Attribution theory deals with how people perceive the causes

of their own and other people's behavior.

The origin of attribution

theory as well as a continuing source of new ideas is Fritz Heider's
(1958) seminal work, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.
Heider's (1958) Theory of Naive Psychology
Heider (1958) believed that scientific psychology has much to
learn from studying naive or common-sense psychology.

This is perhaps

particularly true in studying social cognition and interpersonal rela
tions.

By understanding the psychology of naive social perception we

may be able to make explicit some of the common-sense assumptions that
underlie scientific thinking in this area.
According to Heider, naive social perceivers are like intui
tive or implicit scientists.
trol their environment.

They are motivated to predict and con

It is undoubtedly adaptive to be able to

anticipate the causes and effects of one's own and other people's
1
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behavior.

People accomplish this by organizing and structuring their

perceptions in causal terms.

This was demonstrated in one study

(Heider & Simmel 1944) in which subjects were shown a film depicting
geometric objects moving around a rectangular area.
perceive causality in these events.
seen as "chasing" some smaller ones.

Subjects tended to

One larger geometric figure was
Some subjects even said that the

larger object was a "bully" and therefore caused the smaller ones to
run away.
One of Heider1s basic notions is that people perceive the
causal locus of a behavior as either internal to the person performing
the behavior (e.g., some disposition, trait or attitude) or external to
the person performing the behavior (e.g., some environmental or situa
tional factor).

Perceivers tend to attribute the cause of a behavior

to that factor which seems to be invariant.
To explain this idea, Heider drew an analogy between person per
ception and object perception.

When someone perceives a door, for

example, they see it as invariantly rectangular no matter what perspec
tive they might observe it from.

Even though various shapes actually

impinge on the retina from different viewing angles (e.g., rectangular,
trapezoidal), the door is still perceived as rectangular.
attribute the property "rectangular" to the door.

Perceivers

This phenomenon is

known as shape constancy (Coren, Porac & Ward 1979).

Similarly, if a

person is perceived as behaving aggressively in a number of different
situations, perceivers will attribute the cause of the behavior to
that factor which appears to be invariant.

In this case, the person

who behaves aggressively across situations would appear to be the
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invariant factor.

Perceivers are willing to attribute the property

"aggressive" to the person just as they are willing to attribute the
property "rectangular" to the door.
In social perception it is sometimes difficult to tell where the
locus of causality lies.

For example, if Ruth is arguing, is the cause

of the behavior internal to her (e.g., Ruth has an argumentative per
sonality) or external to her (e.g., the person Ruth is arguing with is
obnoxious)?

Heider realized that in order for a perceiver to decide

between internal and external causality, more information may be needed
than is available from one observation of a person interacting with the
environment.
. . . behavior can be ascribed primarily to the person or to
the environment; that is, behavior can be accounted for by
relatively stable traits of the personality or by factors
within the environment. Failure, for instance, can be attri
buted to lack of ability, a personal characteristics, or to
the supposition that the task is very difficult, an environ
mental condition. Whether attribution to one or the other
source will occur depends on a number of factors, for in
stance, on information concerning the success and failure
of other people, and on the tendency to attribute the con
sequences of actions to the person.
The problem of attribution also applies to thing percep
tion. In the perceptual constancies, for example, the retinal
color may be attributed in varying degrees to either the ob
ject or to the illumination; the retinal shape may be as
cribed to the shape of the object or to the position of the
object with respect to the observer. In other words, even
though the stimulus pattern impinging on the organism may
provide some information about the interaction between two
entities--the object and its illumination, the person and
the environment--additiona1 data are required before one
can determine which of the two poles of the relation is pri
marily responsible for the interaction. The additional data
may take the form of further observations or of beliefs based
upon information transmitted through previous proximal stimu
lus patterns (Heider 1958, p. 56).
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Harold Kelley (1967, 1973) developed a model of attribution that
describes the systematic use of further behavioral observations in de
ciding between internal and external causality.
Kelley's (1967) Covariation Model of Attribution
Starting with Heider's (1958) theory of naive psychology,
Kelley (1967) devised a covariation model of causal attribution, some
times called "Kelley‘S Cube."

This model deals with attributions for

behavior that takes the form "person verb stimulus."

The cause of an

actor's behavior is believed to be attributed to that factor with which
the behavior covaries.

Perceivers presumably use three types of in

formation in deciding whether the behavior in question was caused by
factors that are internal or by factors that are external to the "per
son" or actor.

Consistency information refers to how often in the past

the actor performed the behavior toward the stimulus.

Distinctiveness

information refers to the number of other "stimuli" or targets (be
sides the target in question) toward which the person performs the be
havior.

Consensus information refers to how many other "persons" or

actors also perform the behavior toward the given stimulus.

Each of

these information types can take high (i.e., much covariation) or low
(i.e., little covariation) forms.

The way the model works can be

illustrated as follows:
Consider the following behavior:

"Sue is afraid of the dog."

In this case the "person" is Sue, the "stimulus" is the dog and the
"verb" or behavior is being afraid.

High consensus information

would indicate that many other people are also afraid of the dog.
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Person A
Person B
Person C
Sue

afraid of-

-the dog.

In this case the dog would appear to be the cause of Sue's fear, and
therefore an external attribution would be made for the behavior.

The

dog's ability to provoke fear seems to be the cause of Sue's behavior,
and this ability is reflected in the fact that many others respond the
same way as Sue does.

On the other hand, if no one besides Sue

responds with fear to the dog, there would be low consensus on the be
havior.
Person A
Person B
Person C
Sue-

-afraid of-

■the dog.

In this case, Sue is distinguished from the rest of the actors by virtue
of her fear of the dog.

The cause of the fear would therefore appear

to lie within Sue, and an internal attribution would be made.
Distinctiveness information refers to the covariation of the
behavior across different stimuli.

Using the same example as above,

low distinctiveness information would indicate that Sue responds with
fear to many different dogs.
Sue-

■afraid of

dog A
dog B
dog C
stimulus dog

In this case, the cause of Sue's fear would appear to lie within Sue
(e.g., internal attribution) simply because Sue's fear is not very
distinctive and she is inclined to respond fearfully to many different
stimuli.

On the other hand, high distinctiveness information would
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indicate that Sue is afraid of the specific stimulus dog but is not
afraid of other dogs.

Sue'

dog A
dog B
dog C
stimulus dog

afraid of

In this case it would appear as if Sue's fear is caused by characteris
tics of the one specific dog (e.g., external attribution), simply be
cause she does not respond with fear to other dogs.
Consistency information refers to the covariation of the be
havior across time and across situations.

High consistency information

on our example behavior might take this form:
of the dog in the past.

Sue has always been afraid

In this case, because the relationship between

Sue and the dog is highly consistent, perceivers will tend to believe
that either Sue or the dog is the causal agent of the behavior.

How

ever, either consensus or distinctiveness information or both would be
needed in order to decide between them, that is in order to make either
an internal or an external attribution.
might take this form:
past.

Low consistency information

Sue has never been afraid of the dog in the

In this case, because the relationship between Sue and the dog

is very inconsistent (e.g., little covariation over time), perceivers
would be directed to rule out both Sue and the dog as causal agents.
Instead, they would be forced into making a circumstance attribution,
which would indicate that the unique combination between Sue and the
dog in the given setting was responsible for the behavior.
To summarize, Kelley (1967) suggests that perceivers attribute
behavior internally, externally or to the circumstances, depending on
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the levels of consistency, distinctiveness or consensus information
available.

High consistency indicates that either the person or the

stimulus is the causal agent, whereas low consistency indicates that
the behavior is caused by the unique circumstances.

High distinctive

ness indicates that the stimulus is the causal agent (i.e., external
attribution), whereas low distinctiveness indicates that the person is
the causal agent (i.e., internal attribution).

High consensus indi

cates that the stimulus is the causal agent, whereas low consensus indi
cates that the person is the causal agent.
The Consensus Controversy
The early tests of Kelley's (1967, 1973) model indicated that
while consensus information is used in making causal attributions, it is
underutilized relative to consistency and distinctiveness information
(e.g., McArthur 1972).

Other research involving category membership

prediction or attribution indicated that consensus information is either
greatly underutilized or that it is not used at all (Kahneman & Tversky
1973; Nisbett & Borgida 1975).

These findings stimulated a consensus

controversy in the literature.

Researchers attempted to find the con

ditions under which consensus information is actually used by perceivers.
Contrary to the early findings, Kassin (1979a) cited several
studies in his literature review which indicate that under certain con
ditions perceivers will be strongly affected by consensus information.
Of particular relevance to the present study is the distinction
Kassin (1979a) made between two types of consensus information that
have appeared in previous research.

Implicit consensus information
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refers to norms, stereotypes and expectations, while explicit consensus
information refers to actual observed covariation across actors and
base rate data.

Since there are a variety of consensus variables that

are being investigated for a variety of purposes (e.g., attribution,
category membership prediction, trait ascription), it is difficult for
researchers to arrive at a "consensus on consensus" (Kulik & Taylor
1980).

Perhaps the most neglected area of research has been the use

of consensus and other attribution information variables in non
laboratory settings.
The issue of whether or not consensus information is underuti
lized remains a potentially important one.

Central to Heider's (1958)

notions about attribution is the idea that people perceive behavior as
being caused by factors that are either internal or external to an
actor.

Consensus information, in theory, is one source of evidence

by which perceivers can distinguish between internal and external at
tributions.

The underuse of consensus information, if there is such

an underusage among perceivers, could conceivably be one factor in
volved in biasing perceivers away from external attributions toward
more internal attributions.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Types of Consensus Information
Implicit Consensus
Implicit consensus is the type of information that perceivers
tacitly hold regarding norms, stereotypes and social constraints.

High

implicit consensus information is the belief that the majority of
people would behave in a certain way in a certain situation or that
the majority of people belonging to some group or category possess
certain characteristics.

Low implicit consensus information is the

belief that the minority of people would behave in a certain way in a
certain situation or that the minority of people belonging to some
group or category possess certain characteristics.
Jones and Davis (1965) use a "social desirability" variable in
their theory of correspondent inferences.

This variable partially de

fines implicit consensus.
Society's norms provide implicit expectations for behavioral
propriety.

When an actor performs a socially desirable behavior, they

are performing a behavior that everyone would be expected to perform.
Such behavior is said to be high in implicit consensus.

Someone per

forming such a behavior is revealing little that is unique or personal
because everyone would probably do the same thing.
9

To a perceiver,
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the cause of this behavior would appear to lie in the demand character
istics or constraints of the situation within which the actor is be
having (i.e ., external attribution).

On the other hand, when an actor

performs a behavior which is low in social desirability, he/she is per
forming a behavior that few others would be expected to perform.
behavior is said to be low in implicit consensus.

Such

A person performing

such a behavior is revealing much that would distinguish himself/herself
from others, because virtually no one else would be likely to do the
same thing.

To a perceiver, the cause of this behavior appears to be

some factor unique to the actor (e.g., internal attribution).
According to Jones and Davis (1965) once an internal attribution
is made, perceivers can determine the specific internal causal factor.
This is accomplished through a non-common effects analysis, in which
the effects of behavioral choices are compared in order to locate any
that may be unique (e.g., non-common).

For example, suppose Mil 1y was

going to buy one of two dogs, a German shepherd or a beagle.

If she

chose the German shepherd she would get a dog that eats a lot, is
friendly, and is big.

If she chose the beagle she would also get a

dog that eats a lot and is friendly, but in this
small.

case the dog is

The only non-common effect between the two choices involves

the size of the dog.

Therefore, if the German shepherd were chosen,

a perceiver could be sure that the cause of Milly's behavior was her
preference for a big dog.

If the beagle were chosen, a perceiver could

be sure that the cause of Milly's behavior was her preference for a
small dog.
In correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis 1965) only the
social desirability variable (e.g., implicit consensus) is used to
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determine global external versus global internal attribution.

If a

global internal attribution is made, then a subsequent non-common ef
fects analysis can be used to determine the specific internal factor.
In a later formulation of correspondent inference theory Jones
and McGillis (1976) suggest that implicit consensus can also be gen
erated from category-based expectancies.

Here, perceivers implicitly as

sociate modal characteristics with such factors as age, sex, and occupa
tion.

High and low implicit consensus information are based upon what

characteristics the majority or the minority of people in a given cate
gory possess, respectively.
Perceivers also hold implicit consensus information that takes
the form of situation-based expectancies.

In certain situations the

majority of people (high implicit consensus) or the minority of people
(low implicit consensus) are expected to behave in certain ways.

It is

this kind of implicit consensus information that makes so dramatic find
ings like those in Milgram's (1963) classic obedience study.

Sixty-

five percent of Milgram's (1963) subjects willingly obeyed an experimen
ter request to deliver severe sbock to a person who was ostensibly a
helpless, protesting fellow participant (actually an experimental ac
complice),

People, in general, seem to underestimate obedience (rela

tive to Milgram's (1963) original subjects) when predicting their own
behavior in the same situation (Elms & Milgram 1966).

In other words,

people seem to hold high implicit consensus on non-obedience in the
Milgram (1963) experimental situation.
For all types of implicit consensus, high consensus leads to
external attributions and low consensus leads to internal attributions.
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Explicit Consensus
Whereas implicit consensus represents expectations about the be
havior or characteristics of others, explicit consensus represents in
formation about what others actually do or are.
Kelley's (1967) covariation model of attribution contains an ex
plicit consensus variable.

If it is known that many people perform a

given behavior, then there is high explicit consensus information on
that behavior.

If few people are known to perform a given behavior,

then there is low explicit consensus information on that behavior.

Ex

plicit consensus is believed to direct attributional activity in the
same way as implicit consensus.

If the majority of people behave in a

certain way toward a given stimulus then perceivers feel they have
gained some knowledge about the power of that stimulus to elicit be
havior (e.g., external attribution).

If almost no one else behaves to

ward a stimulus the same way as a given actor, then perceivers feel
they have gained some knowledge about the actor's inclinations (e.g.,
internal attribution).
The social judgment literature contains studies of base rate
information, which is analogous to Kelley's (1967, 1973) consensus
variable.

Base rate information provides high or low consensus in the

form of percentages or proportions of people behaving in a certain
way or possessing certain characteristics.

As with the other types of

consensus information, high base rate leads to external attribution
and low base rate leads to internal attribution.
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Underutilization of Consensus Information
Tests of Kelley's (1967, 1973) Model
The predictions for attribution from Kelley's covariation model
have generally been supported (McArthur 1972, 1976; Orvis, Cunningham
& Kelley 1975; Karaz & Perlman 1975).
In the classic test of the model (McArthur 1972) perceivers were
presented with behaviors of the form "person verb stimulus" (e.g., Sue
is afraid of the dog).

These behaviors were accompanied by supporting

information in the form of high or low consistency (e.g., In the past,
Sue has almost always/almost never been afraid of the dog), high or
low distinctiveness (e.g., Sue is not afraid of almost any other dog/
Sue is also afraid of almost every other dog), and high or low consensus
(e.g., almost everyone else/hardly anyone else is afraid of the dog).
Subjects were required to make attributions for the behaviors to either
the person, the stimulus, the circumstances, or to some combination of
factors.
In terms of the amount of variance accounted for among attribu
tions, consensus information (3%) affected attributional activity a
great deal less than either consistency information (20%) or distinc
tiveness information (10%).

Kelley (1967) suggested that consistency

should be more powerful than consensus because "physical reality
takes precedence over social reality information."

He further sug

gested that consensus information may actually require further attribu
tional tests regarding the trustworthiness of the information source.
However, it remained unclear why consensus should be underutilized
relative to distinctiveness.
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Consistent with Kelley's (1967) theory, McArthur (1972) tested
behaviors of the form "person verb stimulus."

In each case some per

son performed some behavior (e.g., verb) toward some stimulus.
McArthur (1976) reported that in her earlier study (McArthur 1972) the
stimulus was sometimes an inanimate object or thing and sometimes was
an actual person.

An inspection of the earlier data revealed that con

sensus and distinctiveness information were equally powerful in direct
ing attributions when both the "person" and the "stimulus" were persons
(e.g., John laughs at the comedian).

Distinctiveness information, how

ever, was more powerful when the stimulus was a thing (e.g., George
translates the sentence incorrectly).
McArthur (1976) hypothesized that people may be more likely to
draw causal inferences when given information about things than when
given information about persons.

This could be due to the fact that

inanimate things are perceived as relatively invariant entities, while
people are perceived as highly variable entities.

Psychologically,

this hypothesis makes good common-sense, which would be consistent
with Heider's (1958) orientation toward naive perception.
McArthur (1976) presented subjects with behaviors of the form
"agent verb target" instead of "person verb stimulus."

Half the time

the agent was a person (e.g., The man protects the house) and half the
time the agent was a thing (e.g., The tree protects the house).

Also,

half the time the target was a person (e.g., The girl holds the child)
and half the time the target was a thing (e.g., The girl holds the
flower).

Subjects were presented with high or low consensus and high

or low distinctiveness information.
always presented in high form.

Consistency information was
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The results showed that consensus information is significantly
stronger when it applies to persons rather than things.

Distinctive

ness information is significantly stronger when it applies to things
rather than persons.
tially supported.

Thus, McArthur's (1976) hypothesis was only par

Overall, however, the results indicated that distinc

tiveness information had a significantly greater impact on attributions
than did consensus information, even though the two information types
pertained equally often to persons and things.
Orvis, Cunningham and Kelley (1975) looked at the way perceivers
use consistency, distinctiveness and consensus in combinations.
McArthur's (1972) findings indicated that three of the possible combina
tions seemed to be basic patterns.

High consensus, high distinctiveness

and high consistency in combination (HHH) leads to the strongest stimu
lus attributions.

Low consensus, low distinctiveness and high consis

tency in combination (LLH) leads to the strongest person attributions.
Low consensus, high distinctiveness and low consistency in combination
(LHL) leads to the strongest circumstance attributions.
Orvis et al. (1975) hypothesized that perceivers use the three
basic combinations as templates or schemata when making attributions.
If a perceiver encounters partial information (e.g., just one or two of
the information types) they will relate the partial information to that
data pattern with which it is most consistent.

Then the attribution

which the basic pattern predicts is made.
Half of the subjects were given a set of behaviors (both inter
personal and achievement) of the form "person verb stimulus."

In

addition, these subjects were given one or two pieces of information
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consisting of high or low consensus, high or low distinctiveness, or
high or low consistency.
tion were sampled.

All possible combinations of partial informa

These subjects could attribute the cause of the be

havior to the person, the stimulus, the circumstances, or to any pos
sible combination of these factors.

The other half of the subjects were

given the set of behaviors and partial information combinations, but
instead of making attributions they were required to estimate the level
of the missing information dimension on a seven point scale.
The results strongly indicated that perceivers do approach the
task of attribution with the person, stimulus and circumstance informa
tion configurations in mind, and that they interpret partial information
in terms of these basic patterns.

Also, perceivers are quite willing

to infer the level of missing information in terms of the pattern that
the partial information approximates.

One notable bias that per

ceivers demonstrate, though, is a tendency toward making more person
attributions in the presence of high consistency (even though high con
sistency could lead to either person or stimulus attributions).

Orvis

et al. (1975) argued that this bias toward person attribution is not
due to some special preference on the part of perceivers, but instead is
due to the fact that high consistency may be more strongly related to
the basic data pattern for person attribution (e.g., HHH).
Major (1980) studied perceiver acquisition preferences for
Kelley's (1967) three information variables as well as the effects of
the variables upon attributions.
McArthur's (1972).

The procedure closely resembled

Subjects were presented with a target person's

behavior and then were allowed to acquire up to 12 instances each of
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consistency, distinctiveness and consensus information that related to
the target's behavior.

In each condition the 12 instances of informa

tion from a given category were either all high or all low.

After ac

quiring as much information as they felt they needed to make an attribu
tion for the behavior, subjects attributed the behavior to the person,
the stimulus, the circumstances, or to some combination of factors.
Among the analyses performed, Major (1980) looked at the amount of in
formation of each type acquired, the order of acquisition and the direc
tion of attribution.

Subjects acquired less than a third of all avail

able instances of information.

They acquired significantly more con

sistency information than either distinctiveness or consensus.

Distinc

tiveness was acquired significantly more often than consensus.

Consis

tency was generally acquired first, followed by distinctiveness and then
consensus.

In the two experiments performed, the first showed signifi

cant main effects for the information types in the predicted directions
(with the exception of stimulus attributions with consistency).

In the

second experiment only main effects for distinctiveness were found.
These results indicate that consensus information seems to be under
utilized relative to consistency and distinctiveness in terms of attributor's preference in acquisition.
Another study that addressed perceiver's relative preferences
for consistency, distinctiveness and consensus information was performed
by Garland, Hardy and Stephenson (1975).

They argued that in natural

situations, perceivers are often asked to make attributions to either
the person or to the stimulus before reviewing any supporting informa
tion.

An example of such a situation would be where a professor is
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asked to evaluate the ability or initiative of a student.

In this situa

tion the professor is asked in advance to make various person attribu
tions, and the professor would no doubt be expected to assemble support
ing information for these attributions.
Garland et al. (1975) provided subjects with statements of be
haviors that fell into four different categories based on pre-testing.
These categories were accomplishments, opinions, emotions and actions.
Each behavior was followed by a question.

The question asked what

further information would be required in order to make a specific attri
bution.

Half the time the attribution was to the person and the other

half of the time it was to the stimulus.

An example behavior that was

used is "Mary got an A on the chemistry exam."

An example of a person

attribution question that was used is "What further information would
you require in order to say that Mary is intelligent?". The subjects in
the experiment provided the answers to such questions.

These answers

represented free-lance requests for specific information.
were coded into four categories:

The requests

consistency, distinctiveness, con

sensus or uncodable (93% inter-coder reliability was achieved using this
coding scheme on pilot data).
The results indicated that requests for both consistency and dis
tinctiveness information occurred significantly more often under person
attribution than under stimulus attribution.

Consensus information

was requested significantly more often for stimulus attribution than
for person attribution.

Overall, however, only 23% of the information

requests could be categorized as consistency, distinctiveness or con
sensus.

Seventy-seven percent of the data fell into the uncodable
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category.

Consistency requests accounted for 3% of the total, distinc

tiveness requests for 13%, and consensus requests for 7%.
Because so little of the data could be classified into consis
tency, distinctiveness, or consensus, Garland et al. (1975) concluded
that Kelley's (1967) three information categories do not adequate account
for the types of information that perceivers would freely choose to use
in a naturalistic attribution situation.

They further stated that

Kelley's (1967) model may represent a significant departure from Heider's
(1958) notions about "naive psychology" and that the model itself may
reflect rigorous scientific thinking more than it does "the psychology
of the non-psychologist."
Base Rate Research
An interesting parallel to the underutilization of consensus
(McArthur 1972, 1976; Major 1980) emerged in the social judgment litera
ture.

In Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) classic study, subjects were pre

sented with base rate information on a fictitious sample of profes
sionals.

Specifically, one group was told that the sample was composed

of 30% engineers and 70% lawyers.

Another group was told the sample

was composed of 70% engineers and 30% lawyers.

Subjects were then given

very short personality descriptions of a number of members of the
sample.
half

Half the descriptions were designed to be "lawyerlike" and
were written so as to appear "engineerlike."

For each target

case, subjects were required to rate the probability that the person was
either a lawyer or an engineer.

The results showed that subjects seri

ously violated the normative statistical standards for prediction
based on the given prior probabilities (e.g., 30%-70% or 70%-30%).
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They seemed to base their predictions upon the individuating information
contained in the description of the target.

However, even when totally

non-diagnostic or neutral descriptions were given (only age, physical
appearance, etc.) subjects still underutilized the base rate.

Only

when no descriptive information whatsoever was given did subjects make
accurate use of the base rates in their predictions.

Kahneman and

Tversky (1973) argued that predictions are often governed by "represen
tativeness."

Subjects may predict category membership based upon the re

semblance between the target case and the subject's implicit prototypes
for various categories.
Kelley (1967) suggested that consensus information effects can
be used to explain the results of cognitive dissonance studies (Aronson
1973).

In cognitive dissonance studies, a subject will typically be

asked to do something that they do not really want to do or do not really
believe in.

If the subject complies with the request he/she is liable

to infer that his/her true attitude is actually quite in line with his/
her behavior (e.g., "Since I'm doing this I must really like it.").
This will be true mainly when the subject is given little external in
ducement (e.g., "I'm doing this without much reward so I must really
like it.").

Kelley (1967) argued that dissonance experiments always in

volve the subtle manipulation of social cues that make the subjects
believe that there is low consensus on their behavior.

Kelley's (1967)

theory predicts that low consensus should lead to an internal attribu
tion (e.g., "I'm doing something that nobody else would do, therefore
X must really like it.").

The greater attitude change of low justifica

tion subjects reflects the internal attribution.

High justification
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subjects do not undergo such attitude changes because there is much ex
ternal inducement for them to behave the way they did (e.g., "I'm doing
this because I'm getting a big reward.").

If subjects were led to be

lieve that most everyone would do the same thing in the same situation
(i.e., high consensus) then they would be able to realize that their be
havior was caused by something about the situation (i.e., external at
tribution).

It could be predicted that such subjects would not undergo

the typical attitude change of low justification subjects.
Cooper, Jones and Tuller (1972) asked subjects to write a "pro"
viewpoint essay on a subject about which their true attitude was "con."
Subjects were offered either a large or small reward for doing this.
Each subject was led to believe that either 15-20% (low consensus) of
the other subjects complied with the request or that 90% (high consensus)
of the other subjects complied.

After writing the essay, the subjects

rated their personal attitude on the subject of the essay.
pared to a pre-essay attitude rating.

This was com

The results indicated that sub

jects did not differ in their attitude change as a function of how unique
they felt in complying with the request.

In other words, the consensus

manipulation was ineffective.
Miller, Gillen, Schenker and Radlove (1974) gave subjects a
description of Milgram's (1963) obedience study.

Half the subjects were

given the information that 65% of the original subjects delivered maxi
mum shock to a helpless, protesting confederate.

The other half of the

subjects were given no such information. The base rate information did
r
have an effect upon predictions for the behavior of a fictitious sample
of participants in the Mil gram study situation.

However, it affected

only one out of eleven trait ratings for people delivering shock.
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Subjects made trait ratings based almost exclusively upon the amount
of shock delivered by an individual.
Nisbett and Borgida (1975) tested the effects of base rates by
providing subjects with what amounted to the procedure sections of two
previous studies.

They were then given consensus information on the

behavior of subjects in the original studies.

The base rates for these

original subjects were presented in percentage form.

Subjects were

then given information and descriptions of several target cases.
exposure to target cases took several forms:

The

videotaped interviews,

written descriptions, self-generated descriptions (subjects imagined and
then described several "typical" cases), or no target case information.
Subjects were then asked to predict how the target cases behaved in
the experiments, to make situational versus dispositional attributions
for the target's behavior, and to rate the targets on several person
ality scales.

None of the measures were affected by the consensus

manipulations.
In another study Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall and Reed (1976)
tried to use consensus manipulations to shift the locus of causality
from internal to external for two types of mild depression.

They used

college students who experience the "Sunday blues" and new college
faculty members who experience a type of letdown during their first
academic year.

In some conditions subjects were provided with base

rate information which indicated that their feelings were widely shared
(e.g., high consensus).

This manipulation should, in theory, enable

them to make external attributions for their feelings.

Such external

attributions could conceivably lessen any negative personal implica
tions for the subject's condition and possibly improve functioning.
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However, neither mood measures nor behavioral measures were affected
by the consensus manipulations.
In another experiment in the same study subjects were asked to
taste a variety of crackers and then rate them on several dimensions.
Subjects were allowed to drink a "neutralizing solution" between
crackers in order to eliminate previous tastes as well as thirstiness.
At the end of the "experiment" subjects were asked to place their own
container of solution on a shelf with the other bottles supposedly used
by previous subjects.

The amount of liquid in these other bottles

was manipulated so that subjects would think they drank either more or
less of the solution than all the other participants.

This consensus

manipulation had no effect upon subject's ratings of how much they
liked the taste of the solution, how thirsty they felt prior to the ex
periment, or how thirsty they felt the crackers had made them.
Effective Manipulations, of Implicit Consensus
Actor-Based Expectancies
Jones, Davis and Gergen (1961) studied the effects of in-role
and out-of-role behavior in a simulated job interview.

In-role behavior

was defined as acting consistently with the demand characteristics of
the situation.

Out-of-role behavior was defined as acting inconsis

tently with such demand characteristics.

When a person behaves in an

in-role fashion, they reveal that they are responsive to the implicit
normative requirements of the situation.

Because the context of the

behavior is a job interview, there would be high implicit consensus on
in-role behavior and most people would be expected to be responsive
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to the requirements of the situation.

With such in-role behavior a

person reveals nothing about their true inclinations or dispositions
and an external attribution (i.e., to the situation and its demands)
would be made.

When behavior is out-of-role, however, the person is

behaving in a non-normative manner.

There would be low implicit con

sensus on such behavior and few people would be expected to violate
the job interview demand characteristics.

Out-of-role behavior would

lead to internal attributions, that is, the person reveals his/her
individuality.
Jones et al. (1961) tape recorded carefully scripted simulated
job interviews.
mariner.

Two different jobs were represented, astronaut and sub

Astronauts were expected to be inner directed (e.g., "When

planning something, I like to work on my own.").

Submariners were ex

pected to be other directed (e.g., "I like to know how other people
think I should behave.").

An in-role and an out-of-role interview were

recorded for each job type.

Subjects were given detailed descriptions

of in-role and out-of-role behavior appropriate for each job type.
This can be interpreted as an implicit consensus information manipula
tion.

The subjects then rated each job applicant on a 16-item bi

polar adjective rating scale.

Job applicants who were behaving out-of

role were rated more extremely on traits (i.e., stronger internal at
tributions) and were rated so more confidently by subjects.

Therefore,

the consensus manipulation was effective.
The Kahneman and Tversky (1973) study cited above was used as
evidence for the underutilization of explicit consensus information.
However, it is just as clearly a demonstration of the strength of
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implicit consensus information.

The subjects who read the descriptions

of target cases carried implicit consensus information on the charac
teristics generally ascribed to lawyers and engineers.

This implicit

consensus information was ostensibly more powerful than the base rate
information in terms of subject's predicting the probability of the
target case being either a lawyer or an engineer.
In the Miller, Gillen, Schenker and Radlove (1974) study cited
above it was found that explicit consensus information did not affect
trait ratings for target persons in the Mil gram (1963) obedience study.
Other results from the study showed, however, that sex and attractive
ness (based on ratings of stimulus persons taken from yearbook photo
graphs) of the target case did affect predictions about how much shock
would be administered.

Specifically, males and unattractive people

were predicted to deliver greater amounts of shock.
significant sex by explicit consensus interaction.

Also, there was a
Apparently per-

ceivers carry implicit consensus information on the behavior of men,
women and their relative attractiveness that can be related to the situa
tion that was investigated.
Situation-Based Expectancies
The sex and attractiveness results in the Miller et al. (1974)
study related to actor-based implicit consensus.

On another level

the whole obedience study paradigm (Milgram 1963) generates expecta
tions that perceivers hold about how a typical person should behave in
that situation.

Some subjects in the Miller et al. (1974) study were

told about a target case who went "all the way" to shocking a pro
testing fellow participant with maximum shock.

Even when exposed to
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this target case information, the subjects made non-obedience predic
tions for their own behavior almost 90% of the time.
subjects were actually obedient 65% of the time.

Mil gram's (1963)

Clearly, perceivers

carry implicit consensus information about situation specific behavior.
In the Nisbett and Borgida (1975) study cited above, explicit
consensus had virtually no effect upon subject's predictions about the
behavior of original subjects in previous studies.

One of these previ

ous studies was Darley and Latane's (1968) bystander intervention ex
periment.

In that study, subjects communicated to each other from

separate rooms over an intercom system.

One subject at a time was

"turned on" for two minutes and was required to talk about the problems
of college life.

One of the speakers was actually an experimental

accomplice who faked a serious seizure and asked for help during his
turn to talk.

In the original study some 69% of the subjects (in

groups of four subjects plus one accomplice) never moved to help the
victim, even after 2-1/2 minutes had expired.

Even when Nisbett and

Borgida's (1975) subjects were given this base rate information, they
still overwhelmingly predicted that a sizeable majority of people would
have made some move to help the victim.

Apparently the implicit con

sensus information of these subjects regarding the helping behavior
in that situation was much more optimistic than the actual behavior of
participants justifies.
Lowe and Kassin (1977) also described an experimental situation
to subjects that involved a form of helping behavior.

In their

description, subjects were supposedly asked to wait for participation
in an unspecified experiment.

Each subject was asked to wait for
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either a long, medium or short period of time.

While waiting, each

subject was asked by a confederate for help with stapling papers to
gether.

The conditions surrounding this request were varied in a man

ner that generated high, medium and low implicit consensus information
regarding compliance with the request.

Almost everyone would be ex

pected to help (i.e., high implicit consensus) when the confederate was
well-dressed, polite, and expressed urgency and when the subject had a
long wait anyway.

Few people would be expected to help (i.e., low im

plicit consensus) when the confederate was disheveled, rude and ap
peared to be in no hurry.

An intermediate number of people would be

expected to help (i.e., medium implicit consensus) when the confederate
was polite and in a hurry, but when the subject had little time to spare.
Perceivers were given one of these three descriptions or they were
given no such description (i.e., no implicit consensus control group).
Each of these levels of implicit consensus was crossed with high, low
or no explicit consensus information on the helping behavior.

The re

sults indicated that explicit consensus significantly affected predic
tions for target case compliance.

Implicit consensus only affected

predictions in the absence of explicit consensus.

However, only

implicit consensus affected person versus stimulus attributions as well
as trait rating and predicted future helping behavior.

Overall, these

findings suggest that implicit consensus may be more important than
explicit consensus for making attributions and evaluations.

In con

trast to previous research (Nisbett & Borgida 1975), explicit consensus
did affect behavioral predictions for the particular situation being
investigated.

Lowe and Kassin (1977) argued that situation-based
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expectancies do not necessarily interfere with perceiver's use of ex
plicit consensus information.
Self-Based Consensus
Heider (1958) postulated that social actors are egocentrically
biased toward seeing their own behavior as normative.

Ross (1978) sug

gested that if people are prone to see their own behavior as situationally caused, as proposed by Jones and Nisbett (1971), then they
must carry high implicit consensus information on their own behavior
since it should theoretically lead to situation attributions.
Ross, Greene and House (1977) conducted a series of experiments
on this so-called "false consensus effect."

In one study they presented

subjects with a series of stories depicting situations involving some
behavioral choice.

Subjects were required to indicate what their own

choice would be as well as the percentage of people who would choose
each of the two behavioral options.

They rated both themselves and the

typical person choosing each option on a number of bipolar trait
scales.

In a second experiment subjects rated themselves on a number

of personal dimensions (e.g., traits, views, preferences, problems,
activities) and then indicated the percentage of college students in
general who share the particular trait, view, problem, etc.

The third

and fourth experiments in the study presented subjects with a hypo
thetical conflict situation or with the same conflict situation in
vivo, respectively.

The conflict was whether or not to agree to an

experimenter request to wear a sandwich sign for 30 minutes purportedly
to collect data on other people's reactions to the sign.

Subjects

either agreed or refused to participate and then rated the percentage
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of other subjects who would also agree or refuse.

In addition, sub

jects rated a typical agreeing or refusing subject on a number of
dimensions.
The results from all four experiments indicated a significant
tendency for subjects to view their own choices or traits as being high
in consensus.. This implicit consensus information apparently operated
in the predicted manner.

Persons behaving differently from the subject

(low implicit consensus, internal attribution) were rated more ex
tremely on the personality dimensions.
Two of the experiments conducted by Hansen and Donoghue (1977)
dealt with a comparison between the effects of self-based consensus
(implicit) and sample-based consensus (explicit).

In one experiment

they tested the hypothesis that perceivers generate inferences about
population performance from their own behavior.

Self-attributors

sampled a beverage in what was supposedly a survey testing the market
ability of a new snack drink.

The consensus manipulation was similar

to that of Nisbett et al. (1976).

Self-attributors were asked to re

place their own containers of liquid in a cabinet where they con
fronted the containers of other "subjects."

In one condition the other

containers were filled to a level similar to the subject's (e.g., high
consensus) and in another condition the containers were filled to a
level much less than the subject's (e.g., low consensus).
attributor subjects did not drink the liquid.

Other-

Instead they watched

a videotape of a confederate playing the role of subject.

The subjects

in all conditions were able to accurately report the amount consumed
compared to the simulated population amounts.

This indicated that
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subjects did perceive the consensus manipulation.

The results indi

cated that explicit consensus (i.e., sample-based) had little impact
on person versus environment attributions for the self-attributors.
However, other-attributors significantly utilized explicit consensus
in their attributions for the confederate's behavior.

When predicting

general population performance, self-attributors based their predictions
upon their own behavior (i.e., implicit consensus) while otherattributors based their predictions upon what their own behavior would
have been (i.e., also implicit consensus).
In a second experiment, Hansen and Donoghue (1977) provided
both self-based and sample-based consensus information to subjects us
ing a different procedure.

Subjects were randomly assigned to high,

low and no self-based consensus conditions.

The high and low condition

subjects were asked to choose which of two photographs represented the
more "sincere" person.

Subsequently, all subjects were shown a video

tape of other subjects choosing either the same (e.g., high self-based
consensus) or the other (e.g., low self-based consensus) photograph.
The no-self-based consensus subjects did not choose a photograph but
only viewed the videotape.

Sample based consensus was manipulated

by providing subjects with high or low population performance in tabu
lar form.
such data.

The no-sample-based consensus subjects did not receive
It was predicted that congruent sample and self-based in

formation would enhance the expected effects of consensus.

Conflicting

information was predicted to attenuate the effects of consensus.

The

results indicated that either sample-based or self-based consensus
alone was sufficient to affect person and environment attributions for
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picture choosing as well as estimates of general population perfor
mance.

However, the effects of sample-based consensus were signifi

cantly diminished in the presence of self-based consensus.

Contrary

to predictions, congruent self and sample-based information did not
enhance consensus effects, nor did conflicting information attenuate
it.

Overall, the results indicate that self-based consensus (i.e.,

implicit) is more powerful than sample-based consensus (i.e., explicit)
Kulik and Taylor (1930) believed that the photograph preference
procedure used by Hansen and Donoghue (1977) contributed to an arti
ficially greater impact of self-based consensus.

One problem with the

procedure was that there might have been substantial consensus among
subjects regarding which photograph depicted a more "sincere" person.
If one of the two pictures was clearly perceived as being more sincere,
then high sample-based consensus for the less sincere picture would be
viewed with suspicion by subjects and would therefore be discounted.
Another problem is that Hansen and Donoghue (1977) had subjects watch
a videotape of others either agreeing or disagreeing with the sub
ject's own choice.

This was supposedly the self-based consensus manipu

lation.

Technically, this is really sample-based or explicit con

sensus.

Self-based consensus is defined as the actor's normative in

ferences based on his/her own behavior, and not based upon his/her own
behavior plus the behavior of others.

Also, the vividness of the

videotaped information may have rendered less salient and less impor
tant the subsequent sample-based tabular consensus information.
Kulik and Taylor (1980) had their subjects listen to a comedy
audio-tape and then rate their own perceptions of the humorousness of
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the tapes.

The subjects were divided into high and low groups based on

how funny they thought the tape was.
self-based (implicit) consensus.
not listen to the tape.

This would serve to generate

A no-self-based consensus group did

Subjects were randomly

assigned to groups

given tabular data indicating either high or low consensus information
regarding how funny other subjects had found the tape.
information group was also used.

A no consensus

Subjects were required to make gen

eral population estimates on how funny the tape was to people, as well
as trait ratings on target cases who supposedly listened to the tape.
Similar to Hansen and Donoghue (1977), either self or sample-based
consensus alone was sufficient to affect population estimates and trait
inferences in the predicted directions.

In contrast to Hansen and

Donoghue (1977), congruent self and sample-based information did enhance
the consensus effects and conflicting information did attenuate the ef
fects.

Kulik and Taylor (1980) concluded that any "consensus on con

sensus" would be premature in terms of the relative effects of selfbased (implicit) and sample-based (explicit) types.
Effective Manipulations of Explicit Consensus
The original tests of Kelley’s (1967) model (e.g., McArthur 1972)
reported main effects of consensus information, but consensus was found
to be underutilized relative to distinctiveness and consistency infor
mation.

The base rate research indicated that consensus information

may be underutilized in a statistical sense.

The comparisons with

self-based (implicit) consensus also show that explicit consensus may
be underutilized.

These results stimulated researchers to find
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conditions under which consensus information strongly affects predic
tions or attributions.
Neutralization of Expectancies
Hansen and Lowe (1976) suggested that some previous attempts
which failed to show consensus effects may have been unsuccessful be
cause socially undesirable behaviors were used in predictions and at
tributions.

Miller et al. (1974) used Milgram's (1963) obedience para

digm and Nisbett and Borgida (1975) used Darley and Latane's (1968)
bystander failure to intervene situation.

In these types of circum

stances it is unlikely that observers would imagine themselves behaving
negatively; therefore they would not hold high implicit consensus on
the negative behavior and they may or may not hold high implicit con
sensus on positive behavior in the situation.

In order to study the

effects of explicit consensus it would be important to neutralize
these types of potentially interfering expectancies.
It is also possible that actors and observers have different
preferences for consensus and distinctiveness information.

Kelley

(1967) suggested that actors typically have access to a great deal of
historical data on their own behavior (i.e., distinctiveness) which
should theoretically affect attributions.

Observers, on the other

hand, are not privy to such historical information about an actor's
behavior and therefore should be more sensitive to consensus informati on.
Hansen and Lowe (1976) studied the effects of high and low
explicit consensus and distinctiveness on both actor's and observer's
attributions.

They attempted to neutralize the potentially biasing
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effects just described.

They used a relatively neutral behavior, the

rating of musical selections, in order to help control the generation
of socially desirable implicit consensus.

They also presented dis

tinctiveness and consensus information on computer T.V. monitors in
order to provide actors and observers the same access to information.
Subjects were led to believe that their physiological responses to the
music would be recorded because the experimenters attached equipment
to them, such as galvanic skin response recorders.
at his/her own computer monitor.

Each subject sat

Some subjects were told that they

would view their own reactions to the music plus the reactions of
several others (actor condition).

Other subjects were told that they

would view only the reactions of other subjects (observer condition).
The information was presented to the subjects on the computer monitors
in the form of numbered scales with lights indicating the strength of
reactions to the music.

Actually, all information in the presenta

tions was set-up in advance by the experimenters.

After listening to

a musical presentation, subjects recorded the information from the
monitor onto log sheets and then used this information to fill out a
number of attribution measures.

The results indicated that both con

sensus and distinctiveness strongly affected person versus environ
ment attributions in the predicted directions.
Zuckerman (1978a) suggested that Nisbett and Borgida (1975)
failed to obtain consensus effects for two reasons.

First, they

used socially undesirable behaviors and second, they presented infor
mative target case descriptions for use in making behavioral predic
tions.

Both of these factors could have contributed to the generation

of implicit consensus information which could have interfered with
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subject's use of the explicit consensus.

Like Hansen and Lowe (1976),

Zuckerman (1978a) felt that if subjects learn that most people (i.e.,
high consensus) behave in a socially undesirable way, they may have
difficulty in forming a meaningful "script" which accounts for the be
havior.

Subjects may fall back upon some "self script" which would

be based upon how they themselves would behave.

Zuckerman (1978a) also

noted that Kahneman and Tversky (1973) reported strong base rate ef
fects when no target case descriptions were presented.

With target

case information, people tend to rely on the diagnostic data in the
descriptions to make predictions, rather than use the base rates.
Like Nisbett and Borgida (1975), Zuckerman (1978a) presented sub
jects with the procedure of Darley and Latane's (1968) bystander inter
vention study.

Subjects were given either high or low base rate in

formation for helping (i.e., either socially desirable or socially un
desirable consensus) and they were either given target case descriptions
or not.

Subjects were required to predict the distribution of people's

behavior in the bystander intervention situation.

Those subjects with

target case descriptions were required to predict the behavior of the
target case.

The results indicated that subjects who received so

cially desirable consensus were significantly affected by such informa
tion in their predictions.
affect predictions.

Socially undesirable consensus did not

Subjects who did not receive target case descrip

tions were more influenced by the consensus information, whether
socially desirable or not, than the target case information subjects.
Feldman, Higgins, Karlovac and Ruble (1976) studied two vari
ables that could potentially affect subject's use of consensus
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information.

One of these variables was whether observers had direct

information or not regarding the target of an actor's behavior.
Subjects viewed a series of videotapes showing people choosing
from an array of pictures.
as the actor.

One person in the videotape was designated

Subjects were required to make causal attributions re

garding the actor's choice.

In some cases the videotape was filmed in

such a way as to allow full view of the potential choices.

In other

cases the subject watching the videotape could not see the actual items
but was still fully able to see which item the actor signaled as
his choice.

High consensus information was operationalized by show

ing all the other people in the tape making the same choice as the
actor.

Low consensus information was operationalized by showing all

the other people in the tape choosing a different item from the actor.
The results showed that subjects made the predicted use of consensus in
their attributions only when they had'no direct visual information
about the various pictures that could be chosen.

This could possibly

be the result of the neutralization of implicit self-based consensus.
Subjects who could see the items could decide which one they themselves
would choose.

The no direct information subjects could not see the

items and therefore would have no opportunity to generate implicit
consensus based on their own preference.
Order Effects
The other variable investigated by Feldman et al. (1976) was
the temporal presentation of consensus information.

The videotapes

showed consensus information being presented either simultaneously
or sequentially.

Simultaneous consensus was where all the other
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people in the tape besides the actor signaled their choice at the exact
same time.

If they all made the same choice as the actor, there was

high consensus.

If all the others chose differently from the actor,

there was low consensus.

In the sequential presentation tapes, the

people signaled their choices one at a time.

They all either agreed

with the actor's choice (high consensus) or they all chose a different
picture from the actor (low consensus).
The results indicated that the effects of consensus were signifi
cantly greater with sequential presentation than with simultaneous
presentation.

The researchers suggested that the simultaneous con

sensus was processed by perceivers in a single unit, whereas the se
quential consensus involved several independent bits of information.
In the latter case there would seem to be "more" consensus information
and therefore stronger causal attributions would be made.
In the early research on Kelley's (1967) model (e.g., McArthur
1972) consensus information was found to account for significantly
less of the variance in causal attributions than either consistency or
distinctiveness information.

However, consensus information was al

ways presented to subjects first followed by distinctiveness, and
then consistency.
Ruble and Feldman (1976) investigated the possible order effects
in the use of consensus.

They followed McArthur's (1972) procedure

by presenting subjects with a series of behaviors, such as "Sue is
afraid of the dog."

For each such behavior, the three information

types were also presented and varied along the high-low dimension.
Subjects then attributed the behavior to the person, the stimulus,
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the circumstances or to a combination of factors.

The results showed

main effects for all three information variables.

More importantly,

when the order was fully counterbalanced, the three information types
accounted for approximately the same percentage of variance among at
tributions.
Kassin (1977) had subjects read a description of an aggression
experiment in which participants delivered either severe, moderate or
mild shock to a confederate.
as the actor.

One of the participants was designated

The actor delivered shock either before or after all

the other participants.

Consensus was manipulated by having the other

participants deliver the same shock level (high consensus) or deliver
a different shock level (low consensus) than the actor.
always delivered the severe shock.

The actor

Subjects were required to attribute

the actor's behavior to the actor, to the confederate, or to the cir
cumstances.

There was a main effect for consensus and a main effect

for order.

However, the actor was seen as more personally responsible

when he delivered shock before the other participants.

Apparently,

the behavior of others can be seen by perceivers as a situational in
fluence independent of the focal stimulus.
Overall, these results on order effects suggest that the type of
consensus information which actually affects attributions may be picked
up gradually over many observations of others.
Trans!atabi1ity of the Base Rate
It is conceivable that many perceivers might make use of base
rate information if they only knew how to use it.

If subjects are

asked to predict category membership they may have difficulty
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translating the base rate percentages into numbers that are directly
applicable to the sample they are predicting from.

An example would

be where 70% of the population belongs to one group, 30% belongs to a
second group, and the perceivers must apply these base rates to a
sample of five people.

Subjects may simply see no way to separate the

sample of five people along a 70%/30% division.
Carrol and Siegler (1977) investigated this issue.

They gave

subjects the base rate information on a sample of 20 people or on a
sample of 400 people.

This information indicated either that 70% were

lawyers and 30% were engineers, or that 70% were engineers and 30%
were lawyers.

The subjects were asked to predict the category member

ship of 20 target cases using the base rates as well as non-diagnostic
personality descriptions.

With the sample of 20 people, the number of

target descriptions exhausted the sampled population (20/20 condition).
With the sample of 400 people, the number of target descriptions did
not exhaust the sampled population (20/400 condition).

It was assumed

that the base rates would be more directly translatable in the 20/20
condition.
Base rates affected predictions in both the 20/20 and the 20/400
conditions, but the effect was significantly greater in the 20/20 con
dition.

The combination of a small sample, exhaustive sampling and

directly translatable base rates yielded substantial use of the base
rate information.
In another experiment, Carrol and Siegler (1977) included in
formativeness of the personality descriptions as one of the variables.
Subjects were asked to categorize, as either a lawyer or an engineer,
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10 people taken from a population of 20.

The translatable base rate

was 70%-*30% and the non-translatable base rate was 75%-25%.

Five of

the descriptions were "lawyerlike" and five were "engineerlike" based
on pre-testing.

The presence of diagnostic personality descriptions

eliminated any effect of translatability, but there was a main effect
for description type.

Overall, these findings indicate that trans

latabil ity, exhaustive sampling, uninformative descriptions of target
cases and small sample size are favorable circumstances for the use
of base rate information.
Representativeness of the Sample
Wells and Harvey (1977) argued that according to Kelley's (1967)
covariation model, consensus will be effective only insofar as it is
informative regarding the covariation of some internal or external fac
tor with a particular behavior.

If a sample upon which consensus in

formation is based is perceived as being biased in some way, it is pos
sible that a behavior will be seen as covarying with the sample or
with the sampling techniques, and not with some factor either internal
or external to the actor.
Wells and Harvey (1977) replicated Nisbett and Borgida's (1975)
procedure by giving subjects a description of the behavior in a shock
taking study.

High, medium and low consensus information were given

to subjects on the behavior of participants in the original study.
Half of the subjects were told that the original sample of participants
were selected using strictly random sampling techniques.
half of the subjects were given no such information.

The other

Subjects were

required to make population estimates, causal attributions and trait
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ratings for target cases.

Consensus was significantly more effective

for predictions and attributions in the knowledge of random sampling
condition.

There were no significant effects on trait ratings.

Hansen and Donoghue's (1977) study, reported above, manipulated
self-based consensus by having subjects sample a beverage, after which
they confronted the containers of beverage from other "subjects."

This

manipulation enabled actors to compare their amount sampled with that
of others.

Observer subjects did not sample the beverage but instead

watched the actor's behavior and the consensus manipulation on video
tape.

All the subjects were given either high or low sample-based

consensus in tabular form.

Half of the subjects were told that the

sample of people whose beverage containers were encountered were a
representative, randomly sampled population.
subjects were given no such information.

The other half of the

The results showed that the

knowledge of random sampling influenced only observer's use of samplebased consensus in making attributions.

Actors based their attribu

tions on their own, self-based consensus, whether they were aware of
the random sampling techniques or not.
Sample Size
Kassin (1979b) tested the hypothesis that the impact of explicit
consensus should be enhanced when such information is based upon a
large sample instead of a small sample.

If the consensus information

indicates that 30 out of 40 students failed an exam, this should be
more influential than the knowledge that 3 out of 4 students failed
the exam.

4
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Kassin (1979b) had subjects read the description of the helping
behavior experiment that he used in his earlier study (Lowe & Kassin
1977).

The description indicated that students were asked to wait for

participation in an undisclosed experiment.

A confederate approached

the waiting subject and asked for help with stapling papers together.
In the earlier study (Lowe & Kassin 1977) the description of the con
federate was manipulated in order to generate high, medium and low im
plicit consensus on the behavior of helping the confederate.

In this

study, only the medium implicit consensus description was used (e.g.,
the confederate was polite and in a hurry, but the participant had
only a few minutes to spare).
Subjects were told that the experiment was conducted twice, and
they were given the results from two sample sizes (e.g., 50 and 10).
Half the time the large sample was reported to have high consensus on
the helping behavior while the small sample had low consensus.

The

other half of the time the large sample had low consensus and the small
sample had high consensus.
plicit consensus) were used.

Four levels of base rate data (e.g., ex
They varied from 60%/40% to 90%/l0%.

Sub

jects were required to predict the percentage of people who would help
the confederate if the experiment was again replicated.

They also

predicted the behavior of a hypothetical target participant.
The results indicated that increasing levels of base rate did
not significantly increase population or target predictions.

However,

the predictions were significantly higher when the high base rate
was presented with the large sample instead of the small sample.

In

other words, subjects used the base rate of the large sample to guide
their predictions.

43
Actions vs. Occurrences
Zuckerman (1978b) tested the effects upon attribution of Kelley's
(1967) three information variables, following McArthur's (1972) proce
dure.

Two types of behaviors were compared, actions and occurrences.

Actions were defined as behavior under the actor's voluntary control,
such as "Jerry attended the Sunday meeting."

Occurrences were defined

as behavior not completely under actor control, such as "Sue was afraid
of the dog."

Since actions are under voluntary control, they should

automatically be internally caused, which would rule out external or
stimulus attributions.

Anderson (1974) has argued that consensus in

formation provides data about other actors' reactions to a stimulus.
This tells perceivers about the power of a stimulus to elicit behavior.
Since actions, by definition, rule out stimulus attributions, consensus
should be less important for actions than for occurrences.

With occur

rences, internal and external attributions are both possible.
Zuckerman (1978b) provided subjects with actions and occurrences
followed by high or low consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency in
formation in counterbalanced order.
tion.

Some subjects received no informa

Subjects were required to attribute the behavior in question to

the person, the stimulus, the circumstances or to some combination of
factors.

Consensus information accounted for significantly more vari

ance among attributions for occurrences than for actions.

In fact,

consensus accounted for the greatest amount of variance among attribu
tions to the stimulus for both actions and occurrences.
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The Present Study
An Integrated Consensus Information Variable
It is apparent from the literature survey that perceivers do use
consensus information in making causal attributions and predictions.
It is also apparent that some conditions are more favorable than others
for the use of consensus.

In addition, there is evidence that consen

sus may be less important to attributors than other information types,
like consistency and distinctiveness (McArthur 1972, 1976; Kahneman &
Tversky 1973; Major 1980).
Kassin's (1979a) division of consensus into explicit and implicit
types provides one way of conceptualizing an integrated consensus vari
able which may provide a common denominator for the research on norma
tive expectancies, observed covariation and base rates.

It would ap

pear as if both implicit and explicit consensus yield the same predic
tions for internal and external attribution.

When an individual stands

out from the group with his/her behavior (low consensus), the cause
of that behavior is attributed by perceivers to forces internal to the
individual.

When an individual behaves the same way as most other

people (high consensus), then perceivers locate the cause of the be
havior in forces external to the individual.

Evidence regarding the

behavior of others can be based upon what others actually do (explicit)
or upon what others are believed to do (implicit).
Jones and McGillis (1976) discussed some similarities and differ
ences between correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis 1965) and
the covariation model of attribution (Kelley 1967).

In describing

the possibilities for integrating the two attribution models, Jones and
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McGillis (1976) suggested that Kelley's (1967) three information types
represent prior probability variables within a correspondent inference
framework.
One prior probability variable is target-based expectancies.
This refers to inferences about another person's behavior based upon
the knowledge of that person's behavior at other times.

Consistency

and distinctiveness information could be seen as generating targetbased expectancies.

Consistency provides data regarding a person's be

havior in past identical situations.

Distinctiveness provides infor

mation about a person's past behavior toward other entities or stimuli
in similar situations.

Expectancies for the person's behavior would

be generated from such information.
The other prior probability variable in Jones and McGill is'
(1976) formulation is category-based expectancies.

This refers to in

ferences about another person's behavior based upon that person's mem
bership in a particular social class, age group, sex or occupation.
Expectancies for the person's behavior would be generated from such
category memberships.

Category-based expectancies are quite similar

to what Kassin (1979a) calls implicit consensus.

Jones and McGillis

(1976) do not make any provisions in their formulation for inferences
derived from the actual, observed behavior of others.

This, of course

would be Kelley's (1967) explicit consensus variable.

A fully inte

grated consensus variable
plicit consensus.

would have to include both implicit and ex

Such an integration would be theoretically valid

insofar as implicit and explicit consensus, in their high and low
forms, yield identical predictions for attribution.
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Laboratory vs. Naturalistic Study
Virtually all research in the areas of consensus information and
Kelley's (1967) covariation model have been conducted using laboratory
based techniques, such as questionnaires.

One area that has been neg

lected is the study of the ecological validity of Kelley's (1967) three
information variables.

Although main effects have been reported for

all three types of information (e.g., McArthur 1972), it is not known
whether perceivers freely choose to select the three information types
(or whether they are of equal importance to perceivers) in order to
derive attributions for behavior in non-laboratory settings.
Major's (1980) research is probably the only well-controlled
study of attributor's acquisition preferences for the three information
types.

Major's (1980) experiments, like the other related research,

used a laboratory based technique.

Unlike the real world, attributors

were allowed access only to information specified by Kelley's (1967)
three information variables.

In addition, the behaviors that were used

were performed by people who were unseen strangers to the subjects.
The study by Garland et al. (1975), which attempted unsuccess
fully to classify free-lance requests for information into consistency,
distinctiveness and consensus categories was a step toward studying
naturalistic perceiver preferences for the three information variables.
However, the task they used must still be classified as a laboratory
technique.

The perceivers in their study were "force-fed" behaviors

to-be-attributed.

Despite the negative results, the coding format

used by Garland et al. (1975) is the method of choice for studying data
acquired in a free-lance or open-ended fashion.

Other researchers

have studied the attribution process using this technique.
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Elig and Frieze (1975) developed a coding scheme for categorizing
causal attributions relating to success and failure.

Following Heider's

(1958) notions about success-failure attributions, Elig and Frieze
(1975) divided attributions along three dimensions.

The stability di

mension divided attributions into those that are fixed and unchanging
across situations (stable) and those that are situational and variable
(unstable).

The source dimension divided attributions into those that

are internal to the actor, external to the actor, or mutual, in which
causality is shared between the actor and external objects or other
people.

The intentionality dimension divided attributions into uninten

tional (e.g., ability, task difficulty, mood, luck), intentional (e.g.,
effort) or mediate, in which there is a combination of intentional and
unintentional factors.
Elig and Frieze (1975) applied this coding scheme to attributions
for success or failure from open-ended questionnaire answers.

Their

test of validity of the coding scheme was to see whether attributions
for different situations (e.g., academic or social) and outcomes (e.g.,
success or failure) do differ on the three dimensions.

They reported

significant differences using Chi-square analyses on frequency counts
of attributions categorized according to the three dimensions.
Lau and Russell (1980) compared motivational and cognitive ex
planations for success-failure attributions using archival data as
their source.

They developed their own coding format which divided

attributions along two dimensions, stability (e.g., stable or unstable)
and locus of causality (e.g., internal or external).

They applied

this coding scheme to 107 articles from the newspaper sports pages.
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The articles covered 33 major sporting events during 1977 including
the baseball World Series.

The two authors independently coded and

categorized explanatory statements and then compared their results as
a reliability check.

They initially agreed 88% of the time.

Any dis

crepancies were discussed for one minute each in an attempt to come to
an agreement on the proper categorization.

If after one minute the

coders still disagreed, the explanatory statement was discarded.

The

final pool of statements accounted for 96% of the original explanations.
The percentage of attributions of each type were compared using Chisquare statistics.

The results supported a motivational explanation

for success-failure attributions.
The use of archival data from the sports pages is undoubtedly a
more ecologically valid technique for studying attributions than the
typical forced-choice, closed-ended laboratory procedure.

The players,

coaches and sportswriters who made the attributions had a much wider
range of possible responses and were not constrained in their use of
possible information variables.
The Newspaper Advice Columns
Another potentially ripe source for studying attributions in a
natural setting is the newspaper advice columns.

Advice columns have

been in existence for over 75 years and may possibly be a very real
source of help for those in need.

One popular columnist is reported

to receive over 1,000 letters daily and is estimated to have a readership of over 54 million (Dibner 1974).

In one analysis of letters

to an advice columnist regarding old age issues, it was found that
73% of the letters dealt with "problems" (e.g., loneliness, death,
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rejection) and 27% dealt with "other aspects" (e.g., information re
quests) (Gaitz & Scott 1975).
In another analysis (Dibner 1974), 77% of the letters dealt with
"personal problems."

In terms of the type of advice sought, 54% of

the letters requested explicit instructions on how to act and 36% re
quested general information about human behavior.

Attributions are

no doubt involved in an advice column's discussions of human behavior.
Since the consequences and determinants of attribution processes based
on laboratory findings may or may not be generalizable to real-world
settings, the advice columns could possibly be one source for studying
such attribution processes naturalistically.
Questions Addressed in the Present Study
The newspaper advice columns were used as a natural source of
attributional activity.

A coding manual was devised to enable raters

or coders to go through a random sample of advice column letters and re
liably find attributions.

Another coding manual was devised for raters

to identify Kelley's (1967) three information variables--consistency,
distinctiveness and consensus--as they are used to support, defend,
justify or explain the located attributions.

Three questions were ad

dressed in the present study.
The first question is:

Do people freely use consistency, dis

tinctiveness, and consensus information in their attributional activity
in a natural setting?

If these three variables are ecologically valid

attribution information categories, then they can probably be detected
in the context of attributions.

Frequencies of attributions that use

each of the three information types, either alone or in combinations,
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can be compared to the frequency of attributions that are not accompanied
by any of the three information variables.

If Kelley's (1967) variables

are actually used, then it will be possible to analyze which particular
types or combinations perceivers prefer.
The second question is:

Is consensus information in a natural

setting underutilized relative to consistency and distinctiveness, as
some previous research suggests?

Utilization in this study will refer

to the selection of a given information type to support, defend, justify
or explain a given attribution, independent of the predicted direction
of attribution (i.e., internal versus external based upon high or low
form of the information type).

It is conceivable that when consensus

information is defined as both implicit and explicit (Kassin 1979a) it
may not be underutilized.

In other words, the underutilization findings

may be due to the fact that consensus has been defined too narrowly.
Frequency counts of the use of the three variables can be compared,
which will be informative regarding attributor preferences.
The third question is:

Does an integrated consensus information

variable, defined as both implicit and explicit (Kassin 1979a), operate
in a natural setting in the way that previous research and theory pre
dicts?

High consensus information should lead to external attribution

(e.g., locating the cause of a behavior in forces external to the ac
tor) whereas low consensus information should lead to internal attribu
tion (e.g., locating the cause of a behavior in forces internal to
the actor).

Each piece of consensus information can be classified as

either implicit or explicit.

This will be informative regarding the

relative importance to perceivers of the two types.

Each piece of
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consensus that is used alone (i.e., without consistency or distinctive
ness) can be categorized as either high or low.

Also, each attribution

that is accompanied by consensus alone can be rated as either internal
or external.

These last two classifications can be used to test the

predicted relationship between direction of attribution and consensus
information.

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Overview
In order to study the use of Kelley's (1967) three information
variables in the advice columns, it was first necessary to locate at
tributions or explanatory statements.

Next, it was necessary to iden

tify instances of consistency, distinctiveness and consensus informa
tion that were used in the context of the explanatory statements.
Several steps were needed in order to accomplish this.
1) Find explanatory statements; simplify them to the form
"Referent Because Explanation."
2) Identify the person who is performing the behavior in
each referent.
3) Identify the referents of interest in the present study.
4) Simplify the referents to the form "person verb stimulus."
5) Construct test questions for use in a structured search
of the advice columns for the three information variables.
6) Locate the three information types as they are used in
the context of the explanatory statements.
7) Classify the instances of consensus information and
the explanations to which they refer in order to test
the predicted effects of consensus.
Detailed descriptions of the theory and procedure for each of these
steps are contained in two coding manuals.
Manual:

One manual, the Scoring

Explanatory Statements in the Advice Columns (ESAC) (see

Appendix A) was devised by Schoeneman and Rubanowitz (Note 1) for use
52
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in another advice column study.

The other manual, the Scoring Manual:

Consistency, Distinctiveness and Consensus Information in the Newspaper
Advice Columns (CDCNAC) (see Appendix B), was prepared for the present
study.
Step 1
The first step was to realiably locate explanatory statements in
the advice columns.

This was accomplished through the use of the scor

ing manual ESAC (Appendix A).

Teams of student raters were thoroughly

trained in the use of the scoring manual, which contained numerous
examples and a detailed procedure for locating explanatory statements.
Then the raters were given a random sample of advice column letters to
process.
raters.

A large sample of explanatory statements was found by the
Only those explanatory statements that were agreed upon by at

least two out of three teams of raters (including the main team,
described below) were used in subsequent analyses.

This insured that

the final sample would be reliable.
Each explanatory statement was reduced or simplified to the form
"Referent Because Explanation."

The explanation part referred to the

attribution or explanation for some behavior, thought, feeling, etc.
The referent part referred to that which was being explained in the
statement, that is, it referred to the behavior, thought or feeling
itself.

The following explanatory statement can be used as an example:

Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian because she
has a good sense of humor.
The explanatory statement can be simplified to the following form:
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REFERENT:

Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

she has a good sense of humor.

Each of the reliably located explanatory statements was reduced or sim
plified in this way.
Step 2
The second step in the procedure involved identifying whose be
havior in the referent was being explained or attributed.

This step was

necessary because in some referents there is more than one person per
forming a behavior.

In order to analyze the attribution process it

is necessary to establish whose behavior is being attributed in the ex
planatory statement.
In the example above, there were two people (e.g., Andrew and
Ruth) who were involved in the referent behavior.
identify what the explanation refers to.

It is necessary to

In the example, the referent

behavior could be what "Andrew said," or it could be the fact that
"Ruth laughed."

It is apparent from the explanation that Ruth's be

havior of laughing at the comedian is what is being explained.

There

fore, Ruth is the referent subject, or the person whose behavior the
explanation refers to.

The correct referent then becomes "Ruth laughed

at the comedian" while "Andrew said" is dropped.
The example just presented involved a referent in multi-subject
form.

If all referents began with the name or pronoun of a person

performing a behavior, the task of identifying the "person" would be
relatively easy.

However, many referent subjects are not presented
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so simply.

Some are presented in the passive voice (e.g., "They should

not be blamed for his misdeed."

The person performing a behavior here

is "the blamer."), some in the imperative (e.g., "Tell me what to do."
The person performing the behavior is the implicit "you," as in you
tell me what to do.), some as a dangling particple or gerund (e.g.,
"Going to his house, this would be unfair to her."

The person perform

ing the behavior here is the person who is going to the house in ques
tion.), and some as an indirect object (e.g., "The abortion issue
burns me up."

The person performing the behavior here is "me," as in

2. am burned up by the abortion issue.).

For each of these complicated

referent types it was necessary to identify who is performing the be
havior.
Part II.A. of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A) contains a
detailed procedure along with numerous examples.

Raters used this pro

cedure to identify the referent subject in each of the reliably located
explanatory statements.

Identifying the referent subject or "person"

amounted to establishing the correct referent behavior which was being
explained.
Step 3
Once the correct referent was established for each explanatory
statement, the referents themselves could be categorized.

This step

was necessary because not all referents are applicable to Kelley's
(1967) covariation model of attribution.

Those that are applicable

needed to be identified.
The referents of interest were those which could be simplified
to the form "person verb stimulus."

Kelley (1967) stated that his
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model applies to referent behaviors which specifically take this form.
Tests of Kelley's (1967) model (e.g., McArthur 1972) had subjects make
attributions only for these types of statements.

In these referents,

the "person" refers to who is performing the behavior, the "verb" refers
to the behavior itself, and the "stimulus" refers to the target, recipi
ent or focus of the behavior.

The example explanatory statement from

above can be used to illustrate the three referent components.

The re

ferent in the example can be simplified to the following form:
PERSON:
Ruth
VERB:
laughed at
STIMULUS: the comedian
Part II.B. of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A) contains a detailed
procedure for categorizing referents.
referents:

There are three basic types of

enduring personal characteristics, transient personal char

acteristics, and contextual characteristics.
Enduring personal characteristics include such things as social
identities (e.g., He is a Mormon.), personal dispositions (e.g., She is
an aggressive person.), and physical characteristics (e.g., You are
muscular.).

Transient personal characteristics include such things as

behaviors (e.g., I fought with John.), affective states (e.g., We were
happy about the election results.), and motivational states (e.g.,
He needs Sue's love.).

Contextual characteristics include such things

as interpersonal relations (e.g., Our marriage is poor.) and impersonal
physical contexts (e.g., The day was stormy.).
Neither enduring personal characteristics nor contextual charac
teristics could be simplified to the form "person verb stimulus" and
therefore had to be excluded.

Although these two referent types
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contain a "person" (except impersonal physical contexts) and a "verb,"
there frequently is no "stimulus" toward which the "person" is be
having (e.g., With the example "He is a Mormon," "he" is the person,
"is a Mormon" is the verb or behavior, but there is no particular stimu
lus toward which "He is a Mormon.").

Moreover, impersonal physical

contexts do not involve a person's behavior, so they would obviously be
excluded.
Only transient personal characteristics can be simplified to the
form "person verb stimulus" (e.g., With the example "I fought with
John," "I" is the person, "fought with" is the verb or behavior, and
"John" is the stimulus.).
Raters used Part II.B. of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A)
to categorize the entire sample of referents from the explanatory
statements.

Only those with transient personal characteristic referents

were selected for further analysis.
Step 4
Once the appropriate explanatory statements were identified,
each of their referents could be simplified to the form "person verb
stimulus."

Identifying the referent components was important because

Kelley's (1967) information variables (e.g., consistency, distinctive
ness and consensus) are defined by them.
Consensus information provides data on the variance among people
performing some behavior.

For the present study, this refers spec

ifically to the variance across the term "person."

Consensus infor

mation tells us about how many other "persons" perform the behavior in
question:
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Person A
Person B
Person C
Referent
Distinctiveness information provides data on the variation across
the term "stimulus."

Distinctiveness specifically tells us about how

many other target objects or persons are the focus of the "person's"
behavior:
us A
us B
us C
t Stimulus
Consistency information provides data on how frequently or how of
ten a given "person" performed a given behavior toward a given "stimu
lus," either in the past or across situations.
Part II of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B) contains a de
tailed procedure for simplifying referents to the form "person verb
stimulus."

Raters used this procedure to simplify the explanatory state

ment's referents.

The simplified referent components were used to struc

ture a search of the advice columns for Kelley's (1967) three attribu
tion information variables, as described in the next step.
Step 5
The main purpose of the present study was to reliably locate in
stances of Kelley's (1967) information variables (e.g., consistency,
distinctiveness and consensus) that are used to support, defend, jus
tify or clarify naturally occurring attributions.

Locating these

pieces of supporting information required a search of the advice columns
from which the explanatory statements were taken.

In order to insure
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that specific pieces of information were actually used to support a
given attribution, and to insure that the located pieces of informa
tion were reliable, a method of structuring a search of the advice
columns was devised.
A set of three questions was constructed for each explanatory
statement.

The questions were designed to test for the presence of con

sistency, distinctiveness, and consensus.

The questions basically

asked for the following:
How consistent is the behavior?
How distinctive is the behavior?
How much consensus is there on the behavior?
Raters searched the advice columns for answers to the questions.
An answer represented an instance of the given information type.
As noted above, it was important to insure that the rater's
search of the advice columns was both valid and reliable.

To accomplish

this, very detailed versions of the above three questions were con
structed for each explanatory statement from the three simplified re- (
ferent components (person, verb, stimulus).

Consensus referred to the

information about the variation across the "person" of the referent
(i.e., the number of other people who also perform the behavior).

Dis

tinctiveness referred to information about the variation across the
"stimulus" of the referent (i.e., the number of other targets toward
which the person performs the behavior).

Consistency referred to the

variation of the behavior across time or situations (i.e., the fre
quency of the person's past behavior).
The example explanatory statement from above can be used as an
example.
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REFERENT:

Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

she has a good sense of humor.

The referent was simplified to the following form:
PERSON:
Ruth
VERB:
laughed at
STIMULUS: the comedian
The three test questions would take the following form:
CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings)
has Ruth laughed at the comedian?

DISTINCTIVENESS:

How many different comedians does Ruth laugh at?

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (do, would, should) laugh
at the comedian?

A rater would search the advice column for specific answers to these
questions.
A standardized format for question construction is presented in
Part III of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B).

In addition to the

referent components (person, verb, stimulus), three other terms were
needed to construct test questions.
The Person Label referred to thecategory to which the "person" be
longs.

The person performing the behavior will always be a member of

some group such as "men," "Republicans," "car owners," etc.

If the

"person" in the referent is just described as an individual, then they
belong to the category "people."

The Stimulus Label referred to the

category to which the "stimulus" belongs.

Since the "stimulus" can be

a thing or a person, it can belong to any number of categories such
as "dogs," "cities," "movies," "airplanes," or "people."

The Verb
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Label referred to the general behavioral category to which the "verb"
belongs.

For example, "giving someone $100 for their birthday" belongs

to the general category of "gift giving."

Not all "verbs" will have a

Verb Label because many "verbs" are already in general form.
The various referent components were inserted into "skeleton ques
tions."

This insured that each explanatory statement's test questions

would be both customized and standardized.

The actual skeleton ques

tions were as follows:
CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings)
has (would, should) Person Verb (or Verb Label)
Stimulus (or Stimulus Label)?

DISTINCTIVENESS: Toward (at, to, with) how many different Stimulus
Label does (would, should) Person Verb (or Verb
LaBeT)?
CONSENSUS:

How many other Person Label (did, would, should)
Verb (or Verb Label) Stimulus (or Stimulus Label)?

The consensus test question was designed to test for the presence of both
implicit and explicit consensus information (Kassin 1979a).

The label

terms, "helper" verbs and prepositions provided enough flexibility to
insure that each question was gramatically correct and made sense.
Step 6
Undergraduate psychology majors were thoroughly trained in the use
of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B) which contains numerous ex
amples and a detailed procedure for searching through the advice columns
for Kelley's (1967) three information variables.

The raters were pre

sented with the set of explanatory statements along with three test
questions for each.

They searched individual letters to the advice
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columns for answers to the test questions.

Answers to the test ques

tions were instances of consistency, distinctiveness and consensus in
formation which were used in the context of the naturally occurring at
tributions.

A total of three raters were used in this step and only

those located pieces of information that were agreed upon by at least
two out of three raters were considered reliable.

Only the reliable

pieces of information were used in the analyses.
Figure 1 displays a typical stimulus sheet presented to the
raters.

Each explanatory statement had its own stimulus sheet and each

of the raters processed the entire sample of explanatory statements and
test questions.
Step 7
The reliable instances of consensus information that were found
by raters were analyzed further.

Each piece of consensus information

was classified as either implicit or explicit (Kassin 1979a).

Those

pieces of consensus information that were used alone (i.e., without
either consistency or distinctiveness being used also) with a given
explanatory statement were classified as either high (e.g., many other
people performing the behavior) or low (e.g., few other people perform
ing the behavior).

The explanations which these lone pieces of con

sensus referred to were classified as either internal or external to
the person performing the behavior.

These last two classifications

allowed for a test of the predicted relationship between consensus in
formation and the direction of attribution (e.g., high consensus is
associated with external attribution and low consensus is associated
with internal attribution).
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Figure 1
Example Stimulus Sheet
Name

13A-P2-1 3T

Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian, because she has a good
sense of humor.
REFERENT:

Andrew said that Ruth laughed at the comedian

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:
Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:

she has a good sense of humor.

Ruth
laughed at
the comedian

CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings)
has Ruth laughed at the comedian?

DISTINCTIVENESS:

At how many different comedians does Ruth laugh?

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (do, would, should) laugh
at the comedian?
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Materials
A random sample of newspaper advice columns was obtained.

Fif

teen columns from 1980 were randomly selected from Ann Landers, a syn
dicated column appearing in the Grand Forks Herald.

Fifteen columns

were also randomly selected from Dear Abby, a syndicated column appear
ing in the Los Angeles Times.

Each column contained approximately three

letters to the advice columnist plus a reply to each.

Letters that

were devoted solely to poems, prayers, songs and other non-attributional
activity were excluded.

The final sample contained 61 letters.

letter was typed onto a separate numbered sheet.

Each

Each paragraph was

also numbered for easy identification.
A total of 537 explanatory statements were located by the raters
using the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A).

Of these, 200 were con

sidered reliable by virtue of the fact that they were agreed upon by
at least two out of three teams of raters.
statements, 178

Of the reliable explanatory

were found to be applicable to Kelley's (1967) covaria

tion model of attribution (e.g., transient personal characteristics).
For each of the 178 explanatory statements, an individual stimu
lus sheet was prepared.

Each sheet contained the following:

letter

and paragraph I.D. numbers, the statement excerpt, the simplified ex
planatory statement (Referent Because Explanation), the simplified
referent (person verb stimulus) and the three test questions.

A typi

cal stimulus sheet is presented in Figure 1 (p. 63).
When conducting their search for Kelley's (1967) information
variables, each of the raters had available the following materials:
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a copy of the scoring manual CDCNAC, the set of 178 stimulus sheets, and
the sample of 61 original advice column letters.
Raters
For the first step of finding explanatory statements, four teams
of two raters each were used.

The main team consisted of a Ph.D. in

clinical psychology plus the present author.

The other three teams

consisted of upper division undergraduate volunteers.

The main team

applied the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A) to the entire sample of ad
vice column letters.

The other teams each applied the coding manual

to approximately two-thirds of the sample.

In this way, each advice

column letter was processed by three teams.

Essentially, the under

graduate teams served as a reliability check for the main team's find
ings.
The second step involved identifying the referent subject or
the "person" in each explanatory statement.

The third step involved

identifying the referents of interest in the present study (e.g.,
transient personal characteristics).

The fourth step involved com

pletely simplifying referents to the form "person verb stimulus."
Two raters were used for each of these steps.

They were the main team,

described above, consisting of a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and the
present author.
The fifth step was to construct test questions for each explana
tory statement.

Since this was a relatively mechanical procedure

involving the insertion of terms into skeleton questions, there was
no need to assess reliability.

Therefore, only one rater was used, the

psychology graduate student from the main team.
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The sixth step involved searching the advice columns for reli
able instances of Kelley's (1967) three information variables.

Three

upper division psychology undergraduates volunteered for this assignment.
Each rater in this step worked independently.
The seventh and last step involved classifying instances of con
sensus information as implicit or explicit and as high or low.

Also,

the explanations that the consensus information referred to were clas
sified as either internal or external.

The main team of raters,

described above, accomplished this step.
Procedure
The first six steps of the study were outlined in the Overview
section and are detailed in the scoring manuals (Appendices A and B).
Therefore, these steps will only be briefly summarized here.
Finding Explanatory Statements
The six undergraduate raters used in this step were thoroughly
trained in the use of Part I of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A).
They were given a written quiz on the material contained in the manual.
Two training sessions were also conducted during which the procedure
was reviewed and numerous examples given.

To ensure competence, each

team of two raters was given a practice sample of letters on which to
exercise the procedure under supervision.
was tested.

Then the experimental sample

Each team conducted seven sessions in a private testing

room for one hour each, during which time they processed five to seven
letters.

The procedure used is outlined as follows:

1) Each team member worked independently on the experimental
sample, one paragraph at a time. Both team members worked
on the same sample of letters.
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2) The located explanatory statements were recorded individu
ally on a "finder's sheet." Space was provided for the
letter and paragraph I.D. number, the rater's name, the
statement excerpt and the components of the explanatory
statement. Each explanatory statement was recorded in a
simplified, two-part form (e.g., Referent Because Ex
planation).
4) After completing their individual coding, the two members
of the team compared their findings. If the two members
agreed on both the referent and explanation of a given
explanatory statement, they marked "agree" (A) on their
respective finder's forms and then stapled them together.
If one team member found an explanatory statement that
the other member did not find, or, if the two members
identified different referents or explanations, then a
one minute discussion period was implemented in an at
tempt to resolve the discrepancy [following Lau and Rus
sel's (1980) procedure]. If after one minute the two
members had resolved their disagreement, they then marked
either "agree to include" (AI) or "agree to exclude" (AE)
on their finder's sheets. If after one minute there was
no resolution, the raters marked "disagree" (D) on their
finder's forms.
Five hundred and thirty-seven explanatory statements were found by all
four teams combined.

Two hundred of these statements were agreed upon

by at least two out of three teams of raters (including the main team)
Only this final sample of explanatory statements was used in the subse
quent steps.
Identifying Referent Subjects
The "person" in each referent refers to who is performing the be
havior being explained.

The procedure contained in Part II.A. of the

scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A) was used to identify the "person" in
each referent.
The two raters for this step were the members of the main team.
They worked independently and then compared their findings in order to
assess reliability.

The raters initially agreed upon 95% of the
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referent subjects.

The items that the raters disagreed on were dis

cussed and the discrepancies resolved.

There was no time limit on the

di scussions.
Classifying Referents
The three types of referents (enduring personal characteristics,
transient personal characteristics and contextual characteristics) were
defined in the Overview section.

Only transient personal characteris

tics were applicable to Kelley's (1967) model (i.e., they can be simpli
fied to the form "person verb stimulus"), so these explanatory state
ments needed to be identified.
The two raters for this step (i.e., the main team) each classi
fied the entire set of referents using the procedure in Part II.B. of
the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A).
Each of the raters worked independently and then compared their
findings in order to assess reliability.

The raters initially agreed

on 92% of the referents classified into the three types.

Any disagree

ments were discussed and resolved, with no time limit on the discus
sions.

The final sample of transient personal characteristics con

sisted of 178 explanatory statements.

Only this final sample was used

in subsequent analyses.
Simplifying Referents
Following Kelley's (1967) theory and McArthur's (1972) procedure,
all referents in the final sample were simplified to the form "person
verb stimulus."
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A random sample of 50 of the referents were simplified according
to the procedure in Part II of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B).
Each of the two raters worked independently on the sample of 50
referents.

The raters already had the "person" identified for each

referent because these were coded in the earlier step, Identifying Refer
ent Subjects.

Therefore, only the "verb" and "stimulus" needed to be

established for each referent.

The raters were given the set of ex

planatory statements, the list of referent subjects and the sample of
original advice column letters.

Each rater used the explanatory state

ment and the context of the original letter to identify the correct
"verb" and "stimulus."
The raters initially agreed on the simplification of 84% of the
50 referents that were randomly sampled.

Those simplifications that

were not agreed upon were discussed and the discrepancies resolved, with
no time limit on the discussions.

A review of the discrepancies indi

cated that all the disagreements occurred for referents that were in
multi-subject form (see Overview).
The remaining 128 referents were simplified by one rater only.
In view of the disagreements just cited, this one rater was reminded
to pay close attention to the context of the original letters to insure
that the correct "verb" and "stimulus" would be identified.
Test Question Construction
One rater was used to construct the three test questions (one
each for consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus) for each of the
explanatory statements.

There was no need to assess reliability for

this step because no coding was involved and the task was a perfunctory
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placing of the referent components (e.g., person, verb and stimulus)
into skeleton questions.
Part III of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B). contains a
description of the skeleton questions and several examples.

Also, in

structions are presented for the use of Label terms (see Overview),
"helper" verbs and prepositions which help insure that each question is
grammatically correct and makes sense.
Locating Consistency, Distinctiveness and Consensus Information
Three undergraduate raters were used for this step.

They were re

quired to study Part IV of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B).
This scoring manual contains definitions and descriptions of explanatory
statements and their components, referents and their components, the
three information variables and the structured test questions.

The

raters were given a written quiz on this information to determine their
level of mastery as well as to reveal any areas in which further train
ing was indicated.

Two training sessions were conducted during which

the scoring manual was reviewed.

Raters were given supervised prac

tice in locating the three information variables in the context of ex
planatory statements.

Numerous trial runs were conducted using sample

advice column letters and stimulus sheets like the one shown in
Figure 1 (p. 63).
Part IV of the scoring manual CDCNAC (Appendix B) contains a de
tailed procedure for locating the three information variables using
the stimulus materials.

This procedure, which was used by all the

raters, can be summarized as follows:
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1) Read the excerpt, the simplified explanatory statement
(e.g., Referent Because Explanation), the simplified refer
ent (e.g., person verb stimulus) and the three test ques
tions.
2) Locate the correct letter and paragraph from the selection
of original letters using the I.D. number at the top of
each data sheet.
3) Read the entire original letter in order to become familiar
with its contents.
4) Do one question at a time.
5) Start from the beginning of the letter (not just the be
ginning of the paragraph) for each question.
6) If you find information that enables you to answer a ques
tion, write in that information under the question that it
refers to.
7) Write in the supporting information just as it appears in
the original letter. If you feel you need to explain your
choice of information, or show why it is correct, place your
clarificatidn in parentheses next to the piece of informa
tion.
8) If you find more than one piece of supporting information
that answers a given question (e.g., two instances of Con
sistency), then number your pieces of information (e.g.,
1, 2, 3, etc.). Present instances of information in the
order in which they appear in the original letter.
9) If you are not able to locate a piece of information that
will answer a question, write in the words "NO INFO" under
the question.
Raters worked at their own pace on their own time.

Emphasis was placed

upon accuracy and thoroughness.
After completion, the stimulus sheets for each rater were col
lected and the findings tabulated.

Only those pieces of information

that were found by at least two out of three raters were used in the
analyses.
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Coding Consensus Information and Explanations
Those pieces of consensus information that were agreed upon by
at least two out of three raters were considered reliable and were
analyzed further.

The main team of raters (e.g., a Ph.D. in clinical

psychology and the present author) were used for these additional cod
ing steps.
Each piece of consensus information was classified as either im
plicit or explicit (Kassin 1979a).

Explicit consensus refers to actual

or observed covariation of the referent behavior across actors.

It can

take the form of base rate information (e.g., One out of six doctors
endorse the drug), expert testimony (e.g., The professor also agreed
with my point), or any other form of social or consensual support (e.g.,
Many of us enjoyed the movie).

Implicit consensus refers to the expected

covariation of the referent behavior across actors.

It can take the

form of norms (e.g., Children should learn to read at a young age),
stereotypes (e.g., Men like to exert their dominance), or other types
of behavioral expectations (e.g., Couples love to dance).
In coding the reliable pieces of consensus information as either
implicit or explicit, the raters achieved 83% agreement (i.e., 25 out
of 30).

The discrepancies were discussed and resolved, with no time

limit on the discussions.
The pieces of consensus information were also classified as.
either high (e.g., many other people perform or would perform the be
havior) or low (e.g., few other people perform or would perform the be
havior).

For this coding step, the raters achieved 93% agreement (i.e.,

28 out of 30).

The discrepancies were discussed and resolved.
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Ten pieces of consensus information were used alone (i.e., with
out either consistency or distinctiveness being used also).

The ex

planations with which the lone pieces of consensus were used were coded
as either internal to the person performing the behavior or external
to the person performing the behavior, according to the procedure con
tained in Part II.B. of the scoring manual ESAC (Appendix A).
procedure actually contains three coding categories:
nal and interpersonal.

This

internal, exter

Only the internal and external categories were

of interest in the present study.

For this coding step, the raters

achieved 100% agreement (i.e., 10 out of 10).
Data Analysis
Ecological Validity of Kelley's (1967) Information Variables
If Kelley's (1967) model is generalizable to the "real world,"
then naturalistic attributions should be accompanied by the information
variables a substantial portion of the time.

The frequency of attribu

tions supported by any of the variables, either alone or in combination,
were compared to the frequency of attributions that were not accom
panied by any of the variables.

In the advice columns, if the fre

quency of usage were significantly greater or equal to the frequency
of non-usage, then there would be evidence for the ecological validity
of the three variables.

This type of evidence would indicate that per-

ceivers use the variables with their attributions either half the
time or more than half the time.
If the three variables are used significantly, then it would be
of descriptive interest to see whether perceivers prefer to use them
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alone or in combinations.

Previous research indicated that the vari

ables actually do direct attributional activity whether their effects
are analyzed individually (McArthur 1972) or whether particular con
figurations are used (Orvis et al. 1975).

The frequencies of usage of

the information types, alone and in combinations, were tabulated and
compared.
The Underutilization of Consensus
Previous theory (Kelley 1967) and research (McArthur 1972) has
indicated that consistency may be a more valuable and informative vari
able than either distinctiveness or consensus.

It is still not com

pletely clear why under some conditions consensus is so greatly under
utilized relative to the other two types of information.

It is pos

sible that Kelley's (1967) definition of consensus as explicit or ob
served covariation across actors may be too limited.

Such a definition

does not incorporate the implicit forms of consensus (e.g., norms,
stereotypes or expectations) which may be quite influential in natural
attribution situations.

To investigate the possibility that consensus

may not be underutilized when it is more broadly defined, the overall
frequencies of usage of the three information variables were compared,
with consensus defined as both implicit and explicit.
An Integrated Consensus Variable
If it is reasonable to define consensus information as both im
plicit and explicit (Kassin 1979a), then each of these types should
contribute to the overall use of consensus.

Each piece of consensus

that accompanied an advice column attribution was classified as either
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implicit or explicit, and the frequencies of the two types were com
pared.
Previous research (Kassin 1979a) has indicated that implicit and
explicit consensus similarly affect the direction of attribution.
Each piece of consensus that was used alone (i.e., without consistency
or distinctiveness being used also) was classified as either high or
low.

Each attribution that

was accompanied by one of these pieces of

consensus was classified as either internal or external.
sifications yielded a 2 X 2 matrix.

These clas

It is important to note that only

the lone pieces of consensus had to be used in order to prevent the
confounding effects of consistency and distinctiveness upon the direc
tion of attribution.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Ecological Validity of Kelley's (1967) Information Variables
Three raters were used to search the random sample of advice columns
for instances of Kelley's (1967) three information variables.
all performance of each rater is presented in Table 1.

The over

One rater (Rater

A) located much more covariation information than either of the other
two raters.

It is possible that the extreme rater was too liberal in

her coding of information.

It is also possible that she may have been

more sensitive than the other raters to subtle examples of the three in
formation types.

In either case, the reliability of the method used

to locate covariation information cannot be determined from the perfor
mance of the three raters used in this study.

However, only those

pieces of information that were agreed upon by at least two out of three
of the raters were considered reliable.

Only these reliable, unambigu

ous pieces of information were used in the data analyses.
The frequency of attributions that were accompanied by at least
one of Kelley's (1967) three information variables (e.g., something)
was compared to the frequency of attributions that did not use any of
the three information variables (e.g., nothing).
frequencies were 0.50.

The expected cell

Although the frequency of at least something

being used was greater than the frequency of nothing being used, this
difference was not statistically significant (see Table 2).
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Table 1
Overal1 Rater Agreement
Number of Pieces of Information Found
Rater

Consi stency

Distinctiveness

Consensus

A

99

85

65

B

44

46

28

C

50

61

34

2 out of 3
agreement

31

22

9

3 out of 3
agreement

24

33

21

55

55

30

Total

78

Table 2
Overall Use of Covariation Information
Information
Used

Number of
Attri butions

Something

97

Nothing

81

Total

178

Chi-square

Probabi1ity

1.438

0.2300
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result indicates that Kelley's (1967) information variables appeared
with approximately one-half of all the attributions in the sample.
The attributions that were accompanied by Kelley's (1967) vari
ables were divided into those that used an individual piece of infor
mation and those that used information combinations.

The results in

dicate that perceivers significantly prefer to use the information vari
ables individually (see Table 3).

The expected cell frequencies were

0.50.
No one information combination seemed to be used more than any
other (see Table 4).

The expected cell frequencies were 0.25.

The

results involving pieces of information that were used alone are re
ported in the Underutilization of Consensus section.
The Underutilization of Consensus
The overall frequencies of usage of the three information vari
ables indicate that consistency and distinctiveness information were
used equally often, and that consensus information was significantly
underutilized (see Table 5).

The expected cell frequencies were 0.333.

Consensus information was also significantly underutilized rela
tive to consistency and distinctiveness among those attributions that
were accompanied by only one piece of information (see Table 6).
expected cell frequencies were 0.333.

The

It is interesting to note that

consistency and distinctiveness information were used equally often
when used alone, which is the same result obtained with their overall
use.
Consensus information was greatly underutilized relative to con
sistency and distinctiveness information even though consensus was
broadly defined as both implicit and explicit.
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Table 3
Alone Versus Combination Use of Information
Information
Used

Number of
Attri butions3

Alone

66

Combinations

31

Total

97

a0ut of 178 attributions

Chi-square

Probability

12.629

0.0004
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Table 4
Use of Information Combinations
Information
Combination
Consistency +
Distinctiveness

Number of
Times Used3

Probability

12

Consistency +
Consensus

5

Distinctiveness +
Consensus

8

Consistency +
Distinctiveness +
Consensus

6

Total

Chi-square

3.710

31

Out of 178 attributions

0.2946
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Table 5
Overall Use of Kelley's (1967) Variables

Information

Number of
Times Used3

Consistency

55

Distinctiveness

55

Consensus

30

a0ut of 178 attributions

Chi-square

Probabi 1ity

15.135

0.0005
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Table 6
Individual Use of Kelley's (1967) Variables

Information

Number of
Times Used3

Consistency

28

Distinctiveness

28

Consensus

10

a0ut of 66 attributions

Chi-square

Probability

9.818

0.0074
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An Integrated Consensus Variable
When consensus information appeared in the context of an attribu
tion it was used significantly more often in high form as opposed to
low form (expected cell frequencies were 0.50).

Consensus information

was used about equally often in its implicit and explicit forms (ex
pected cell frequencies were 0.50).

When the implicit/explicit clas

sification was crossed with the high/low classification, the four cell
frequencies were significantly different (expected cell frequencies
were 0.25).

However, there was no interaction.

These results are dis

played in Table 7.
Ten pieces of consensus information were used alone (e.g., with
out consistency or distinctiveness being used also).

The attributions

that were accompanied by these items of consensus were classified as
either internal or external to the actor.

These attributions and the

accompanying pieces of consensus were used to test the predicted rela
tionship between consensus information and the direction of attribution.
However, of the 10 pieces of consensus none were used in low form.
Therefore, only the predicted relationship between high consensus and
internal/external attribution could be tested.

The results were in the

predicted direction, that is, high consensus was associated more often
with external attribution than with internal attribution.
ence achieved borderline significance (see Table 8).

This differ
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Table 7
Forms of Consensus Information

Implicit

Explicit
High

Low

High

Low

15

2

13

0

Compari son
Overal1

Chi-square
22.80

Probability
0.00004

Interaction

0

1.0

Explicit/Impl icit

0.5333

0.4652

High/Low

22.5333

a30 pieces of consensus were used for these analyses.

0.000002
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Table 8
Relationship Between Consensus and Attribution
Low Consensus

High_ Consensus
Internal

External

Internal

External

2

8

0

0

Comparison
Internal/Externalb

Chi-square

Probability

3.600

0.0578*
0
1

a

10 pieces of consensus were used in this analysis.
bThis comparison was made only for high consensus.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The Ecological Validity of Kelley's (1967) Variables
The results of this project indicate that in a natural setting
perceivers may make substantial use of social data corresponding to
Kelley's (1967) three information variables.

Over half of all the at

tributions in the present sample were accompanied by at least one piece
of covariation information.
The method used in this study insured that each piece of covaria
tion information which accompanied an attribution related specifically
to that attribution.

The advice column raters were guided in their

search for supporting information through the use of carefully con
structed test questions.

Consistent with Kelley's (1967) theory, these

test questions were designed to focus the rater's search upon covaria
tion information (i.e., consistency, distinctiveness and consensus)
that related to the particular behavior in question (i.e., person verb
stimulus).

The supporting information in the advice columns some

times appeared before the explanatory statement (i.e., Referent Be
cause Explanation), sometimes after the explanatory statement and
sometimes as part of the explanatory statement.

Therefore, it cannot

be determined whether the supporting information was used to direct
attributional activity or whether it was a by-product of attributional
activity.

Undoubtedly, it was used in both ways.
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Some of the research
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reported earlier (McArthur 1972, 1976; Ruble & Feldman 1976; Major
1980) indicated that perceivers use consistency, distinctiveness and
consensus information in order to determine where the locus of causal
ity lies.

However, other research (Zuckerman & Mann 1979) has demon

strated that once an attribution is made for a behavior, perceivers will
make generalizations about the same behavior across actors (i.e ., con
sensus), across other stimuli (i.e., distinctiveness) and across cir
cumstances (i.e., consistency).

These generalizations corresponded to

the high and low levels of the three information variables that are
associated with particular attributions.

This effect can be viewed as

Kelley's (1967) model in reverse.
Although the present study supports the ecological validity of
Kelley's (1967) three information variables, the results do not ad
dress the ecological validity of the covariation model itself.

In

order to study this model in the advice columns it would be necessary
to code all reliably located pieces of covariation information as
either high or low.

Each related attribution could be coded as either

a person, stimulus or circumstance attribution.

A prediction for

attribution (e.g., person, stimulus or circumstance) could be derived
from Kelley's (1967) theory for each individual item of information
and for each combination of items.
pared to the actual attributions.

These predictions could be com
If the actual attributions corres

pond to a significant degree to the predicted attributions, then
Kelley's (1967) model would be partially supported.

The model would

derive only partial support from such results because it could be
argued that the procedure just outlined still fails to test the
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covariation model.

It could not be stated with certainty that the lo

cated pieces of information were directing attributions in the pre
dicted manner.

It could only be stated that the pieces of information

accompanied the particular attributions.

The method used in the present

study (i.e ., coding covariation information in the context of attribu
tions) is limited to the extent that the cause/effect relationship be
tween covariation information and attributional activity cannot be
determined.
The subjects of this study were the people who wrote letters to
the advice columns as well as the advice columnists themselves.

These

subjects were spontaneously making attributions and presenting support
ing or clarifying information.

In order to perform a full test of

Kelley's (1967) model in this type of setting, it would probably be
necessary to effect some type of control over the attributional activ
ity or over the use of covariation information.

However, once experi

mental control of this kind is exercised, the data source can no longer
be considered naturalistic.
In the present study, no particular combination of information
was used significantly more than any other.

However, perceivers used

significantly more individual items of information than combinations
of items (p = 0.0004).

This last result may reflect a genuine prefer

ence on the part of perceivers or it may reflect a physical limitation
of the advice columns.
to the advice column.

Only a small space is allowed for each letter
Therefore, it may be necessary for perceivers

to be economical in their use of supporting covariation information.
Future research might be devoted to developing an index of attributional
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activity as well as a measure of usage of covariation information.

In

their study of sports page attributions, Lau and Russell (1980) used
the number of attributions per inch of newsprint as a measure of attri
bution frequency.

A comparable method for use in the advice columns

might be an interesting complement to the present method of assessing
the extent to which perceivers use Kelley's (1967) three information
variables.
The pieces of consensus information that were included in the
data analysis were considered reliable because they were agreed upon
by at least two out of three of the raters.

The raters were under

graduate psychology majors and they were not familiar with attribution
theory.

It can be seen from Table 1 (p. 77) that one of the raters

(Rater A) found more pieces of covariation information than either of
the other two raters.

If a large number of raters had been employed

(e.g., 25) then the presence of one or two extreme raters could be at
tributed to individual differences.

However, since only three raters

were used in the present study it is possible that the more produc
tive rater was inclined to identify covariation information in ambigu
ous advice column passages (i.e., the additional pieces of informa
tion found by this rater were actually unreliable), or that this rater
was simply more sensitive to subtle examples of the information types
(i.e., the other two raters failed to find potentially reliable items).
In either case, this situation highlights the importance of using more
than one rater.

Using a number of raters insures that the final

sample of information items is highly reliable.

Since the raters in

the present study were naive regarding attribution theory and its
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predictions, it is conceivable that some subtle examples of covariation
information were overlooked.

If this were true, then Kelley's (1967)

information variables are even more ecologically valid than the present
results indicate.

The alternative to using naive raters would be to

use raters who are educated in the area of attribution theory.

How

ever, it is possible that using such informed raters would introduce
biases into the advice column searches.

For example, if a rater is

aware that consensus information is believed to be underutilized, this
knowledge may influence the salience of consensus-like information in
the advice columns.
If consistency, distinctiveness or consensus information are
naturalistically used about half the time, as the present results indi
cate, then what factors are associated with attribution the other half
of the time?

It may be the case that Kelley's (1967) covariation model

with its three information variables is reserved for particular attri
bution situations.

Kelley's (1967) model is quite logical in its form

and it is based on the idea that the naive psychologist, or the man
in the street, used a naive version of the scientific method.

Kelley

(1967) drew an analogy between the analysis of variance F-ratio and the
procedure uses in common-sense attribution.

The variability of a per

son's behavior toward various entities (e.g., distinctiveness) is
weighed against the stability of the person's behavior over time/situations (e.g., consistency) and across other actors (e.g., consensus).
Distinctiveness represents the numerator of the F-ratio while con
sistency plus consensus represents the denominator.

The attribution

that an observer makes will depend upon his/her state of information
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regarding these sources of variability.

The use of this model is con

tingent upon the perceiver having access to information regarding the
actor's behavior at other points in time, toward other entities or
across other social agents.
It is conceivable that Kelley's (1967) model may be most appli
cable when automatic attribution proves to be problematic (Taylor &
Fiske 1978).

There are probably times when attributors attempt to gen

erate the sense that their perceptions and judgments are veridical.
In terms of knowing what caused an event, perceivers may want to "know
that they know."

Kelley (1973) suggested that the processes governing

such "psychological epistomology" may be an important area related to
attribution theory.
Although the covariation model may be intuitively appealing to
the scientifically-minded perceiver, there are no doubt many attribu
tion situations where the locus of causality is determined much more
reflexly.

For example, there is evidence that perceivers sometimes

attribute causality to that factor which is simply the most salient
(Taylor & Fiske 1978).

In addition, the covariation model is not the

only method available to attributors who are motivated to be rational
in their perceptions.
For situations where only a single behavioral observation is
available to perceivers, Kelley (1972, 1973) developed the causal
schemata model.

A causal schema is a plan or template which perceivers

use in making causal attributions.

The limited information available

from a single behavioral observation is fitted into an appropriate
schema.

The schema provides a framework within which causes can be
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inferred from effects.

Causal schemata presumably develop after much

experience with everyday social situations involving cause and effect.
Schemata enable a perceiver to construe and interpret a stable external
world in the face of limited information.
One causal schema involves Multiple Sufficient Causes.

This is

where a number of potential causes are available for a given effect.
For example, if someone does well at their job, it may be due to their
employer's pressure (i.e., external cause) or due to a high need to
achieve (i.e., internal cause).

There are two rules or principles that

aid in determining how the causes will be perceived.

The discounting

principle states that if more than one plausible cause exists, the
strength of any one cause will be reduced.

In the example just cited,

the employer's pressure may be perceived as the most plausible cause,
but if it is known that the individual also has a high need to achieve,
then the attribution to the employer's pressure will be made less
confidently.

On the other hand, if it is known that the individual

does not have a high need to achieve, then a strong attribution to the
employer's pressure can be made.

The other principle is the augmenta

tion principle, which involves situations in which there is both a
facilitative cause and an inhibitory cause.

If a person performs a

behavior in the face of an inhibitory cause, then the strength of the
attribution to the facilitative cause will increase.

For example,

suppose someone wants to succeed at a task (i.e., facilitative cause),
and yet the task is extremely difficult (i.e., inhibitory cause).

If

the person succeeds, then this must have been due to a strong desire
to succeed simply because the person had the difficulty of the task to
overcome.
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Another causal schema involves Multiple Necessary Causes.

This

schema refers to the situation where more than one cause is necessary
for an effect to occur.

If one or both of the causes are absent, the

effect will not transpire.

For example, in order to succeed at a task

both effort (i.e., internal cause) and task easiness (i.e., external
cause) may need to be present.
Another causal schema involves Compensatory Causes.
is similar to the Multiple Necessary Causes schema.

This schema

The latter involves

causes combined in an all-or-none fashion whereas the former involves
causes combined in a graded fashion.

Using the previous example, suc

cess at a task may depend upon both effort and task easiness.

A compen

satory schema would indicate that an actor will be progressively more
successful as effort increases or as task easiness increases.

If the

actor succeeds in the face of a difficult task (i.e., low task easi
ness) then effort is inferred to be proportionally strong.
Kelley (1971, 1973) also suggested more complicated causal
schemata for interpersonal and group effects.
Another procedure available to attributors would be Jones and
Davis' (1965) correspondent inference model, which was discussed
earlier in the section on Implicit Consensus.

In this model perceivers

use social desirability information and a non-common effects analysis
to infer specific internal causes.
In summary, there are several attribution procedures available
to perceivers.

The fact that consistency, distinctiveness or con

sensus was used over half the time in the present study indicates
that covariation information may be relatively important to naturalistic

95
attribution.

In particular, Garland, Hardy and Stephenson's (1975)

conclusion (discussed earlier) that Kelley's (1967) three information
variables lack ecological validity may be incorrect.
It is important to remember that evidence for one model does not
weaken the position of the other models.

Kelley (1973) stated that

future research must address when the various models are most applic
able:
. . . in the context of the last 15 years of thought within
social psychology, the notion of a repertoire of thought
models is rather radical in its implications. This period
has been characterized by proposals that the layman has one
model or another and by the attempt to demonstrate the opera
tion of each model. . . . The present conception is, of
course, that each and all of these models are reflected in
the person's thinking--each at specific (and specifiable)
times, and all, over a variety of occasions. . . . The re
search implications are probably also clear. Our initial
problem is not one of proving or disproving the operation
of one model or another. Rather it is one of identifying
the entire set of models that are commonly or importantly
used. Then, we must determine the conditions under which
each of the set is evoked and the implications and conse
quences of its evocation. . . . These problems tend to be
lacking in appeal because their answers depend on the spec
ifics of time and place (pp. 118-19).
Naturalistic research may be the method of choice for determining these
"specifics of time and place" regarding the use of attribution models.
However, laboratory-based research may be the most effective way to study
the machinations of each particular model.
The Underutilization of Consensus Information
Overall, consensus information was significantly (p = 0.0005)
underutilized (in terms of perceiver preference) relative to consistency
and distinctiveness information in the present sample of advice columns.
Among the attributions that used the information types individually,
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consensus was also significantly (p = 0.0074) underutilized.

These

results support the findings of Major (1980), who found that consensus
was the least requested of the three information types.
The underrepresentation of consensus occurred even though the
definition of consensus was expanded to include both explicit and im
plicit forms (Kassin 1979a), instead of just the explicit form pro
posed by Kelley (1967).

In view of the expanded definition, it is in

teresting that consensus was the least preferred of the three informa
tion types in the advice columns.

The advice columns would seem to be

a popular arena for the presentation of generalizations and stereo
types as well as a barometer for current trends, styles and social
norms.

These types of social data would all seem to be best represented

by consensus information.
However, if the advice columns are in fact a forum for the pre
sentation of the values of popular culture, then this may provide an
explanation for why consensus information was underrepresented rela
tive to consistency and distinctiveness information.

According to

Gergen (1968), Western culture is characterized by a "consistency
ethic" and there is much social value placed upon personal predictabil
ity and consistency in behavior.

Individuals are motivated to maintain

a consistent self-concept and much importance is placed upon being
"true to self."

Personal inconsistencies are believed to produce dis

comfort, and therefore people strive to eliminate such inconsistencies
(Festinger 1954).

Interpersonally, consistent behavior is reinforced

with "trust" and positive evaluations from others.
Both consistency and distinctiveness information refer to the
amount of consistency in an individual's behavior, that is, they refer
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to the consistency of an individual's behavior over time/situations
and across entities, respectively.

Consensus information, on the other

hand, does not provide such personal consistency information since it
does not offer data on an individual's previous behaviors.

If there is

a strong emphasis in our culture upon personal consistency, and if the
advice columns are a domain in which behavioral information is pre
sented, then it is conceivable that perceivers in the advice columns
displayed a bias toward using personal consistency information (e.g.,
consistency and distinctiveness) as opposed to a bias aqainst using con
sensus information (Schoeneman, Note 2).

In addition, the relative im

portance to attribution of the three information types as they were
used in the advice columns cannot be determined, since the present
method does not permit such an analysis.

It cannot be concluded that

consensus information was underutilized, only that it was underrepre
sented relative to consistency and distinctiveness information.
«

Even before his model was tested empirically, Kelley (1967) sug
gested that consistency may be more important than consensus.

He

cited theoretical work by Festinger (1950, 1954) in which it was postu
lated that "physical reality tests take precedence over social reality
information."

The use of consensus may be mediated by "side" attribu

tions regarding the expertness or trustworthiness of the information
source.

This could make consensus a somewhat cumbersome information

type to use.

Also, Kelley (1967) suggested that consensus may be most

valuable when physical reality information (i.e., consistency) is ab
sent.

In the present study, however, the frequency of consensus used

alone (i.e., without physical reality data) was still less than the
frequency of each other information type.
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Some previous research has demonstrated that consistency infor
mation is used more than distinctiveness information in terms of af
fecting the direction of attribution (McArthur 1972; Zuckerman 1978b)
and in terms of perceiver preference (Major 1980).

It can be argued

that consistency is the most economical of the three information vari
ables.

High consistency information tells us that either the "person"

or the "stimulus" is the causal agent.

Low consistency information

rules out both the "person" and the "stimulus" as the causal agent
simultaneously (i.e., circumstance attribution).

Distinctiveness and

consensus information, however, implicate only one causal factor at a
time, either the "person" or the "stimulus."
The results of the present study do not support the preceding
argument.

Consistency and distinctiveness information were preferred

equally by perceivers in the advice columns, overall and when used in
dividually.

It is conceivable that in the advice columns (and perhaps

other naturalistic sources), consistency may be implied when distinc
tiveness is presented.

If it is indicated that a person performs a

behavior toward many different stimuli, this may imply some consis
tency in the behavior over time or across situations.

Similarly, if

a person is described as performing some behavior toward only a single
stimulu-s, then this may imply that in other situations or at other
times the person did not perform the behavior.

In the advice columns,

perceivers often report and attribute behavior in descriptive or every
day language.

Pieces of covariation information are sometimes implied

or are buried in the verbiage of the advice column letter.

Therefore,

it is possible that some letters were written in such a way as to
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imply consistency information without ever actually reporting it.
This may explain why consistency was not used more than distinctiveness,
as previous theory and research would predict.
An Integrated Consensus Variable
In the present sample of advice columns, explicit and implicit
types of consensus contributed equally to the overall use of consensus
information.

This indicates that perceivers choose to present expec

tations for covariation across actors as well as actual covariation in
formation.

In other words, implicit consensus appears to be used for

the same purposes as explicit consensus in the advice columns.
To test the predicted relationship between direction of attribu
tion and level of consensus, the pieces of consensus information that
were used alone were coded as either high or low while the related
attributions were coded as either internal or external.

Because con

sensus was greatly underutilized, only 10 pieces of consensus were
available for this analysis.
implicit.

Six of these were explicit and four were

All of these pieces of consensus were in high form and

therefore should accompany external attribution.

The results were in

the predicted direction, although they were only marginally signifi
cant (p = 0.0578).

A more adequate test of an integrated consensus

variable (i.e., both implicit and explicit combined) would require a
larger sample as well as a number or pieces of consensus in low form.
In the present study, consensus information was overwhelmingly
used in the high form (e.g., much covariation across actors, either
expected or observed).

Twenty-eight pieces of consensus were high

while only two were low (p = 0.000002).

Kelley's (1967) covariation
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model predicts that high consensus is associated with external or stimu
lus attribution while low consensus is associated with internal or per
son attribution.
One possible explanation for the prevalence of high consensus
may involve the method used by raters to search for consensus informa
tion.

The raters were instructed to use the test questions that accom

panied each explanatory statement as a guide for conducting an advice
column search for the three information variables.

The raters were

alerted to the possibility that some subtle instances of information may
not represent an exact answer to one of the test questions.

The follow

ing referent behavior can be used as an example:
Bruce enjoyed the movie.
The consensus test question for this behavior would be as follows:
CONSENSUS:

How many other people (did, would, should) enjoy
the movie?

An instance of consensus information in the advice column might be a
direct answer to this question.
HIGH:
LOW:

For example:

Many people enjoyed the movie.
Few people enjoyed the movie.

However, it could be argued that a valid instance of low consensus might
not be a direct answer to the test question.
LOW:

For example:

Many people did not enjoy the movie.

This piece of low consensus tells us about how many people did not enjoy
the movie, while the test question itself asks about how many people
did enjoy the movie.

If the raters were using the test questions
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literally to guide them in their search for information, it might be
argued that they were biased against identifying low covariation pieces
of information.

This would be true for all three of the information

variables.
There are several arguments against this line of reasoning.

First,

there is no reason why a particular piece of high consensus information
should be a direct answer to the test question.
high consensus might take this form:
movie."

In the example above,

"Few people did not enjoy the

In terms of training, the raters were instructed to use the

test questions only as a guide for conducting their searches.

As

stated earlier, the raters were alerted to the possibility that some
subtle examples of information may not directly answer a given test
question.

The raters were given numerous practice examples involving

these types of information and they were trained to use the scoring
manual CDCNAC (Appendix B) as a reference.

Part IV of this scoring

manual contains descriptions and examples of subtle pieces of informa
tion that do not directly answer the test questions and yet are still
valid and acceptable instances of the three information variables.
The raters were also trained to use as a guide the simplified referent
components (person verb stimulus) and the definitions derived from
them for the three information types.

Finally, a review of the reli

able pieces of consensus information revealed that two of the 30
items located by the raters constitute valid instances of consensus
even though these pieces of information did not directly answer
their respective test questions, as described above.

For both of

these pieces of consensus, all three raters were in agreement.
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This indicates that all of the raters were aware of the correct pro
cedure to follow when confronting such subtle instances of information.
Another explanation for the prevalence of high consensus informa
tion involves perceiver preference.

According to Anderson's (1974)

multiplicative model, consensus information is used specifically to de
termine the valence of a given stimulus, or in other words, the power
of a stimulus to provoke or elicit behavior from actors.

Garland,

Hardy and Stephenson (1975) found that when requests for consensus in
formation were made by perceivers, they were made significantly more
often under stimulus attribution as opposed to person attribution con
ditions.

Zuckerman (1973b) demonstrated that consensus information ac

counted for the highest overall percentage of stimulus attributions
relative to consistency and distinctiveness information.
DiVitto and McArthur (1978) conducted a developmental study of
Kelley's (1967) covariation model, and their analysis provides a reason
able explanation for why consensus information may have been used
almost exclusively in high form in the advice columns.

In agreement

with Anderson (1974), DiVitto and McArthur (1978) argued that con
sensus information provides evidence on the presence or absence of
some causal factor within the target or stimulus of a behavior.

High

consensus tells us that the behavior covaries with the stimulus,
which of course leads to a stimulus attribution:
Person
Person
Person
Person
tow consensus tells us only that the behavior does not covary with the
stimulus, and it leads to a person attribution:
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Person
Person
Person
Person

1
2
3
4

■Verb

rStimulus

High consensus provides direct covariation evidence for stimulus causal
ity whereas low consensus requires a second inferential step for person
causality.

With low consensus both the covariation principle and the

discounting principle (Kelley 1971) must be invoked in order to arrive
at a person attribution.

The covariation principle with low consensus

indicates that the stimulus, although present, is not the likely cause
of the behavior.

Since there is another potential causal agent present

(i.e., the person), the discounting principle is used to rule out the
stimulus in favor of the person as the perceived locus of causality.
Using consensus information to make a stimulus attribution (i.e., a one
step analysis using covariation evidence) is a much simpler cognitive
task than using consensus information to make a person attribution
(i.e., a two-step analysis using covariation evidence plus the dis
counting principle).

A similar analysis of distinctiveness information

can be performed to show why person attribution is a more simple task
than stimulus attribution.
In view of the increasing cognitive complexity of covariationbased attribution as compared to discounting-based attribution,
DiVitto and McArthur (1978) hypothesized that there should be age
related trends in the use of the latter.

Various test behaviors along

with consistency, distinctiveness and consensus information were pre
sented in the form of stories and pictures.

First, third and sixth

graders as well as college students were the subjects.

The results
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indicated that younger subjects did not use consensus and distinctive
ness to make person and target attributions, respectively (i.e., dis
counting), but older subjects were able to.

Almost all the subjects

were able to use the covariation principle to make attributions.
The overwhelming use of high as opposed to low consensus in the
advice columns suggests that perceivers were using consensus information
in its least ambiguous form.

It is possible that perceivers prefer to

support their attributions with information about what other people do
or would do instead of what other people do not or would not do.

Heider

(1958) might argue that perceivers in the advice columns were attempting
to make common-sense in the simplest and most straightforward manner.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
SCORING MANUAL:

EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS IN THE ADVICE COLUMNS

SCORING MANUAL:

EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS IN THE. ADVICE COLUMNS
Introduction

The purpose of the study we are about to undertake is to describe
people's explanations for their own and others' behaviors, characteris
tics, and so on. More specifically, we are interested in "why" explana
tions, notions about why someone acted in a certain way or why a person
is the way he or she is. Advice columns will be our hunting ground,
since they offer "naturally-occurring" data; when people write in to
describe problems, and when the columnist gives advice, we may find
explanations of behavior and persons embedded in these communications.
The advantage of such naturalistic data is that they are very generalizable to social reality, that is, they are usually more representative
of the complexities of social behavior and less artificial than data
that come from a psychological test or laboratory task.
Naturalistic sources also present some difficulties. It is not
easy to derive usable data from them (compared to questionnaires and
lab measures) because they are so complex. In order to reduce complex
materials to a form that is more easily grasped and utilized, investiga
tors devise coding formats. These are sets of instructions which guide
two kinds of activity. First, it is necessary to separate the wheat
from the chaff, that is, to separate the things you want.to study from
the mass of irrelevant details. In our case, we need to find explanatory
statements in advice columns. After the phenomena of interest have been
isolated and identified, the investigator will want to characterize them
further. He or she will devise a set of categories and ask a judge or
rater to look at materials (such as a set of explanatory statements
from advice columns) and make decisions about which categories they fit
into most closely.
The coding formats will not be very useful, however, unless they
are reliable. Reliability is an indication of the extent to which a
measure (such as a coding scheme) yields the same result each time it is
used. There are different types of realiability, but one of the most
important for coding formats is interjudge or interrater reliability.
If we devise a method to find explanations in advice columns and to
characterize them, and then ask three people to use the method on the
same set of letters and replies, will they all end up with the same set
of results? If they did, we would have good interrater reliability;
we would be confident that when they use our instrument, different
observers see the same things. If interrater reliability is poor, how
ever, we could have any number of problems. Our coding scheme may not
describe the naturalistic materials very well, or it may be hard to
apply consistently because the instructions or categories are vague.
Or, our raters may not be familiar enough with the measure to use it
well; they could be well-trained but fatigued; they may have particular
idiosyncratic biases when they make ratings.
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The purpose of this scoring manual is to describe how to use a
coding method for explanatory statements in advice columns as precisely
as possible. This should help to reduce error due to the instrument
itself. Error due to raters' usage of the instrument will be reduced
by careful training and monitoring of observers. If we can reliably
isolate and describe explanatory statements in advice columns, we will
have a gold mine of information on the ways in which people account
for important facets of their daily life.
Part I:

Finding Explanatory Statements

Definitions
Our first job is to scour the advice columns for explanatory
statements. People make explanatory statements when they mention a be
havior (or set of behaviors) or a personal trait or a social role or
a temporary personal state and then explain it in some way by citing a
cause, purpose, reason, intention, source, determinant, and so on. In
a sense, explanatory statements are some form of a "because" statement.
Here are some examples of explanatory statements.
straightforward, but others are not so obvious.

Some are fairly

EXAMPLE 1:

"She wants to be pregnant again because she believes it will
be a valuable 'learning experience' for her children."

EXAMPLE 2:

"For business reasons I cannot be seen in public with my
lover."

EXAMPLE 3:

"This morning your column made me see red."

EXAMPLE 4:

"Kathy's self-righteousness is beginning to get to me.

Components of explanatory statements. Explanatory statements
contain two parts: an explanation and what is being explained. The
former we will call an explanation and the latter a referent. No matter
what they look like in raw or natural form, explanatory statements can
be reduced to the form "referent because explanation" (for example, "I
hit him because he hit me"). Now we will take a closer look at refer
ents and explanations, and define them further.
What are referents? Another way of phrasing this question is
to ask what kinds of things people try to explain in their daily lives.
For our purposes, we can identify five types of referents:
1.
2.

Personal and interpersonal behaviors (actions, reactions,
things people do)
Personal and interpersonal traits (enduring characteristics
or dispositions; labels for behaviors which are very con
sistent across time and situations; consistent behavior
that is determined from within)
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3.
4.
5.

Personal and interpersonal states (more-or-less temporary
modes of being or conditions of existence)
Social (interpersonal) roles (patterns of behavior shaped by
external social situations or influences, not by internal
behaviors, states or traits)
Impersonal situations (the external world or environment;
settings or external conditions)

Table 1 on the next page clarifies types of referents further by giving
examples. Although the distinctions between types is sometime subtle,
we will not really be concerned with them at this point; our job is to
find explanatory statements, which will contain all sorts of referents.
There is only one distinction which will concern us now, the distinction
between situations and all other types of referents. We will not be
looking for explanations of situations; we will be concerned only with
personal and'interpersonal' referents (states, traits, roles and be^~
haviors)! An easy way to keep this distinction in mind is to usetwo
memory aids: STROBE (for states, traits, roles and behaviors) and "Don't
sit" (Don't worry about situational referents).
There are also different kinds of explanations. Again, we are
concerned now only with finding explanations, not classifying them. I
list types of explanations only to give you an idea of what to look
for. There are two general kinds of explanations. The first is mechani
cal or lawful cause-and-effect, the notion that a current event was
caused by some preceding occurrence in a regularly-observable manner
(for instance, the direction and speed of billiard ball B was caused
by the way billiard ball A hit it). Some examples: He's a minister
because of his upbringing; I hit you because I had a seizure; he is
talkative because he is insecure. The second kind of explanation is
purpose or justification, in which STROBEs are explained by referring
to their purpose or intention (I hit you because I wanted to hurt you)
or by citing some justification (He talks because he has good things to
say; he is a minister because it was right for him).
To sum up, then, the explanatory statements we will be seeking
will include something that is being explained (a referent) and an
explanation. The referents we are interested in are behaviors, traits,
roles and states. The explanations will cite cause-and-effect or pur
poses and justifications.
Forms of explanatory statements. As we said above, explanatory
statements contain referents and explanations, and they can be reduced
to the form of "referent because explanation." However, not all ex
planatory statements in their raw or natural forms will conform to
this model to begin with. In this section we will consider various
"raw types" of explanatory statement.
1.
Straight "referent because explanation." This is the
simplest and most obvious form of explanatory statement. Recall
EXAMPLE 1: "She wants to be pregnant again because she believes it
will be a valuable 'learning experience' for her children."

lable 1
Types of Referents
Behaviors

Traits

States

Roles

Situations

Actions, reac
tions, things
people do.

Enduring characistics or dis
positions; labels
for behaviors
which are very
consistent
across time and
situations and
which are deter
mined from with
in.

More-or-less
temporary
modes of being
or conditions
of existence.

Patterns of be
havior shaped
by external
social situations
or influences,
not by internal
behaviors, traits,
or states.

The external
world or environ
ment; settings
or external
conditions.

Examples:

I went to the
store.

I am bashful.

I am hungry.

I am a Democrat.

The world is a
funny place.

You are writ
ing a letter.

You have always
been friendly.

You are not
usually this
anxious,

You were a stu
dent.

The room was
cold.

Jack fell down.

Jill is a care
ful person.

Jack is alive
and wel1.

Jill is a wife.

North Dakota is
sunny.

We went to
school.

We are a quar
relsome pair.

We are married.

We are Jaycees.

The university is
ivy-covered.

The glee club
sang 10 songs.

The Senate is
lazy.

The university
is hurting
financially.

Parents are
teachers.

My office is
small.

Oil

Definition

in

2. The "because explanation referent" variant. Sometimes people
put the cart before the horse in explanatory statements so that refer
ents follow rather than precede explanations. EXAMPLE 1 could be re
worded in this form: "Because she believes it would be a valuable learn
ing experience for her children, she wants to be pregnant again."
3. "Because" variations. "Because" can be said in a number of
ways, using alternative wordings or synonyms. For instance: I'll get
it, since I'm up; he can't talk, for he is busy; I think, therefore I
am (that is, I am because I think); and EXAMPLE 2, "For business reasons
I cannot be seen in public with my lover." Notice how subtle some of
these examples compared to straight "because" statements.
As we go
down the list of explanatory statement forms, they become harder to de
tect and less obvious.
4. Implicit "because" statements. Sometimes explanatory state
ments are worded in such a way that "because" or its synonyms are left
out or unnecessary. For instance, referents and explanations can be
connected by the conjunction "and": It was cold out and I wore my heavy
coat. The "and" could be dropped, too: It was cold out; I wore my
heavy coat. Or, It was cold out. I wore my heavy coat. In addition,
there are often "becauses" lurking in what appear to be simple state
ments; consider EXAMPLE 3, "This morning your column made me see red,"
and EXAMPLE 4, "Kathy's self-righteousness is beginning to get to me."
All of these examples could be reworded in "referent because explana
tion" form: I wore my heavy coat because it was cold out; I saw red
this morning because of your column; I am beginning to be 'got to'
(bugged) because Kathy is self-righteous.
5. Implicit referent plus explicit explanation. Occasionally
you will find, if you look carefully, explanations that have no explicit
referent STROBEs. When this happens, it means that the referent is part
of the context of the letter or reply. Here is an example: A woman
writes in complaining that she found dirty pictures in her husband's
desk. She describes all the horrors she discovered, and states her
negative feelings on pornography. She notes that her husband says it's
fun and does nobody harm, and then asks the advice columnist who is
right and what to do about it. End of example. Did you find the ex
planation? It is "it's fun and does nobody harm." The referent,
which is not explicitly stated, is "he collects dirty pictures" or "he
thinks it is OK to have such filth." This referent is given in the
context of the letter.
In summary, then, explanatory statements can be very obvious or
quite obscure. In order to be able to find them reliably, you will
need to know the following fairly well:
1.

Definitions of referent, explanation and explanatory state
ment.

2.

Types of referents and explanations.

3.

The five forms of explanatory statements.
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Thus, your first job is to study this "Definitions" section until you
think you understand it.
Instructions for Finding Explanatory Statements
You will be given a number of typewritten letters and replies
from advice columns. Each letter + reply will have an ID number; para
graphs in each will be numbered in sequence (1, 2, 3, . . .). For each
rating session, you will work on a packet of five letters and replies.
Raters will work in pairs, at first independent of each other while lo
cating explanatory statements, and then together in order to produce re
liable statements. This section describes the work of finding explana
tory statements.
Step 1 .
familiarity.

Take a letter + reply and read it through once for

Step 2 . Now start the letter again. Look at the first paragraph
carefully; read it more than once; don't go on to the next paragraph un
til you are satisfied that you have located all explanatory statements or
that there are none contained in the paragraph.
General strategy: Look for explanations first. When you search
a paragraph for explanatory statements, evaluate each sentence or phrase
as a possible explanation, that is, as an implicit or explicit "because"
statement having to do with cause-and-effect or purpose/justification
(review the section on Components of explanatory statements above). If
you think you've found an explanation, then look for its referent (STROBEs
only; remember, "Don't sit"). You will use this strategy because, after
much trial-and-error, we have found it to be the best way to locate ex
planatory statements. There are other strategies, but they all have
flaws: (1). You could search for the word "because." Unfortunately,
this simple strategy will catch only the most obvious explanatory state
ments and miss many others that have "because" variations or implicit
"becauses" (review the section on Forms of explanatory statements above).
(2). You could widen your search to include "because" variations (since,
for, and therefore, etc.), but there are many synonyms for "because" and
they frequently have more than one meaning (e.g., "since" also refers
to a time period, as in "since last Thursday"); you would also miss
implicit "becauses." (3). Finally, you could look for possible refer
ents (that is, notice any time a behavior, trait, state or role is
mentioned) and then look to see if they are explained. This is ineffici
ent, since many STROBEs are not explained; this strategy would also
miss those explanatory statements which have implicit referents and ex
plicit explanations.
To repeat, then, the strategy of choice for locating explana
tory statements is to look for explanations first, referents second.
Step 3 . When you have located an explanatory statement, record
it on a Finder's Sheet (see the next page).

113
a. Put down the letter + reply ID number, the paragraph number,
and your name.
b. Under Statement Excerpt, write down a direct quotation of
the section from the paragraph that you have identified as an explana
tory statement.
c. Under Statement Reformulation, interpret the explanation as
you see it by rewording it into explicit "referent because explanation"
form. Two examples are given on the sample Finder's Sheet on the next
page.
Step 4 . Go through each paragraph in the above fashion until the
letter is completed.
Instructions for Rater Agreement
As mentioned above, raters will work in pairs. You and your part
ner will receive an identical set of five letters in any one rating ses
sion. You will each search for explanatory statements independently, as
outlined in the previous section. Then, when you are both finished, you
will get together to compare notes, so that the final set of explanatory
statements that you hand in will be those that you both agreed on. This
section describes the-procedure for rater agreement.
Step 1 .

Look at the first paragraph of the first letter + reply.

la. If you both agree that there was no explanatory state
ment in this paragraph, go on to the next paragraph.
lb. If you both agree that there was an explanatory state
ment (or more than one) in this paragraph, compare your Finder's Sheets.
1) . if you both put down the same (or very similar)
Statement Excerpts, and if your Statement Reformu
lations are basically similar, circle the "A" next
to Disposition at the bottom of each of your Finder'
Sheets, staple or clip them together, and go on to
the next paragraph.
2) . if there is a major disagreement (e.q., different
Statement Excerpts or Reformulations) proceed as
in Step lc below.
lc. If you and your partner disagree (one of you finds an
explanatory statement but the other doesn't, or you both found different
Statement Excerpts, or you disagree about the Statement Reformulations),
discuss the disagreement and try to resolve it within one minute.
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS IN THE ADVICE COLUMNS:

FINDER'S DHEET

Letter #

U. Judge______________

1.

5

Paragraph #

Statement Excerpt:

1

Rater

"For business reasons I cannot be seen in

public with my lover."_____________________________________________

2.

Statement Reformulation:

REFERENT_____ I can't be seen in public with my lover._________________

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION

of business reasons______________________________________

Disposition (circle one): A
AI
AE
D
*********************************************************************
Letter #
1.

5

Paragraph #

Statement Excerpt:

2

Rater

U. Judge_____________

"Kathy's self-righteousness is beginning

to get to me."___________________ ____________

2.

Statement Reformulation:

REFERENT_____ I am beginning to be bugged (got to).____________________

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION

Kathy is self-righteous._________ ________________________

Disposition (circle one):

A

AI

AE

D

115
1) . start timing a minute after you have located the
disagreement; don't include discussion of whether
there is a disagreement in the minute.
2) . Note: when discussing disagreements, maintain an
open but skeptical outlook. Do not give in to your
partner every time there is a disagreement. Do
give in if you see your partner's argument as reason
able and justified. Your job in this discussion of
disagreements is to ensure that the final sample of
explanatory statements is a good, reliable sample.
3) . by the time a minute is up: if you both agree to
include a statement that one of you missed, or if
you agree that one of your Statement Excerpts or
Reformulations should be revised, then take the
correct Finder's Sheet (make up a new one if you
need to) and circle "AI" under Disposition; take
the incorrect Finder's Sheet(s), put a big "X"
across it, and staple or clip it to the back of the
correct sheet.
4) . by the time one minute is up: if you both agree
to exclude or drop an explanatory statement that
one of you found, circle "AE" on the relevant
Finder's Sheet.
5) . if you cannot resolve a disagreement by the time a
minute is up, circle "D" on the relevant Finder's
Sheet(s).
5). Note: keep two piles of Finder's Sheets: one for
those marked A or AI, one for those marked AE or D.
Step 2 . Go through each letter + reply on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis until you have completed the packet.

Part II:

Classifying Explanatory Statements

When you read this, Part I of this study (Finding Explanatory
Statements) will be finished, providing us with a sample of statements
of the form "REFERENT because EXPLANATION." Recall that the referent
is some personal or interpersonal event which a perceiver might seek to
explain (e.g., a behavior, trait, mood, interpersonal relationship,
etc.), and that an explanation is the perceiver's notion about the cause,
purpose, justification, or reason of the perceived event. In sum, we
have a sample of explanatory statements that include what is being ex
plained as well as how it is being accounted for.
What, then, do we do with such a sample? Part II of this study
is concerned with classifying explanatory statements: Now that we
have a number of explanatory statements, what are they like, how are
they put together? Whose "personal events" are being explained? What
kinds of explanations are being used? These are the kinds of questions
we wish to ask.
In order to answer these questions, we will (as in Part I) de
vise a coding format, train some people how to use it, and assess the
reliability of our coding format by looking at agreement between raters.
A.

Identifying and Categorizing Subject Persons in Referents

The first task is to answer a "Who?" question: Who is the per
son (or persons) whose behavior, mood, personality or other characteris
tic is being explained? Remember that explanatory statements are of the
form "REFERENT because EXPLANATION." We are asking about the referent:
Who is the subject in an explanatory statement's referent? Some personal
or interpersonal event is being explained; whose is it?
First, let's discuss the ratings that need to be made and how
to make them. Then we will consider the problem of interrater agreement.
Making Ratings
Identifying referent subjects. Each explanatory statement that
you will examine for subject persons will be printed on a separate
8-1/2 x 11" sheet of paper. Each explanatory statement has its own
code number (e.g., 5A-P3-1 3T) which is printed in the top right corner
of the sheet. An explanatory statement appears on each sheet first in
"raw" form, as an excerpt from an advice column letter or reply: then
it will be given in the "refined" form of "REFERENT because EXPLANA
TION." So these are the materials you will be rating. An example
is given on the next page.
You will make your ratings on the "Referent Subject Rating Sheet"
(see the page after the next).

117
REFERENT SUBJECT RATING SHEET

Statement Code:
Referent Subject

Self

Other(s)

Both

Self

Other(s) ,

Both

Self

Other(s)

Both

Self

Other(s)

Both

Self

Other(s)

Both

Self

Other(s)

Both

Self

Other(s)

Both

Self

Other(s)

Both

Self

Other(s)

Both

Statement Code:
Referent Subject
Statement Code:
Referent Subject
Statement Code:
Referent Subject
Statement Code:
Referent Subject
Statement Code:
Referent Subject
Statement Code:
Referent Subject
Statement Code:
Referent Subject
Statement Code:
Referent Subject
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99A-P3-1

3T

She wants to be pregnant again because she believes it will be a valu
able "learning experience" for her children.

REFERENT:

She wants to be pregnant again
BECAUSE

EXPLANATION:

she believes it will be a valuable "learning experience"
for her children.
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First, fill in the code number of the explanatory statement you
are working on.
Next, fill in the blank after the words "Referent Subject."
Here's how to do this. Your job is to look at an explanatory statement
(REFERENT because EXPLANATION) and decide whose personal or interper
sonal events (in the referent) are being explained. Many of these re
ferent subjects will be obvious; examples 1-7 in Table 2 are fairly
obvious.
There are, however, some less obvious cases.
some of them.

Let's consider

1.

Passive voice. Some referents are phrased in the passive rather
than the active voice. An example of passive phrasing is example
8 (Table 2): "He should not be blamed for his misdeed." Is the
referent subject "he," or is it the unnamed person or persons
doing the blaming? As a rule of thumb, when you encounter the
passive voice, translate it into some form of active phrasing
(e.g., "The blamer/s should not blame him for his misdeed") and
identify the grammatical subject (actor, doer) of the active
sentence as the referent subject (thus, fill in "blamer/s" under
Referent Subject).

2.

Imperative mood. Referents may sometimes be requests or commands,
as in example 9 in Table 2: "Tell me what to do." The impera
tive mood implies a "you": the example is short for "(You) tell
me what to do." As another rule of thumb, with imperative forms,
the implicit "you" is the referent subject (thus, fill in "you"
for this example's Referent Subject).

3.

Dangling participle. Whenever you encounter a construction like
example 10, Table 2 ("Going to his house would be unfair to his
wife") you have a participle that has no clear connection to a
word it supposedly modifies. You should immediately ask "Who
would be going to his house?" Then you can consider who the re
ferent subject is.4

4.

Direct and indirect objects as referent subjects. As you may have
noticed, referent subjects are quite often the grammatical sub
jects of the sentence that is the referent (i.e., subject verb
object). There will be some cases, however, where it will be
more prudent to identify the direct or indirect object of a re
ferent as the referent subject. Consider example 11 (Table 2):
"The abortion issue burns me up (because . . .)." What is
being explained here? Certainly not the behavior, personality
or affect of an issue: it is more likely that "my" anger over
the issue is being accounted for. Thus, the referent subject
is "me." We can make this a little more complex: suppose I
say, "Jane burns me up (because . . . ) . "
I could conceivably
be trying to explain Jane's behavior ("Jane burns me up because
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Table 2
Examples of Referent Subjects

REFERENT SUBJECT3

R.S. CATEGORY15

She

Other(s)

2 . I'm at my wits' end.

I

Self

3. You should say no to
her.

You

Other(s)

4. Johnny is never on
time.

Johnny

Other(s)

5. We can't get alone.

We

Both

6 . Several people called

Several people

Other(s)

7. Our marriage is on the
rocks.

Our marriage

Both

8 . He should not be blamed

Blamer/s

0 ther(s)

You

Other(s)

REFERENT
1 . She can't do a thing

with her hair.

us.

for his misdeed.
9. Tell me what to do.
1 0 . Going to his house would

★

*

be unfair to his wife.
1 1 . The abortion issue

Me

Self

burns me up.
1 2 . He said she is a snob.

★

Other(s)

aThe terms in this column are the ones you would write in after the
words "Referent Subject" on your rating sheet.
^The terms in this column are the ones you would circle on your rat
ing sheet. Remember that there are three possible choices: Self,
Other(s), and Both.
★
These are ambiguous examples. See pages 119 and 121 for discussions
of these problems.
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she likes to see me lose my cool") or I could be explaining my
own emotions as caused by an external force ("Jane burns me up
because she is so stuck-up"). This can get somewhat ambiguous
and may depend, in part, on how you see the referent in relation
to its context (the entire explanatory statement). As such,
this case resembles the following type of nonobvious example.
5.

Two or more possible subjects. Sometimes a referent will be worded
in such a way as to have two or more plausible subjects, and it
will not necessarily be clear which is the real subject. Look
at the example 12 (Table 2): "He said she is a snob." Who is
the subject? Is it the "he" who is saying something ("he said
it because . . ."), or is it the "she" whose personality is in
question ("she is a snob because . . .")? The answer may lie
in the explanation. If the full explanatory statement is "He
said she is a snob because he was upset," then "he" seems to be
the correct subject. If it is, "He said she is a snob because
she always ignores blue-collar workers," then "she" is appar
ently the more appropriate subject. But if the statement is
"He said she is a snob because she insulted him," the subject is
still ambiguous and you have to make an educated guess.

Categorizing referent subjects. After you fill in the blank fol
lowing "Referent Subject," the last rating task is to circle one of the
three choices which describe the referent subject: self, other(s), or
both (see the Referent Subject Rating Sheet).
Self is the appropriate choice if the referent subject is also
the author of the explanatory statement. If the writer is explaining
himself or herself, the referent subject will be "I" or "me" or some
equivalent. You should therefore circle "Self" (see examples 2 and 11,
Table 2).
Other(s) is the appropriate choice if the author is accounting
for a referent subject who is another person or other persons. If the
referent subject is a you, he, she, they or equivalent (Mr. Jones, the
Smiths, Joe, etc.), circle "Other(s)" (see examples 1, 3, 4, 6 , 8 , 9
and 12 in Table 2).
The both category is for "we" and "us." Whenever the referent
subject includes both the author/self and at least one other person,
circle "Both" (see examples 5 and 7 in Table 2).
Interrater Agreement
Referent subjects will be identified by a pair of raters. When
each individual rater has completed rating all of the explanatory
statements, the two will compare their ratings.
The rating team should go through each explanatory statement and
compare notes. Whenever there is disagreement about a referent subject
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of any kind (identity of subject, category, or both), raters should
discuss it and resolve it one way or the other. For instance, consider
"He said she is a snob": suppose one rater identifies "he" as the sub
ject and the other rater identifies "she," but both circle "Other(s)."
These two raters would discuss this until they reached agreement on
whether "he" or "she" is the subject. Since they agree on the category
of "Other(s)," this needs no discussion.
There is no time limit for discussion and resolution of disagree
ments.
When there is a disagreement and a resolution is reached, use a
red pen or marker to correct the incorrect rating.
(Obviously, raters
should not make their initial ratings in red.)
When all ratings are compared and completed, turn in both raters'
Referent Subject Rating Sheets, with corrections noted in red.
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B.

Components of Referents

What kinds of personal events do people seek to explain? In
order to answer this question, we will look at referents and sort them
into various categories. Our first job will be to define the kinds of
components; then we will discuss how to use these definitions to cate
gorize referents.
Definitions
Overview. Before defining the categories explicitly, let's take
a look at the broad structure of the classification system (see Table 3
on the following page). There three large categories which organize
eight smaller categories: the three are (a) Enduring Personal Charac
teristics, (b) Transient Personal Characteristics, and (c) Contextual
Characteristics. Next, there are eight smaller categories distributed
among the three larger categories (see Table 3). These smaller cate
gories are the ones you will actually use in classifying referents.
Finally, after a referent is assigned to one of the eight classifica
tions, you will further characterize it as prescriptive or descriptive
(see below).
Thus, there are three levels of classification, although you will
actually use two. The first level of three large categories helps you
to organize your thinking and narrow your search among smaller categories.
The second involves selecting one of the eight smaller categories as
best fitting the referent. The third level is an either-or choice:
it's either descriptive or prescriptive.
Now, let's define the various categories more explicitly.
Table 4 (page 125) as a guide.

Use

1.
The first large category is Enduring Personal Characteristics.
As the title suggests, this large category deals with events which are
(a) personal, that is, referring to individual persons (including one
self) rather than to interpersonal relationships or personal situations,
and (b) relatively long-term, enduring characteristics. We use the
term "relatively" because there are few (if any) personal characteris
tics that cannot change over the long run. Some are, however, more
enduring than others. Social identities, personal dispositions and
physical characteristics are generally more enduring than moods and
emotions, single behaviors, and drives or motives. Let's look more
closely at the small categories encompassed by Enduring Personal Charac
teristics.
First, there are social identity elements. These are categories
or groups to which a person is socially recognized as belonging, and
cover behavior that is consistent and determined social1 y , that is, by
forces external to the person. These include such universal social
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Table 3
Classification System for Referents

Enduring Personal Characteristics
Social Identity Elements
Personal Dispositions
Physical Characteristics
Transient Personal Characteristics
Behavi ors

Descri pti ve/Prescri pti ve

Affective States
Motivational States
Contextual Characteristics
Interpersonal Relationships
Personal Situations9

aThis category was added after raters had used the previous seven cate
gories to classify referents. Its addition is due to our finding that
a number of referents did not fit any of the previous categories, but
all seemed to refer to a person's current, past or future situation.
We have added it here and in our manual for future users of this clas
sification system.
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Table 4
Examples of Categories of Referents

Descriptive

Prescriptive

Social
Identity

He is a Mormon be
cause . . .

He ought to be a
Jaycee because . . .

Personal
Disposition

She is aggressive
because . . .

Be patient because . . .

Physical
Characteristic

You are muscular
because . . .

He should be thin
because . . .

Behavior

I was fighting
because . . .

You should have kept
trying because . . .

Affective
State

We were ecstatic
because . . .

Stop being depressed
because . . .

Motivational
State

I want your advice
because . . .

She shouldn't be thirsty
because . . .

Interpersonal
Relationship

Our marriage is very
good because . . .

The party should have
been a success be
cause . . .

Personal
Situation

I live in Oregon
because . . .

I shouldn't come in for
such abuse because . . .
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statuses as sex, age, occupation, social class, and so on; membership
groups, including ethnic, religious, political, racial, and interest
groups; and social labels, like alcoholic (used as a noun), thief,
philanthropist, doctor, lawyer and Indian chief. There may be some
overlap between social identity elements and personal dispositions (see
below) that are social in nature (e.g., "martyr" vs. "self-sacrificing"),
so be alert.
Second, there are personal dispositions, traits or behavioral
tendencies. These are abstract labels for behaviors which are consis
tent over time and across situations, and which are determined from
within the person, i.e., by an inferred personality structure or pro
cess. Dispositions often take the form of adjectives (e.g., outgoing,
friendly, sneaky) and nouns (e.g., Don Juan, snake, extrovert). We have
already noted that there is a fine line between trait nouns and social
identities; you will have to use your judgment and the definitions of
the two categories when you make your rating. Be careful not to con
fuse less enduring characteristics (like affects, behaviors and motiva
tional states) with enduring dispositions. Examples: "she's depressed"
(affect) vs. "she's depressive" (disposition); "he was outgoing at the
party" (behavior) vs. "he's an outgoing guy" (disposition); "he was
hungry" (motivational state) vs. "he's a hungry type" (disposition).
Finally, there are physical characteristics, which include rela
tively long-term aspects of physique, appearance and so on (e.g., muscu
lar, fat, handsome). Do not include short-term physical aspects like
manifestations of mood ("he blushed"), behavior ("she was out of breath
from running") or motives ("his stomach was growling"); note that this
and the previous two examples would all be classified as behaviors;
see below.
2.
The large category of Transient Personal Characteristics is
like the first large category in that it deals with events that refer
to individual persons and not to interpersonal or impersonal situa
tions. It is unlike the first large category in that it deals with
relatively short-term characteristics, personal events which have a
perceivable beginning and end (or at least an inferrable beginning and
a foreseeable finish). Transient events have a kind of on/off quality
that enduring events don't seem to have. Let us consider the three
kinds of Transient Personal Characteristics.
First, there are behaviors. Behaviors are actions and personal
occurrences, things people do. There are many modalities of be
haviors, including perceptual ("He saw the sign"), cognitive/ideational
("He thought . . .", "She imagined . . ."), motoric ("She ran";
"She picked the book up"), reflexive/involuntary ("her stomach growled";
"He tripped and fell"), verbal ("He said . . ."; "She yelled") and
interpersonal ("They danced"). We are looking for accounts of past,
present or future behaviors that do not make a leap into abstraction
and infer enduring statuses and dispositions ("He runs" vs. "He is a
runner"; "She was friendly to me" vs. "She is friendly"). Note that
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qualifiers like "always" and "never" do not a disposition make. "He
always runs" is still a behavior, but "He is a mover" comments on the
person himself.
Next we have affective states. These are moods, emotions and
feelings ("I felt good"; "She was mad"; "You'll be sorry"). Note that
we are talking about mood and emotional states and not behaviors that
accompany them. If I say "He was sad and he cried," the first part is
an affective state and the second is a behavior. Also, affective states
are more or less transient; anything that sounds like an emotion or
has emotional overtones but refers to a stable disposition is either a
social identity or a personal disposition (compare "She is depressed"
with "She is a mental case of psychotic depression" or "She is depres
sive" ).
Finally, there are motivational states. These are needs, drives,
motives and intentions, all of which are states which are terminated
or alleviated, at least temporarily or partially, upon attaining some
goal or end. Motivations can be physiological ("he is hungry"), psycho
logical ("He wants to be effective"), or interpersonal ("She needed a
hug"). Motviations can be chronic, as in the hunger of a starving man,
but they always have some potential finish that could alleviate or
terminate the state. Again, if motives are described as enduring, not
in the sense of chronic, but as a social identity ("She's a beggar") or
personal disposition ("She's dependent"), then they are not really mo
tives.
3.
The last of the three large categories is Contextual Charac
teristics. These are events that refer to contexts or situations, which
may be interpersonal (a marriage, a date, a crowd) or personal (a life
situation, a personal space). There are two smaller categories of Con
textual Characteristics.
First, we have interpersonal relationships. This refers to a
situation involving more than one person in some kind of relationship.
It does not refer to identities, dispositions, behaviors, motives, etc.,
of individuals in a group. In other words, a "we" does not automat
ically signify an interpersonal relationship. Consider this: "We are
married. Our relationship is on the rocks. We fight all the time.
We are both sad a lot." The first two sentences refer to interpersonal
relationships, the third to behaviors (of two people) and the last to
their affect states.
Second, there are personal situations. These involve a person's
context or existence in a particular setting, environment or place.
The emphasis is not on someone doing, feeling, having a role, etc., in
a particular situation, but on the situation itself. Consider this:
"The university is my home." You could conceivably rate this as a
behavior ("being at" a place, making a home), but the person is
really describing his or her situation. Contrast this example with
the following: "I am a student at the university" (social identity;
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"I attend classes at the university" (behavior); and "I feel at home
at the university" (affective state).
OK, we have now defined two of the three levels of categories
of referents: the three large categories and the eight smaller cate
gories. Let's look at the third level.
A referent can be presented in two ways, regardless of whether
it is a social identity, personal disposition, physical characteristic,
behavior, affective state, motivational state, interpersonal relation
ship or personal situation. The first is the descriptive mode: a be
havior, mood, situation, disposition, etc., is described, characterized,
portrayed, interpreted. The second mode is prescriptive: events are
accompanied by shoulds, oughts and their equivalents. Thus: "He saw a
doctor" vs. "He should have seen a doctor"; "She will never consent to
it" vs. "She must never consent to it"; "I am running" vs. "I ought to
be running." Note that occasionally a "should" is implied or unstated:
"See a doctor" is equivalent to "You should see a doctor."
One last note before we consider how to classify referents. The
eight smaller categories and the descriptive/prescriptive distinction
refer equally to past, present and future events. Thus, it makes no
difference if he ran, he is running, he will run, he should have run,
he should be running, or he ought to run tomorrow. They are all in
the category of behaviors; some are descriptive, some are prescriptive.
The verb tense is irrelevant.
Instructions for Classifying Components
Two raters will work on the task of classifying referents. The
first part of the job is to make individual ratings. The second is to
compare notes, and come to an agreement in cases where the two raters
di sagree.
Making ratings. Individual raters should, of course, be very
familiar with the categories that they will use. So this is a rater's
first responsibility.
Raters will receive a set of explanatory statements from advice
columns, each one on a separate sheet. Each sheet will contain the
following information: (a) an excerpt from the advice column which
contains an explanatory statement; (b) a reformulation of the explana
tory statement into "REFERENT because EXPLANATION" form; and (c) an
indication of whose behavior, mood, etc. is contained in the referent.
Ratings will be marked on the 'Referents Rating Sheet." This
form contains (a) a blank for the code number of the explanatory state
ment being rated; (b) a listing of the eight smaller categories to be
used to classify the referent; and (c) a choice between "descriptive"
and "prescriptive" for the referent.
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The first step is to write down the code number of the explana
tory statement you are working on. Now look at the referent. Decide
which of the eight categories it best fits, and circle the appropriate
choice. If a referent is compound, that is, if it covers two categories
or more (e.g., "He is a friendly Democrat"; "She was happy and did an
impromptu dance"), circle the appropriate choices.
Next decide whether the referent is in the descriptive or prescrip
tive mode. Circle the D or P located beneath the category (or cate
gories) you selected above.
Comparing notes. After the raters have completed all excerpts,
they will go through their "Referents Rating Sheets" and compare notes.
Whenever there is a disagreement of any kind, raters should discuss it
and resolve it one way or the other. There is no time limit for this
discussion and resolution.
When there is disagreement and resolution, use a red pen or
marker to correct the incorrect rating.
(Do not make your initial rat
ings in red.) When all ratings are compared and completed, turn in both
raters' "Referents Rating Sheets," with corrections noted in red.
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C.

Components of Explanations:

Locus and Stability

In the preceding section we sorted referents into various cate
gories. Now we will turn our attention to the other half of an ex
planatory statement: the explanation.
We are interested in two characteristics of explanations. First,
when a cause is cited, is it located internal to the actor, in some ex
ternal circumstances, or in some relationship the actor has with another
person? Second, is the cause stable (enduring) or unstable (variable)?
The first part of this section is concerned with locus of causation,
and the second with stability of causes.
1.

Locus of causation

This study is interested in the causes people give for what we
have termed personal events. The referents of all of our explanatory
statements 'are personal events, and in the previous section of this
manual we said that there were eight categories of referents: social
identities, personal dispositions, physical characteristics, behaviors,
affective states, motivational states, interpersonal relationships,
and personal situations. Thus, we are looking at explanations of a
person's (or persons') behaviors, moods, etc. We will call this person
the actor. (Note that we are not concerned, at this point, about the
identity of the person who is offering the explanation; we are inter
ested in the person who is being explained.)
One way of categorizing explanations refers to locus of causa
tion. This is illustrated in Table 5. Let's look at each type of
causal explanation more closely.
Explanations can focus on some process or characteristic internal
to the actor. That is, the actor's personal events are seen as due to
something which is inseparable from the actor, something about the ac
tor, something inherent in the actor. All of the following could be
cited as internal causes: abilities and capacities, efforts, motiva
tions, enduring personal characteristics (including traits, roles,
physique,temperament, etc.), and transient psychological states (in
cluding behaviors and affects). Examples are given in Table 5.
Explanations can, alternatively, emphasize events external to
the actor. Personal events can be seen as caused not by the actor but
by the situation or circumstances or other people. The following are
examples of external explanations: task difficulty, characteristics
of the physical setting, coercion, social influence, outside interven
tion, accident, chance, luck, and so on.
There is a third kind of explanation which involves interper
sonal factors. The reason or cause for some personal event can be
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Table 5
Examples of Three Types of Locus of Causation
INTERNAL

EXTERNAL

INTERPERSONAL

..because he has a
tremendous capacity
for work.

..because the job was
so simple.

..because my wife
doesn't love me any
more

..because she is
intelligent.

..because her mother
made her work hard.

..because we cooper
ated.

..because she tried
the hardest.

..because of sheer
luck.

..because you and I
see eye-to-eye.

..because I wanted to.

..because the path was
quite rough.

..because they are in
love.

..because you are too
heavy.

..because it was so
warm in there.

..because they have a
rotten marriage.

..because he is a
lucky guy.

..because of an
accident.

..because I can't make
it without her.

..because I am shy.

..because people
intimidate me.

..because we didn't hit
it off.

..because he was
hopping mad.

..because she insulted
him.

..because she and her
dad always fight.

..because he lifted it
too high.

..because it was God's
will.

..because we al 1
refused to go.

Note:

for internal examples, assume the person cited as a cause is the
person who is being explained;
for external examples involving persons, assume that the caus
al person is not the person who is being explained;
for interpersonal causes, assume that at least one of the per
sons involved is the person who is being explained.

132
attributed to an actor's involvement with another person, to a relation
ship. Thus, the explanation is not internal, because another person is
involved; nor is it external, because the actor cannot be left out or
excluded. The explanation encompasses a "we." Note that there are
certain kinds of internal and external explanations which look interper
sonal but which really aren't. On the internal side, if I say that
person A did such-and-such because he is friendly, I am referring to a
trait that directs his behavior when he is around other people. I am
not referring, however, to his relationship to a particular person or
group. Social traits are internal causes. On the external side, I can
say that person A did such-and-such because person B had a gun on A or
because B jostled A. In this case, person A's behavior is a result of
person B as an external force, and not to some relationship in which
the contributions of A and B are intertwined. Again, refer to Table 5
for examples of these types of explanations.
Rating task. Raters will first categorize explanations as inter
nal, external or interpersonal. This classification will be done by
raters individually. Next, raters will compare notes and compute a per
cent agreement. Finally, disagreements will be discussed and resolved,
with no time limit.
The actual rating is fairly simple. The rating sheet will require
judges to circle the appropriate choice (internal, external, interper
sonal) for each explanatory statement. In cases of compound explana
tions involving more than one kind of locus (example: I went to the
party because I was invited and also because I'm naturally outgoing),
circle more than one choice.
2.

Stability of Causes

Causes of personal events can vary in their stability. Some causes
will involve stable, enduring characteristics of the actor, the situa
tion, or a relationship; other causes will be relatively unstable and
variable. There will also be causes of uncertain stability, for which
it is difficult to make a determination of stability or instability.
As we shall see, the task in this section is to rate explanations
as stable or unstable. Cases of uncertain stability will require some
thinking through, but they should, in the end, be categorizable. Table
6 takes the examples from Table 5 and classifies them according to
their stability. Now, let's define more explicitly the terms stable
and unstable.
Stable causes are those that are relatively long-term and endur
ing. A stable cause is one you would expect to see operating in the
future in the same way that it is operating now or has operated in the
past. Stable causes can be internal to the actor; they can be features
of the situation or context; and they can involve interpersonal re
lationships. Examples of stable causes include all enduring personal
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Table 6
Examples of Two Types of Stability of Causes

STABLE

UNSTABLE

..because he has a tremendous
capacity for work.

..because she tried the hardest.

..because she is intelligent.

..because I wanted to.

..because you are too heavy.

..because he was hopping mad.

..because he is a lucky guy.

..because he lifted it too high.

. .because I am shy.

..because of sheer luck.

..because the job was so simple.

..because it was so warm in there.

..because her mother made her
work hard.

..because of an accident.

..because the path was so rough.

..because she insulted him.

..because people intimidate me.

..because we cooperated.

..because it was God's will.

..because we didn't hit it off.

..because my wife doesn't love
me anymore.

..because we all refused to go.

..because you and I see eyeto-eye.
..because they are in love.
..because they have a rotten
marriage.
..because I can't make it with
out her.
..because she and her dad always
fight.
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characteristics (abilities and capacities; most roles and social iden
tities; personality traits; intelligence; physique and long-term physi
cal characteristics; and motives that have an enduring, trait-like qual
ity), all enduring aspects of social and physical situations (task
difficulty; unvarying, long-term social influences; and relatively un
changing aspects of the physical environment), and stable interpersonal
relationships (past, present and future) or aspects thereof.
Unstable causes are those that are relatively changeable, vari
able, or short-term. An unstable cause is one which you would expect to
have changed or stopped operating in the future, which has been variable
or inconsistent in the past, or which you believe would have a low-tomedium probability of operating in a stable fashion. Like stable causes,
unstable causes can be internal, external, or interpersonal. Examples
of unstable causes include transient personal characteristics (effort;
moods and emotions; short-term motives; and isolated behaviors and be
haviors that are not characteristic, nor part of a trait-like pattern),
short-term or variable aspects of the social or physical context (luck,
chance and accident; unexpected or unusual circumstances; short-term so
cial influences; and changing or variable aspects of the physical world),
and unstable personal relationships or any variable aspects of relation
ships.
Many of the explanations that are to be rated will cite causes
that are clearly stable or unstable. Others will be less obvious. In
these latter cases, use two strategies to assist in your decision-making.
(a) Rather than think about stability/unstability in absolute,
either-or fashion, consider this dimension in a relative,
more-or-less way. That is, ask yourself, "Does this cause
seem more stable than unstable?" and vice versa.
(b) Think in terms of the future. Would you expect a cited cause
to be likely to be operating, unchanged, in the future? Or
would you see this cause as having changed or ceased later
on?
The answers to these two types of question may be implicit in the word
ing of an explanatory statement. Look for clues. You may occasionally
have to make an educated guess about stability, however.
Rating task. Raters will, individually, categorize explanations
as stable or unstable. Next, raters will compare notes and compute a
percent agreement. Finally, disagreements will be discussed and re
solved, with no time limit.
The actual rating is fairly simple. The rating sheet requires
judges to circle the appropriate choice (stable, unstable) for each
explanatory statement. If a compound explanation should involve both
stable and unstable causes (e.g., he won because he is very smart and
he tried hard), circle both.
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D.

Types of Explanations:

Causes and Reasons

Philosophers and psychologists have pointed out that there are
two types of explanations that people offer for personal events: causes
and reasons. This section defines these terms and provides a set of in
structions for rating explanations as causes or reasons.

Definitions
Causes. A cause involves explanation without justification:
"behavior simply follows from its causes, whether justified or not."*
Causes explain behavior as "the automatic or inevitable outcome of a cer
tain complex of conditions." Thus, causal explanations are general, regu
lar, and perhaps predictable antecedent-consequent relationships. This
is the type of explanation favored by professional scientists, including
psychologists. Naive or implicit psychologists can, too, cite causes in
a quasi-scientific manner.
Reasons. A reason is an explanation via justification. "Reasons
explain intentional behavior . . . by showing it to be what any rational
agent would do, given the relevant beliefs and desires." Justification
is used in a broad sense; it includes not only justification based on
moral or ethical principles, but also justification of a behavior as
rational, that it, "correct, appropriate or sensible from the agent's
point of view." Agents know the reasons for their behaviors, and these
reasons may be idiosyncratic (they could also be general and normative,
however).
Causes and reasons compared. Causes and reasons are similar in
that they are both explanations; as such, they can refer to one's own
behavior or to that of other Deople; they can be psychological (inter
nal) or situational (external), and they can be stable or unstable.
We are more interested, however, in differences between causes
and reasons, since we are setting out to categorize explanations as one
or the other. Table 7 outlines the differences, and Table 8 supplies
examples. The most basic and general distinction between causes and
reasons revolves around the issue of justification. The clearest ways
in which reasons are different from causes are twofold: reasons are
always known (never unknown) to agents, and reasons explain only inten
tional behaviorl"! (Note that causes may be known or unknown to the
agent, and may refer to both intentional and unintentional behaviors.)
It follows, too, that if an explanation involves unintended behaviors
*A11 quotations are from D. Locke & D. Pennington, Reasons and other
causes: Their role in attribution processes. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 1982, 42^, 212-23. These authors' usage of the
term behavior corresponds to this manual's personal events; acjervt cor
responds to actor.

136

Table 7
Different Characteristics of Causes and Behavior
CAUSES

REASONS

Explanation without justifica
tion.

Explanation via justification.

May be unknown to agent, dif
ficult to uncover.

Always known to agent.

Explain accidents and occur
rences as well as intentional
behaviors.

Explain only intentional behaviors
(actions)..

General and regular causal
connections.

May be idiosyncratic to agent.

Automatic, inevitable, often
predictable result of ante
cedent condition(s).

Based on rationality (what any ra
tional agent would, could or
might do); a rational, sensible
or appropriate act from the
agent's point of view.

137

Table 8
Examples of Causes and Reasons
CAUSE

REASON

He knocked her down
because

the bus suddenly
stopped.

she insulted his man
hood.

I went to the store
because

I was kidnapped.

we needed milk.

He is a thief
because

he had a twisted
childhood.

he doesn't care for
hard work.

I choose to walk
because

I have a driving
phobia.

it is good exercise.

They always fail
because

society is against
them.

they prefer to be
taken care of.

We need your advice
because

nothing else has
helped.

we want to do the
right thing.

He became president
because

he was driven by a
lust for power.

it was his life's
ambition.

I am happy because

my wife just had a
baby.

I don't let little
things bother me.

and/or cites causal conditions unknown to the agent, it must be a cause
and not a reason.
Making Ratings
The rating sheet for causes and reasons (see p. 139) structures
your decision about whether explanatory statements contain causes or
reasons by asking four questions. You will answer these questions prior
to making your final decision; your answers will help to determine the
choice that you make. Let us briefly look at each of these guiding
queries.
Justification? The full form of this question is as follows:
Does the explanation that is offered involve some kind of justification?
Remember that we are using the term justification in a broad sense.
It is not restricted to moral or ethical correctness; it includes jus
tification of a behavior as correct, appropriate or rational from the
agent's point of view. Note, too, that the question is not "Do you think
the agent's behavior was justified, correct, what you would do?" You
have to take the role of the agent and decide whether the act was jus
tified in his/her view.
If you answer "No" to this question, it would suggest that the
explanation is a cause.
If you answer "Yes" to this question, it would suggest that the
explanation is a reason.
If the explanation is ambiguous, if you are very unsure or cannot
decide whether justification is involved, you should circle the ? option.
Agent's awareness? Full form: Is the agent aware of the fac
tors that are being cited to explain his/her behavior?
Your answer to this question will be your estimate about whether
or not the agent consciously knows about the particular factors cited,
in the explanation, as influencing his/her behavior. Remember to check
ratings of the Referent Subject (made previously) to be sure you have
the correct agent in mind.
If your answer to this question is "No," it would suggest that
the explanation is a cause.
If your answer to this question is "Yes," it could suggest either
a cause or a reason, although a reason is probably favored.
Use the ? option for ambiguous cases.
Intentional referent? Full form: Is the personal event described
in the referent of the explanatory statement an intentional action?
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RATING SHEET:

CAUSES AND REASONS

Justification?
Agent's awareness?
Intentional referent?
General/regular/normative?

No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

?
?
?
?

CAUSE

I

E

REASON

P

S

Justification?
Agent's awareness?
Intentional referent?
General/regular/normative?

No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

7
7

CAUSE

I

E

7
7

REASON

P

S

Justification?
Agent's awareness?
Intentional referent?
General/regular/normative?

No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

7
7
?
7

CAUSE

I

E

REASON

P

S

Justi fication?
Agent's awareness?
Intentional referent?
General/regular/normative?

No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

7
?
7
7

CAUSE

I

E

REASON

P

S

Justification?
Agent's awareness?
Intentional referent?
General/regular/normative?

No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

7
7
?
7

CAUSE

I

E

REASON

P

S

Statement code: Justification?
Agent's awareness?
Intentional referent?
General/regular/normative?

No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

7
?
7
?

CAUSE

I

E

REASON

P

S

Statement code: Justification?
Agent's awareness?
Intentional referent?
General/regular/normative?

No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

?
?
7
7

CAUSE

I

E

REASON

P

S

Justi fication?
Agent's awareness?
Intentional referent?
General/regular/normative?

No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

7
7
?
7

CAUSE

I

E

REASON

P

S

Statement code:

Statement code:

Statement code:

Statement code:

Statement code:

Statement code:
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This question asks whether the referent involves an action over
which the agent has volitional control, as opposed to an occurrence in
volving no intent or control by the agent.
If you answer "No" to this question, it would suggest that the ex
planation involves a cause.
If your answer is "Yes," it could suggest either a cause or a
reason, although a reason is probably favored.
A choice of ? denotes a large amount of uncertainty.
General/regular/normative? Full form: Are the factors cited in
the explanation general and regular, of the type you would expect to see
operating in a similar fashion and with similar effects across agents,
situations, or particular agent x situation interactions?
In this question you are asked to make a statement about the
nomothetic or idiographic nature of the factors cited in the explanation.
Does it seem "lawful" in a deterministic way? Or is the explanatory fac
tor idiosyncratic to the agent?
If you answer "Yes" to the question about generality/regularity/
normativeness, then either a cause or a reason is suggested, although a
cause is probably favored.
If you answer "No" to this question, a reason is suggested.
A ? suggests an uncertain or ambiguous state of affair^.
Putting the answers together. The four preliminary questions and
their response choices (yes, no, ?) are arrayed in a column for each ex
planatory statement. The pattern of responses to these queries will be
an aid to your decision between a rating of "cause" or "reason." Note
that the left column of responses is suggestive of causes and the middle
column suggests reasons. In some cases, all responses may suggest a
cause or a reason unequivocally. In other cases, there will be a mix
or some missing information (? responses). In the latter eventuality,
you will have to make your decision based on the evidence and your intui
tion.
Rating procedure. Two judges will each, individually, rate all
explanations as causes or reasons. Then they will compare notes, cal
culate percent agreement, and resolve discrepancies via discussion.'

APPENDIX B
SCORING MANUAL:

CONSISTENCY, DISTINCTIVENESS AND CONSENSUS

INFORMATION IN THE NEWSPAPER ADVICE COLUMNS

142

PART I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

OVERVIEW

The purpose of the present study is to see how people use support
ing information to justify or clarify their explanations for their own
or other people's behavior. This is actually a study which is part of
an ongoing research project studying the newspaper advice columns. Last
semester, student "raters" or "coders" went through a set of letters to
the advice columns. Their job was to search for explanations of be
havior. This semester student raters will be searching for certain
pieces of information that support or clarify explanations.
Sometimes, pieces of information in the advice columns are vague
or unclear. For this reason, we decided to use several raters or coders
We can be relatively confident that we have located the correct pieces
of information if several independent raters all locate the same items.
This procedure will help us to insure that our data is clear and unam
biguous.
If several raters all end up with the same data using this par
ticular coding manual, then the manual is said to be Reliable. The par
ticular type of reliability involved is called interrater reliability.
If the independent raters end up with different data, then the coding
manual is not reliable, and we may have problems with the definitions of
our terms or with the procedure we outline.
Although the raters who will be using this manual will be search
ing the advice columns for information that supports explanatory state
ments, it will be helpful for them first to understand what explanatory
statements are:
B.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS

People write into the newspaper advice columns with descriptions
and explanations of their own and other people's problems and be
haviors. A system for reliably identifying advice column explanations
was developed by Thomas Schoeneman and Daniel Rubanowitz. This system
is contained in the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the Ad
vice Columns. The definitions and classifications for explanatory
statements and their components which were used in this scoring manual
will be presented in this section.
Let us first begin with some examples of explanatory statements:
1) She wants to be pregnant again because she believes it will
be a valuable "learning experience" for her children.
2) For business reasons I cannot be seen in public with my lover.
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3) Kathy's self-righteousness is beginning to bug me.
Explanatory statements contain two parts: an explanation and
what is being explained. The explanation part is naturally called an
explanation. That which is being explained is called a referent. Using
the three examples from above, we can see how explanatory statements can
be reduced or simplified to the form "referent because explanation."
1) REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

She wants to be pregnant.

2) REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

I cannot be seen in public with my lover

3) REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

she believes it will be a valuable "learning
experience" for her children.

of business reasons.
I'm beginning to be bugged
of Kathy's self-righteousness.

C. TYPES OF REFERENTS
There are three general types of referents: enduring personal
characteristics, transient personal characteristics and contextual
characteristics.
Enduring personal characteristics refer to relatively long-term,
unchanging aspects of people. Referents in this category include social
identity elements (e.g., He is a Mormon), personal dispositions (e.g.,
Joe is an aggressive person) and physical characteristics (e.g., Bill is
tall).
Transient personal characteristics refer to relatively short term
personal events. Referents in this category include behaviors (e.g.,
I was fighting with John), affective states (e.g., Bob was happy about
the election results) and motivational states (e.g., Ed needs Sue's
love).
Contextual characteristics refer to events that are not personal,
but that are contextual, physical or impersonal. Referents in this cate
gory include interpersonal relationships (e.g., We are happily married)
or impersonal/physical contexts (e.g., The day was stormy).
D. TRANSIENT PERSONAL CHARACTERISTIC REFERENTS
Transient personal characteristic referents will be the focus
of the present study because they possess one special property. They
can be reduced or simplified in a certain way that makes them compatible
with certain theories of social cognition.
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Specifically, this type of referent can be broken down into three
components: the person, the verb and the stimulus. The person refers
to who is performing or experiencing the behavior, affect or motivation
in the referent. The verb refers to the behavior, affect or motivation
itself. This term should be differentiated from the grammatical com
ponent of a sentence referred to by the same name. The referent com
ponent verb refers to al 1 the words in the sentence that are necessary
to specify the complete behavior, thought or feeling in the referent.
The stimulus refers to the target, recipient or focus of the verb. Here
are a few examples:
1) John laughed at the comedian.
PERSON:
VERB:
STIMULUS:

John
laughed at
the comedian

2) She was ecstatic about the movie.
PERSON:
VERB:
STIMULUS:

She
was ecstatic about
the movie

3) I need to get some sleep.
PERSON:
VERB:
STIMULUS:

I
need to get
some sleep

It is important to note that only transient personal characteris
tics can be simplified to the form "person verb stimulus." The referent
"Bill is very tall" (classified as an enduring personal characteristic)
cannot be simplified in this way. "Bill" is the person and "is very
tall" would be the verb. But, there really is no stimulus or target
toward which Bill is behaving.
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PART 11.
A.

FORMING FULLY SIMPLIFIED REFERENTS
EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS OF INTEREST TO THE PRESENT STUDY

A set of explanatory statements was generated from a random sample
of advice columns using the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in
the Advice Columns. Each explanatory statement was simplified to the
form "referent because explanation." The referent refers to the be
havior, thought, feeling, etc., which is being explained. The explana
tion refers to the attribution, or "why" the behavior, thought, feeling,
etc. occurred. This section of the present scoring manual is concerned
only with the processing of referents.
Only certain types of referents are of interest in the present
study. Part II.B. of the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the
Advice Columns contains a procedure for classifying referents into one
of three general categories: enduring personal characteristics, transi
ent personal characteristics or contextual characteristics. This sec
tion of the present scoring manual is concerned only with the processing
of referents categorized as transient personal characteristics.
B.

REFERENT COMPONENTS

The referents that were categorized as transient personal charac
teristics can be simplified or reduced to the form "person verb stimu
lus."
The "person" refers to who is performing the behavior in question.
The "verb" refers to the complete behavior being performed, such
as thinking, feeling, acting, etc.
The "stimulus" refers to the target, recipient or focus of the
behavior, and it could be a person, an object, or an event.
Here are two example referents and their components:
1) REFERENT:

John laughed at the comedian.

PERSON:
VERB:
STIMULUS:
2) REFERENT:

John
laughed at
the comedian

Sue is afraid of the dog.

PERSON:
VERB:
STIMULUS:

Sue
is afraid of
the dog
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C.

VARIATIONS ON THE "PERSON"

Our two above examples illustrate referents that are relatively
simple. In the advice columns many referents are quite complex and
represent a variety of grammatical forms. Consider the following ex
ample:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

He said that she is a snob
he is quick to call people names.

This referent is in multi-subject form. Either "he" or "she" could be
the referent subject or person. When the explanation is examined, how
ever, it becomes apparent that "he" is the person. "He" is the person
because it is his behavior that is being explained.
Part II.A. of the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the
Advice Columns wi11 be used to locate the "person" in each referent. Tn
addition to the multi-subject form just described, Part II.A. of the
Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the Advice Columns describes
four other types of unusual referent subject forms. The person can be
presented in the passive voice, as in "They should not be blamed for
his misdeed." The person performing a behavior here is "the blamer."
The person can also be presented in the imperative, as in "Tell me what
to do." The person performing the behavior is the implicit "you" as in
"You tell me what to do." Sometimes the person occurs as part of a
dangling participle, as in "Going to his house would be unfair to her."
The person performing the behavior is that person who is going to the
house in question. Finally, the referent person can show up an indirect
object, as in "The abortion issue burns me up." Here, the person per
forming the behavior is "me," as in "I" am burned up by the abortion
issue."
D.

VARIATIONS ON THE "STIMULUS"

1) IMPLICIT "STIMULUS" TYPES: Sometimes the stimulus is simply
not presented in the referent. For example, consider the referent
"John swims." "John" is the person, "swims" is the verb, but no
stimulus is given. Obviously, John must swim somewhere. In order to
determine the stimulus it will be necessary to examine the original
advice column letter in which the referent appeared.
2)

EVENTS AND GERUNDS

The focus or target of a behavior can sometimes be a verb (gram
matical) or a verb form. For example, in the referent, "I enjoy jog
ging alone," "I" is the person, "enjoy" is the verb, and the gerund
"jogging" is the stimulus.
An example referent that has an event as its stimulus would be,
"I am happy that you arrived." "I" is the person, "am happy that" is
the verb and "you arrived" is the stimulus.
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3) MORE THAN ONE "STIMULUS":
Occasionally there is more than one target, recipient or focus
of a person's behavior. For example, consider the following referent,
"I am cleaning the house for my mother." "I" is definitely the person.
"Cleaning" could be the verb with "the house" as the stimulus. However
"cleaning the house for" could be the verb with "my mother" as the
stimulus. In order to determine the correct verb and stimulus it may
be necessary to examine the original letter. If the particular letter
is a discussion of various activities that are performed for one's
mother, then the stimulus may be "the house," But if the letter dis
cusses helping various people with their chores, errands or housework,
then "my mother" may be the correct stimulus, problems in determining
the correct stimulus can be dealt with by using the explanation, the
statement excerpt or the original letter as a reference.
E. PROCEDURE
Before fully simplifying referents it is necessary to identify
those referents that are relevant (e.g., transient personal characteris
tics). Two steps will be involved in this process. First, the referent
subject or the person will be identified in each referent. Second,
transient personal characteristic referents will be identified. These
two steps will be accomplished using Part II.A. and Part II.B., respec
tively, of the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the Advice
Columns. Once the appropriate set of referents have been located, a
sample of fully simplified referents can be generated.
One team of two raters will fully simplify a random sample of 50
referents in order to assess the reliability of the procedure. One
rater only will fully simplify the remaining referents in the total
sample. All raters will use the following procedure for simplifying
referents:
1) Record the person obtained for each referent obtained from
Part II.A. of the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in
the Advice Columns. This person will refer to who is per
forming the behavior.
2) Locate an answer to the two following questions:
What is the complete behavior? (verb)
Who or what is the target, recipient or focus of the behavior?
(stimulus)
These two questions must be entertained simultaneously because
postential variations in the stimulus will result in varia
tions of the verb.
3) If there is more than one answer to one or both of the ques
tions in #2 , then refer to the explanation, statement ex
cerpt and/or the original letter in order to determine the
correct stimulus and verb.

4) The results of the two raters will be compared and the per
centages of agreement (e.g., reliability) will be calculated
5) If there are any discrepancies between the two rater's re
sults, then the discrepancies will be discussed and resolved
one referent at a time. There will be no time limit on the
discussions.
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PART III:

TEST QUESTION FORMATION:

CONSISTENCY, DISTINCTIVENESS AND

CONSENSUS
In order to help ensure that raters will be searching for in
stances of supporting information in a systematic manner, it will be
necessary to provide them with a structured format. This manual will
describe the procedure for formulating three questions, one for Consistency information, one for Pistinctiveness information and one for
Consensus information. The raters will use these questions to test for
the presence of each kind of supporting information as it relates to
an explanatory statement in the advice columns.
A.

REVIEW OF EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS:

Teams of student raters scanned the advice columns for explana
tory statements using the Scoring Manual: Explanatory Statements in the
Advice Columns. Using this manual, a reliable set of explanatory statements was generated. Each explanatory statement was reduced or sim
plified to the following form:
REFERENT

BECAUSE

EXPLANATION

Referents can be categorized into three general types: enduring
personal characteristics, transient personal characteristics and con
textual characteristics (see Part II.B. of the Scoring Manual: Explana
tory Statements in the Advice Columns). Only referents that are transient personal characteristics are of interest in the present study.
B.

REVIEW OF REFERENT COMPONENTS

Each referent of interest can be simplified to the form "person
verb stimulus." The "person" refers to who is performing the behavior
in the referent. The "verb" refers to the complete behavior being per
formed. The "stimulus" refers to the target, recipient or focus of the
behavior.
C.

INFORMATION TYPES

The simplified referent components can be used to define three
types of information.
Consensus information provides data on the variance of the term
person. Consensus tells us about how many persons perform the same be
havior as the referent person toward a given stimulus. Consensus infor
mation can be outlined this way:
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PERSON A?
PERSON B?
PERSON C?
REFERENT PERSON

VERB'

STIMULUS

A concrete example can be illustrated as follows:
REFERENT:

Andrew is afraid of the dog.

PERSON:
VERB:
STIMULUS:

Andrew
is afraid of
the dog

CONSENSUS INFORMATION:
ANDREW
RUTH?
MONICA?
BRUCE?

Ruth, Monica and Bruce are also (or, are
not also) afraid of the dog.

AFRAID OF-

•THE DOG

Distinctiveness information provides data on the variance of the
term stimulus. Distinctiveness tells us about how many target objects
or persons are the focus of the given persons behavior (e.g., verb).
Distinctiveness information can be outlined this way:

PERSON-

•VERB

?STIMULUS
?STIMULUS
?STIMULUS
REFERENT

A
B
C
STIMULUS

Our example from above can be illustrated as follows:
REFERENT:

Andrew is afraid of the dog.

DISTINCTIVENESS INFORMATION:

ANDREW-

Andrew is also afraid of (or, is
not also afraid of) beagles, ter
riers, huskies and dachshunds.

-AFRAID OF

?BEAGLES
?TERRIERS
?HUSKIES
?DACHSHUNDS

Consistency information provides data on how frequently or how
often the given person performed a given behavior (e.g., verb) toward
the given stimulus, either in the past or across situations. Consistency
information often involves the use of a modifier of the verb, such as
"always," "sometimes" or "never." When there is variance of a behavior
across situations, the various situations are usually listed. Our ex
ample from above can be described as follows:
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REFERENT:

Andrew is afraid of the dog,

CONSISTENCY INFORMATION:

Andrew has always/never been afraid of
the dog in the past.
or
Andrew has always/never been afraid of
the dog, either indoors, outdoors, or
riding in the truck.

D.

QUESTION FORMATION
1.

DEFINITIONS

In addition to person, verb and stimulus, three other terms need
to be defined for question construction:
PERSON LABEL:

Every person is a member of some category. If
the person is described in the referent just as
an individual, then they belong to the category
"people" or "others." If the person is described
as belonging to some specific group then that
group name can be invoked (e.g., men, Republicans,
car owners, etc.). Since we are concerned here
only with the behavior of organisms, there are
no categories for objects or things under person
label.

STIMULUS LABEL:

Every stimulus also belongs to some category.
Unlike the person, the stimulus can be a thing
or a human being. Things will belong to cate
gories such as dogs, cats, movies, cities, air
planes, etc. A human being will belong to cate
gories in the same way as the person did (see
PERSON LABEL).

VERB LABEL:

Some, but not all verbs are behaviors which be
long to a general behavioral category. For
example, "giving someone $100 for their birthday"
is part of the general category of "gift giving."

1)

REFERENT COMPONENTS AND RAW FORM QUESTIONS

Once we have the three components of each referent identified,
it is possible to construct questions which test for the presence of
Consistency, Distinctiveness and Consensus information.
The "raw" forms for each of these questions are as follows:
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CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings),
has (would, should) Person Verb (or Verb label)
Stimulus (or Stimulus label)?

DISTINCTIVENESS:

Toward (to, with) how many different Stimulus
Label does (would, should) Person Verb (or Verb
label)?

CONSENSUS:

How many other Person label (did, would, should)
Verb or (Verb label) Stimulus (or Stimulus label)?

E.

EXAMPLES

The referent components obtained from the rater's use of Part II
of this coding manual can be placed in the appropriate slot to form each
question. The use of the "helper" verbs "did," "would" and "should"
will ensure that each question is grammatically correct. The use of the
Person label and the Stimulus label will enable questions to be formed
which will address the variance across the person and the stimulus,
respectively, since these are the definitions of Consensus and Distinctive
ness, respectively. The Verb label will be used to help make sure each
question makes sense and is consistent with the Person and Stimulus
labels. Here are several examples:
1)

REFERENT:

Bill gave Ed fifty dollars for his graduation.

AGENT:
VERB:
STIMULUS:

Bill
gave fifty dollars (e.g., gave a gift)
Ed

CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many set
tings) has Bill given such a gift to Ed?

DISTINCTIVENESS: Toward how many different people does Bill
give gifts?
How many other people (do, would) give such
a gift to Ed?

CONSENSUS:

2)

REFERENT:

My boyfriend liked my hair.

AGENT:
VERB:
STIMULUS:

My boyfriend
liked
my hair

CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many set
tings) has my boyfriend liked my hair?

DISTINCTIVENESS:

Toward how many different physical features
of mine does my boyfriend express liking?
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How many other people (do, would) like my
hair?

CONSENSUS:

3)

REFERENT:

Mom said the movie was a rip-off.

AGENT:
Mom
VERB:
said was arip-off
STIMULUS:the movie
CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many set
tings) has Mom said "it was a rip-off" about
a movie?

DISTINCTIVENESS:

Toward how many different movies does Mom
say "it was a rip-off"?

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (do, would) say "it
was a rip-off" about the movie?
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PART IV:

FINDING CONSISTENCY, DISTINCTIVENESS AND CONSENSUS

According to Harold Kelley's (1967) theory of attribution (e.g.,
how people attribute or explain the causes of behavior), people use
three types of information along with explanatory statements: consis
tency, distinctiveness, and consensus. The job of the raters in this
part of the study is to find instances of these information types that
are used to support, justify, defend or clarify explanatory statements.
Before learning how to locate these information types in the advice
columns, it will be necessary for the raters to be thoroughly familiar
with them.
A.

CONSISTENCY INFORMATION

This information type tells us about how frequent or repeatable
a behavior has been in the past or in other settings. In general, it
tells us how consistent the behavior has been. Behavior that a person
has performed most of the time is said to have HIGH CONSISTENCY. Be
havior that a person has performed relatively infrequently is said to
have LOW CONSISTENCY.
Consider the following behavior (remember that a behavior is
called a referent when it appears in an explanatory statement):
JOHN LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
If John laughed at the comedian most of the time in the past, his behavior
would be high in consistency. In this case, consistency information
might take this form:
JOHN HAS ALWAYS LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
If John laughed at the comedian relatively infrequently, then his be
havior would be low in consistency. In this case, consistency informa
tion might take this form:
JOHN HAS NEVER LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
The key words in the last two examples were "always" and "never," re
spectively. Key words like these "clue us in" that we are being given
information about the consistency of the behavior. Other key words
that usually indicate consistency information are "rarely," "usually,"
"frequently," "occasionally," "sometimes," "habitually," "chronically,"
etc. Notice that some of these key words indicate high consistency
(e.g., frequently), some indicate low consistency (e.g., rarely) and
some are unclear (e.g., sometimes). Even if you cannot tell whether
the information is high or low in form, it would still be consistency
information if it tells you about the frequency of past behavior.
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The consistency of a behavior is sometimes revealed in the number
of ways the behavior presents itself, or in the number of different set
tings in which the behavior occurs. This type of consistency informa
tion can be illustrated using our example "John laughed at the comedian.
High consistency might be:
JOHN HAS LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN, WHETHER HE SAW HIM
ON T.V., IN THE MOVIES, OR IN PERSON.
Low consistency might take this form:
JOHN DOES NOT LAUGH AT THE COMEDIAN, WHETHER HE SEES
HIM ON T.V., IN THE MOVIES, OR IN PERSON.
Just for the sake of completeness, here is a list of instances of
high consistency on John's behavior:
JOHN OFTEN LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN GENERALLY LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN USUALLY LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN IN CLUBS, ON STAGE, OR AT
THE MOVIES.
Here is a list of instances of low consistency on John's behavior:
JOHN
JOHN
JOHN
JOHN
HE'S

RARELY LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
SELDOM LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN.
LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN ONLY ONCE IN A WHILE.
LAUGHS AT THE COMEDIAN IN PERSON, BUT NEVER WHEN
ON STAGE OR IN THE MOVIES,

Finally, here is a list of general examples of consistency information
as you might encounter them in the advice columns:
(high) - I ALWAYS KEEP MY CAR WELL POLISHED.
- EVERYTIME I WANT TO GO SOMEWHERE, SOMEONE IS
SURE TO WANT TO RIDE ALONG.
- I ALWAYS FOLLOW THE YANKEES, WHETHER I HEAR ABOUT
THEM ON THE NEWS, READ ABOUT THEM IN THE PAPER,
OR LISTEN TO THE GUYS AT WORK TALK ABOUT THEM.
(low)

- YOUR WIFE RARELY PUTS UP WITH THIS.
- MY BOSS ENJOYS A BIG DINNER WHEN HE EATS OUT
BUT AT HOME HE NEVER COOKS VERY MUCH.
- BILL HAS NOT ACCEPTED AN INVITATION FROM ME
EVER SINCE MY DIVORCE.

The raters will not be required to tell the difference between high and
low consistency when finding it in the advice columms, but being aware
of the differences may be helpful.
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B.

DISTINCTIVENESS INFORMATION

You will remember from before that the behaviors we are interested
in can all be simplified to the form "person verb stimulus." Distinc
tiveness information tells us about the number of different stimuli toward
which a person performs a behavior (e.g., verb). LOW DISTINCTIVENESS
information tells us that a behavior occurs for many different "stimuli."

PERSON

•VERB

STIMULUS
STIMULUS
STIMULUS
STIMULUS

A
B
C
D

This can be illustrated with our example referent "John laughed at
the comedian." Low distinctiveness might take this form:
JOHN LAUGHS AT MANY DIFFERENT COMEDIANS.

JOHN

LAUGHS

COMEDIAN
COMEDIAN
COMEDIAN
COMEDIAN

A
B
C
D

John's behavior is low in distinctiveness because it occurs for many dif
ferent stimuli.
HIGH DISTINCTIVENESS information tells us that a behavior occurs
only for a specific stimulus.

PERSON

VERB'

-STIMULUS
STIMULUS
STIMULUS
STIMULUS

A
B
C
D

With the referent "John laughed at the comedian," high distinctiveness
might take this form:
JOHN LAUGHS ONLY AT HIS FAVORITE COMEDIAN.

---

------

FAVORITE
COMEDIAN
COMEDIAN
COMEDIAN

COMEDIAN
A
B
C

Sometimes distinctiveness information is presented by simply listing
the different stimulus toward which the behavior occurs. If the behavior
occurs for the majority of the stimuli, then it is low in distinctiveness,
as in:
At the party, John laughed at Bill's, Ruth's, Steve's and George's
jokes.
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'S JOKES
'S JOKES
E'S JOKES
GE'S JOKES
If the behavior occurs for the minority of the stimuli then it is high
in distinctiveness, as in:
John laughed at Bill's jokes, but not at Ruth's, Steve's or George's
jokes.

JOHN

LAUGHED

BILL'S JOKES
RUTH'S JOKES
STEVE'S JOKES
GEORGE'S JOKES

Using our example, "John laughed at the comedian," here are some
general examples of distinctiveness information:
(low)

- JOHN LAUGHED AT MANY COMEDIANS,
- JOHN LAUGHED AT VARIOUS COMEDIANS.
- JOHN LAUGHED AT ALL KINDS OF COMEDIANS,

(high) - JOHN LAUGHED AT NO OTHER COMEDIAN.
- JOHN LAUGHED AT ONE OF THE COMEDIANS.
- JOHN LAUGHED ONLY AT POLITICAL COMEDIANS.
Here are some examples of distinctiveness information as you might
encounter them in the advice columns:
(Low)

Someone is sure to call and invite me to play golf,
go fishing, to a ball game, wrestling match or to
play poker.

SOMEONE1

(Low)

I

(Low)

CALL AND INVITE

PLAY GOLF
GO FISHING
BALL GAME
WRESTLING MATCH
POKER GAME

I urge all mothers to listen to their children.
MOTHER
MOTHER
MOTHER
MOTHER
Etc.

A
B
C
D

Your kindness brightened not only the boy's life
yours and your husband's as well.

All
mothers

but

BRIGHTENED

YOU
(High)

I

I guess I'm marching to the "union drummer" because it's
the only drummer I have ever heard.

AM MARCHING

(High)

BILL

SUE

UNION DRUMMER
All
DRUMMER B
other
DRUMMER C
drummers
Etc.

Bill changed his last name but kept his first and middle
names the same.
CHANGED

(High)

BOY'S LIFE
‘YOUR LIFE
HUSBAND'S LIFE

FIRST NAME
MIDDLE NAME
LAST NAME

Sue is particularly afraid of big dogs, especially doberman pinschers.

AFRAID OF

DOBERMAN PINSCHERS
BIG DOGS
TYPE OF DOG C
TYPE OF DOG D
TYPE OF DOG E

All
other
kinds
of
dogs

Raters will not be required to identify whether the distinctiveness
information is hign or low. But we are interested in locating all applic
able instances of distinctiveness, so it may be helpful to understand the
difference between high and low types.
There are times when it will not be easy to tell whether the dis
tinctiveness information is high or low. For example:
I LIKE A NUMBER OF STRANGE FOODS.
In this case we do not know whether the distinctiveness is high or low.
If the person had said, "I like all strange foods," the distinctiveness
would be low. If the person had said, "I like few strange foods," the
distinctiveness would be high. In any event, the words "a number of"
in the above example do tell us something about the number of stimuli
toward which the person performs the behavior (e.g., "liking").
Therefore, this example would count as distinctiveness information.
C.

CONSENSUS INFORMATION

This type of information tells us about the number of other
people, besides the referent person, who perform the same behavior.
It can also refer to the number of other people who would be expected
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to perform the same behavior. Just like consistency and distinctive
ness, consensus information can be high or low. HIGH CONSENSUS would
indicate that most other people perform (or would be expected to perform)
the same behavior toward the stimulus:
PERSON
PERSON
PERSON
PERSON
With our example, "John laughed at the comedian," high consensus infor
mation might take this form:
EVERYONE LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHN
PERSON &
PERSON C
PERSON D

LAUGHED

COMEDIAN

LOW CONSENSUS would indicate that few other people perform (or
would be expected to perform) the same behavior:
PERSON
PERSON
PERSON
PERSON

A
B
C
D

VERB

•STIMULUS

With our example, "John laughed at the comedian," low consensus infor
mation might take this form:
NO ONE ELSE BESIDES JOHN LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN.
JOHNPERSON B
PERSON C
PERSON D

LAUGHED----------- -— COMEDIAN

Sometimes the number of different persons performing the behavior are
simply listed, as in:
JOHN, RUTH, STEVE AND GEORGE ALL LAUGHED AT THE
COMEDIAN.
High
Consensus

JOHN
RUTH
STEVE
GEORGE

LAUGHED

COMEDIAN

Or,
JOHN LAUGHED AT THE COMEDIAN, BUT RUTH, STEVE AND
GEORGE DID NOT.

Low
Consensus

RUTH
STEVE
GEORGE

LAUGHED

COMEDIAN

Sometimes, the forms of consensus that involve expectations for
others or for groups of others can be somewhat subtle. Again consider
our example, "John laughed at the comedian":
PEOPLE GENERALLY LAUGH AT THE COMEDIAN.
People
in
General

JOHN
PERSON A
PERSON B
PERSON C

LAUGH*

•COMEDIAN

In this case, there is high consensus on John's behavior.
pose the information was:

Sup

ALTHOUGH PEOPLE GENERALLY DO NOT LAUGH AT THE
COMEDIAN, JOHN DID.
JOHNPERSON A
PERSON B
PERSON C

•LAUGH

COMEDIAN

We know that "John laughed at the comedian" but the "People generally do
not laugh at the comedian," therefore there is low consensus on John's
behavior.
An even more subtle example might be:
HIGH CONSENSUS:

Women are known to laugh at the comedian.

LOW CONSENSUS:

Women usually do not laugh at the comedian.

Sometimes consensus information is not so subtle, as in:
HIGH CONSENSUS:

Eighty-eight percent of the audience laughed
at the comedian.

LOW CONSENSUS:

Twenty-two percent of the audience laughed at
the comedian.

One familiar type of consensus information that you have no doubt
encountered in commercial advertising involves rates of "expert" testi
mony, as in:
HIGH CONSENSUS:

Four out of five critics laughed at the
comedian.

LOW CONSENSUS:

One out of five critics laughed at the comedian.
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Here are a number of general examples of consensus information
as you might encounter them in the advice columns:
(High)
Men
in
General

Men shake hands as a matter of custom.

MAN A
MAN B
MAN C
MAN D
Etc.
(High)

Many
People

SHAKE HANDS WITH

OTHERS

I'm sure many people write to you to say how grateful
they are:

PERSON
PERSON
PERSON
PERSON
(High) All four gynecologists who examined me said there is
nothing physically wrong.
GYNECOLOGIST
GYNECOLOGIST
GYNECOLOGIST
GYNECOLOGIST
(Low)

Few
Women

RESIDENT
RESIDENT
RESIDENT
RESIDENT

•NOTHING IS PHYSICALLY WRONG

A
B
C
D

YOUR ACCENT

Few women share your dilemma.

WOMAN
WOMAN
WOMAN
WOMAN
WOMAN
Etc.
(Low)

SAID-

No one in Iowa has your accent.

IOWA
IOWA
IOWA
IOWA
(Low)

1
2
3
4

A
B
C
D
E

SHARE

YOUR DILEMMA

Only 1l of children are known to lie.

99% OF CHILDREN
1% OF CHILDREN-

TELL

LIES

As with Consistency and Distinctiveness, there will be times when
it will be difficult to determine whether the consensus information is
high or low. Since raters will not be required to identify whether the
information is high or low, this difficulty is not crucial. Nonetheless,
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it may be helpful to be aware of this difference between high and low
types when trying to identify consensus in the advice columns. Here are
some acceptable examples of consensus information that are not clearly
high or low:
- Some of us simply believe in -doing things the hard way.
- There are definitely people in the world who like to do
unkind things.
- Several participants rooted for the Twins.
- A certain percentage of people are afraid of public speaking.
D.

FINDING SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS
1.

PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW

The purpose of the present study is to use a naturalistic source
of social data, like the advice columns, in order to study how people
use information (e.g., Consistency, Distinctiveness and Consensus) in
order to support, clarify, defend or justify their explanations of be
havior. Unfortunately, this type of information is very difficult to
get at. There are many problems with wording, grammar and "figures of
speech" that sometimes cause the explanations and the information types
to become buried in the verbiage of the advice columns. Sometimes the
explanatory statement and the information types are separated from the
behavior by several sentences.
In order for the raters or coders to reliably locate (e.g., all
raters finding the same thing) the correct data, they must first become
totally familiar with the kinds of information types and how they relate
to explanatory statements. In addition, the raters must be given suf
ficient training and practice. This will help insure that all raters
are competent and will help to catch potential problems before they can
happen on the real experimental sample of advice columns. Some examples
of the three information types in the advice columns are used for
descriptive purposes only, and may or may not have anything to do with
an explanatory statement. Since the reliability of this coding format
is the "bottom line" of the present study, it is important for the
raters to locate information types in a clear and unambiguous fashion.
Also, it is important that each piece of supporting information be agreed
upon by several independent raters. In view of these considerations,
we have devised a structured procedure for finding information types.
The group of raters who will be using this coding manual will be
working from a set of explanatory statements that were found by another
group of raters. Each explanatory statement will be presented in its
simplified form, "REFERENT BECAUSE EXPLANATION," as described earlier.
In addition, the excerpt from the advice column that contained the ex
planatory statement will also be presented. The letter number and para
graph number for each explanatory statement will also be presented.
Finally, raters will be given the set of original advice column letters
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from which the explanatory statement was taken. The rater's job will
be to re-locate the explanatory statement in the original letter, and
then scour the letter for any pieces of supporting Consistency, Dis
tinctiveness and Consensus information.
2)

TEST QUESTIONS

To help structure the rater's search for supporting information,
three specific questions will be presented with each explanatory state
ment, one for each information type. Each question will be designed to
test for the presence of the specific information type. The general
form of the three questions will be as follows:
HOW CONSISTENT IS THE REFERENT BEHAVIOR?
HOW DISTINCTIVE IS THE REFERENT BEHAVIOR?
HOW MUCH CONSENSUS IS THERE ON THE REFERENT BEHAVIOR?
In the actual experimental sample, each question will be worded in ac
cordance with the actual referent (e.g., "person verb stimulus") being
explained. For instance, consider our previous example:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

John laughed at the comedian.
he has a good sense of humor.

CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has
John laughed at the comedian?

DISTINCTIVENESS:

At how many different comedians does John laugh?

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (do, would) laugh at the comedi
an?

Here is another example:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:
CONSISTENCY:

Sue is afraid of the dog.
he's a vicious animal,
How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has
Sue been afraid of the dog?

DISTINCTIVENESS:

How many different dogs is Sue afraid of?

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (are, would be) afraid of the
dog?

The rater's job will be to search the original advice column
letter for answers to the three questions. In some cases, the same ex
cerpt will contain several explanatory statements (and therefore several
referents), each with its own set of questions. Each set will be
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presented on its own data sheet. Sometimes, the questions for two dif
ferent explanatory statements will sound quite similar. It is impor
tant that the rater search for answers to questions that relate to the
specific referent. It is possible to get confused and search for an
answer while holding a previous referent in mind. This is why the ques
tions and explanatory statements will be presented on separate data
sheets. This potential confusion also highlights the importance of
carefully reading each excerpt, referent and explanation before begin
ning to search for answers to the questions. Also, when searching
through the original letter it will be helpful to re-read the referent
and the question several times.
3.

USING THE THREE TEST QUESTIONS

As stated earlier, some pieces of information are vague or im
plied. It will be necessary for the rater to carefully consider each
sentence in the letter to see if it is usable as an answer to one of the
test questions. The three test questions are designed to be used only
as a guide to help organize and structure a search for the three infor
mation types. It will be helpful for each rater to be aware of how vari
able the information types will be presented in actual advice column
letters. Sometimes an instance of information will not be an exact
answer to one of the questions. For this reason it is important for the
raters to understand, in theory, what consistency, distinctiveness and
consensus information are.
In the advice columns, the three types of supporting information
are presented in various locations and frequencies. The information
can show up before the explanation or referent, or it can show up after
the explanation or referent, or it can even show up as part of the ex
planation or referent. Supporting information types are frequently
separated from the explanation or referent by several sentences. At
times, several information types may be used to support a single explana
tory statement (e.g., both Consistency and Distinctiveness may be used).
Occasionally, the same information type may be used more than once
(e.g., two instances of Consensus) for a single explanatory statement.
Also, the same piece of information may be used to answer questions for
different explanatory statements (e.g., one instance of Consistency in
formation may be used to answer the consistency test questions for two
or more explanatory statements. We are interested in collecting al1
of these available pieces of supporting information. Finally, it is
important to note that there are times when jto supporting information
is used with an explanatory statement.
Since some collectible pieces of information are not exact
answers to the test questions, it will be important for raters to be
aware of the following variations.
a.

REFERENT PLURALS

As noted above, a piece of supporting information may be part of
the actual referent. Anytime a rater sees that the person in the referent
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is presented in plural form (e.g., People, Men, Teachers, Parents,
Couples, They and I, Thousands of children, etc.) they should automat
ically consider the possibility that this is an instance of consensus
information. Here are two examples:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

People get upset about the police
they are often incompetent.
Many of us uphold these principles
it says so in the Bible.

Similarly, any time a rater sees that the stimulus in the referent is pre
sented in plural (e.g., others, people, mom and dad, a therapist or coun
selor, these three items, etc.) they should automatically consider the
possibility that this is an instance of distinctiveness information.
Here are two examples:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

I have married my share of couples

REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

She is bothered by barking dogs

I am a justice of the peace.

she has trouble concentrating.

Sometimes both the person and the stimulus in the referent are presented
in plural form, so both consensus and distinctiveness should be con
sidered. Here are two examples:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

Men use women

REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

Children must cope with frustrations

they were raised to be that way.

it is part of life.

A more subtle type of plural involves generalizations or norms.
ample:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

For ex

The man should be the boss
it is expected.

In this case the man refers to men in general, so this would be consensus
information. Here is another example:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

I always thank the host
I feel better about myself when I do.
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In this case, the host refers to any host, so this would be distinctive
ness information.
One exception to these rules about plurals involves the use of
words like "we" or "them." For example:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

We enjoy being married
it is right for us as a couple.

In this case, even though the person is in plural form, consensus would
be present only if there was information about the number of other
couples who also enjoy being married.
b.

CONSISTENCY IN THE REFERENT

Consistency information can also be presented as part of the re
ferent. This is usually signaled by the presence of some key word
which reveals the variation of the referent behavior over time. Here
are several examples:
-

He continues to be aggravated by his boss.
It is unusual for us to argue over money.
Mi 11y rarely speaks for herself.
Sue will never read your letter again.
I always dress nicely.
Since I turned 21, I have consumed alcohol excessively.

Sometimes, consistency information is presented in the referent when the
behavior is described as occurring in various situations. Here are a
couple of examples:
- People discuss politics at school, at work, and at home.
- She is a messy eater, whether it is at breakfast, luncF
or dinner.
c.

NEGATIVES AND OPPOSITES

As noted above, the test questions are to be used only as a guide
for conducting the information type search. There are times when an in
stance of one of the information types does not answer a test question
exactly, and yet it will still be an acceptable piece of consistency,
distinctiveness or consensus. Consider this example:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

People should not resort to welfare

Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:

People
should not resort to
welfare

they should work for their keep.
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The consensus test question would be:
CONSENSUS:

How many people (do, would, should) not resort to
welfare?

The first noticeable piece of consensus lies in the referent itself, be
cause the person is presented in plural form (e.g., people in general
should not resort to welfare). Suppose that the following piece of in
formation also appeared somewhere in the original advice column letter:
Many folks survive entirely on welfare.
Notice that the consensus information question asked about how many people
do not resort to welfare. The above piece of information tells us about
how many people do resort to welfare. Even though that piece of infor
mation does not answer the test question exactly, it would still be an
acceptable piece of consensus.
It is acceptable because it does give us
information about the variation of the person.
Here is another example:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

Bernard will not come to our party

Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:

Bernard
will not come to
our party

he knows Beth will be there.

The consistency test question would be:
CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings)
has Bernard not come to our party?

Suppose the following piece of information appeared somewhere in the
original advice column letter:
Bernard always loved to come to our parties.
Notice that the consistency information question asked about how often
in the past Bernard would not come to our parties. Even though the
above piece of information does not answer the test question exactly,
it would still be an acceptable piece of consistency. The information
that "Bernard has always come to the parties in the past" tells us
something about how consistent his not coming is.
For the sake of completeness, here is an example involving dis
tinctiveness:
REFERENT:
BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

Henry thinks a lot about adopting a child
he knows his wife would love it.
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Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:

Henry
thinks about
adopting a child

First note that thinks a lot reveals consistency information.
the distinctiveness test question:
DISTINCTIVENESS:

Here is

About how many different aspects of adopting
a child does Henry think?

Suppose the following piece of information appeared somewhere in the
original advice column letter:
Henry tries not to think about all the paperwork,
the legal hassles, and the long delay involved.
Notice that the distinctiveness information question asked about how
many different aspects of adopting a child that Henry does think about.
The above piece of information tells us about how many different aspects
he does not think about. This is still an acceptable piece of distinc
tiveness information because it provides data on the variation of the
stimulus.
When processing the experimental sample, the raters should re
member that the test questions are to serve only as a guide. It is im
portant to be alert for both positive and negative variations of the
person (consensus), the stimulus (distinctiveness) and time/situations
(consistency).
E. PROCEDURE
The following procedure should be used by all raters:
1) Read the excerpt, the simplified explanatory statement (e.g.,
REFERENT BECAUSE EXPLANATION), the simplified referent (e.g.,
person verb stimulus) and the three test questions.
2) Locate the correct letter and paragraph from the selection
of original letters using the I.D. number at the top of
each data sheet.
3) Read the entire original letter in order to become familiar
with its content.
4) Do one question at a time.
5) Start from the beginning of the letter (not just the beginning
of the paragraph) for each question.
6 ) If you find information that enables you to answer a question,
write in that information under the question that it refers
to.
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7) Write in the supporting information just as it appears in
the original letter. If you feel you need to explain your
choice of information, or show why it is correct, place
your clarification in parentheses next to the piece of
information.
8 ) If you find more than one piece of supporting informa
tion that answers a given question (e.g., two instances of
Consistency), then number your pieces of information (e.g.,
1, 2, 3, etc.). Present instances of information in the
order in which they appear in the original letter.
9) If you are not able to locate a piece of information that
will answer the question, write in the words "NO INFO"
under the question.
10) Complete one question before going on to the next.
11) Complete all three questions for one explanatory statement
before going on to the next data sheet.
F. TIPS AND SUGGESTIONS
As stated before, reliability is the "bottom line" of the experi
ment. It is essential that those information types that are found be
agreed upon by the majority of our raters.
There is a very real tendency to "read into" the advice columns.
A rater may sometimes get "the feeling" that a particular information
type is being presented but they can find no clear proof of it. We are
interested in finding all available pieces of information that can be
agreed upon by several independent raters. There are two "rules of thumb"
that may be helpful. First, if a rater finds himself/herself thinking
too much, or twisting words around too much, chances are he/she has lo
cated an unreliable piece of supporting information. However, it is im
portant for us to find all available pieces of information, and this may
involve "playing" with the sentences in one's mind to see if they can
be used as an answer to one of the questions. There will no doubt be
times when a rater must make a "judgment call." This brings us to the
second rule of thumb which is simply to use common sense.

G.

SAMPLE INFORMATION TYPE SEARCHES
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EXCERPT:

About eight months ago she launched into one of her
middle-of-the-night screaming fits. I belted her in the
mouth. From that day on she never had another nightmare
Now she is trying to make me feel gui1ty--claims I am
a wife beater. Actually, it's the only time I ever laid
a hand on her.

REFERENT:

I belted her

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

she launched into one of her middle-of-the-night scream
ing fits.

Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:

I
belted
her

CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has
he belted her?

Actually, it's the only time I laid a hand on her.

DISTINCTIVENESS:

How many different people does he belt?

NO INFO

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (do, would, should) belt her?

NO INFO
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EXCERPT:

About eight months ago she launched into one of her
middle-of-the-night screaming fits. I belted her in the
mouth. From that day on she never had another nightmare.
Now she is trying to make me feel guilty--claims I am a
wife beater. Actually, it's the only time I laid a hand
on her.

REFERENT:

She never had another nightmare

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

I belted her.

Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:

She
had not
nightmare

CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has
she not had nightmares?

She never had another nightmare.

DISTINCTIVENESS:

How many different types of nightmares does she no
longer have?

. . . she launched into one of the middle-of-the-night
screaming fits . . . she never had another nightmare.

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (do, would, should) not have
ni ghtmares?

NO INFO
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EXCERPT:

You need psychiatric help to get over your phobia which
is uncommon but not unheard of.

REFERENT:

You need psychiatric help

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

of your phobia.

Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:

You
need
psychiatric help

CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings) have
you needed psychiatric help?

NO INFO

DISTINCiIVENESS:

How many different types of professional help have you
needed?

NO INFO

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (do, would, should) need such
psychiatric help?

. . uncommon but not unheard of.
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EXCERPT:

The little boy is five years old. I'm sure he has never
heard the words, "I love you" from his parents. The
father's idea of attention is constant criticism, bark
ing commands and threats of physical violence. What's
unfortunate is that the boy's other relatives also fail
to express any love for him.

REFERENT:

He has never heard the words "I love you" from his parents.

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

The father's idea of attention is constant criticism,
barking commands and threats of physical violence.

Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:

He
has not heard the words "I love you" from
his parents

CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings) has
he not heard the words "I love you" from his parents?

I'm sure he has never heard the words "I love you" from
his parents.

DISTINCTIVENESS:

From how many others does he not hear the words "I
love you"?

The boy's other relatives also fail to express any
love for him.

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (do, would, should) fail to hear
the words "I love you" from their parents?

NO INFO
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EXCERPT:

When I am introduced to a new person, I extend my hand.
Most people reciprocate, but too many appear uncomfortable.
Either they will not put out their hand, or when they do,
you get a dead fish.

REFERENT:

I extend my hand

BECAUSE
EXPLANATION:

I am introduced to a new person.

Person:
Verb:
Stimulus:

I
extend my hand to
others

CONSISTENCY:

How often in the past (or, in how many settings) do I
extend my hand to others?

When I am introduced to a new person, I extend my hand
(e.q., Whenever I meet a new person I consistently
extend my hand).

DISTINCTIVENESS: Toward how many different people do I extend my hand?

NO INFO

CONSENSUS:

How many other people (do, would, should) extend their
hand to others?

Most people reciprocate (e.g., most people also extend
their hands).
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